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ABSTRACT 
 
Examining the case law of the ECJ reveals that the multilingual nature of the 
EU presents numerous problems, such as the relative rather than absolute 
equality of languages, and translation errors that lead to non-uniform law due 
to the impossibility of perfect translation. This directly limits the application of 
the legal certainty aspect of the Rule of Law, thus putting into question the 
EU’s democratic viability. 
Democracy is dependent on communication opportunity, something which 
the Union is lacking due to its multilingual nature. To solve these legitimacy 
problems created by the EU’s multilingual nature, it is necessary to 
understand the force of language as a concept in its own right. 
Western linguistic theory tells us that each language encodes a particular 
experience of the world and that its use might predispose its speakers to see 
the world according to the experience encoded in it. Not only this, but that 
language holds such power due to the significant role of a common language 
collective identity formation.  
In order to solve, or at least mitigate the democratic legitimacy issues which 
arise due to the EU’s multilingual nature, we must forge a European identity 
which is not dependant on the feature of a common language. Accepted 
beliefs and archetypes of identity are deconstructed and then reconstructed 
in a way which uses alternate features which allow for democratic 
participation without the precondition of a common language.   
viii 
 
Rather than trying to solve the language problem with a language solution (as 
has been done before), this thus provides new and original theoretical 
solutions to a practical language problem by suggesting that it can be 
overcome if we redefine our accepted notions of identity in the post-national 
sense and look at the problem through a wider lens. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his 2008 seminal book A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity and Polity 
Building in Europe, Peter Kraus reasons that the European Union’s democratic 
deficit is not merely due to the governance of the Union’s institutions lacking 
procedural democratic legitimacy, but rather is caused by the lacking existence 
of a European people or demos.  Citing Dieter Grimm’s 1995 essay ‘Does Europe 
Need a Constitution’, Kraus writes: 
According to Grimm, plans elaborated with the intention of enhancing 
the democratic integration of the EU are bound to remain irrelevant as 
long as there are no real opportunities for cultural integration across 
national borders.  The constitutional lawyer is particularly sceptical 
about the chances of establishing a European community of 
participation without first creating a European community of 
communication.  He uses a straightforward line of argument to stress 
this point: there can be no European public sphere because there is no 
European people (in the sense of a demos possessing a collective 
identity that would serve as a frame for political unity); and there can 
be no European people because there is no common European 
language.1 (my emphasis) 
It was the ultimate statement of this quote that prompted the line of research 
and search for answers that constitute this thesis. Initially I had begun by 
looking into the language situation of the European Union: how it practically 
worked on a day-to-day basis; whether there were any serious issues in law 
created by the multilingual nature of the EU; and how the EU dealt with these. 
I had the intention of looking at the multilingual legal situation through the eyes 
of a linguist, given that my background is in languages and linguistic theory (in 
an English Literature context). When I came across Grimm’s assertion 
highlighted above, I began to look into the reasons why he might suggest that 
                                                          
1 P. A. Kraus, A union of diversity: language, identity and polity-building in Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
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there can be no European people without a common language.  And also why 
is it that both Kraus and Grimm reason this to be the cause of the EU’s 
democratic deficit.  After reading Grimm’s 1995 essay the force of his argument 
became clear: for Grimm, democracy is dependent on communication 
opportunity, something which the Union is explicitly lacking due to the 
inexistence of a common language. 
After reading both Kraus and Grimm, I was left with this problem:  I was 
fervently convinced by their arguments that the reason for the democratic 
deficit in the EU was due to the inexistence of a true collective demos, which in 
itself was due to the lack of communication opportunities resulting from the 
lack of a common language across the states of the European Union. However 
I still had not been presented with an adequate explanation as to why it was 
that language stood in the way of a European demos, and I also had not been 
presented with any clear solution to this vast and confusing problem. Grimm 
had considered whether the creation of a European constitution would lead to 
a sense of belonging and thus forge a demos amongst the European people by 
circumventing the barrier created by the lack of a common language; 
constructing communication opportunities through constitutionalism. 
However, I was not strongly enough convinced by his argument that a demos 
could form a strong collective attachment around such emotionally detached 
political and legal concepts and initiatives (as discussed in Chapter Five of this 
thesis).  What is more, 20 years on from when Grimm wrote his essay, it could 
most certainly be argued that the attempt to create a European constitution 
was not met with the greatest amount of support from all citizens of the EU; 
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which in my opinion was partly due to the fact that the people themselves did 
not feel like a collective people and thus were hesitant of constitutionalism. The 
feeling of being a collective must come before such processes if they are to 
succeed. 
If I were to understand why the lack of a common language was hindering the 
creation of a demos and subsequently causing a communicative democratic 
deficit, the first thing I needed to do was to get a full understanding of the 
language situation of the EU.  Practically, were/are any accepted democratic 
procedures being blocked by the multilingual situation of the EU? Answering 
this question involved looking at the legal status of the 24 treaty languages 
within the Union, as well as that of minority languages. It also involved looking 
at the procedural role of certain dominant languages and looking at case law 
where translation errors and impossibilities had caused the law of the European 
Union to be confused. Not only that but, as evidenced in ECJ case law, the 
complications arising from multilingualism can diminish legal certainty, the 
equal enforcement of the law and the equality of all language versions, thus 
negating the accessibility and foreseeability criteria of the Rule of Law; a critical 
feature that must be present if the EU is to function as a democratic entity. In 
demonstrating that the lack of a common language is undeniably causing not 
only a barrier to communication opportunities between the citizen and the 
institutions of the EU, but also that the consequence of this was a hindrance to 
the democratic viability of the EU as a whole I had discovered the problem I 
wished to solve: Is creating a solidly defined European demos the answer to 
the EU’s language problem? 
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Whether or not the European Union is moving towards, or even desires to move 
towards a more ‘nation-state’ type role is of little consequence.  The fact is that 
one of the founding principles of the EU is respect for democracy and the Rule 
of Law, and so in order to uphold these principles the EU must establish greater 
and more equal communicative participation possibilities for the speakers of 
all 24 official languages within its borders.  But, for this to be possible, there 
must be defined European demos. So, what does this mean? By demos, I mean 
a people or a public, connected by a subconscious sense of belonging between 
them. Or, ‘a group of people, the vast majority of which feels sufficiently 
attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic discourse and 
binding decision-making’. 2  Joseph Weiler named this the ‘subjective 
manifestation of peoplehood’, consisting of ‘a sense of social cohesion, shared 
destiny, and collective self-identity which, in-turn, result in and deserve 
loyalty’.3 This demos of which I speak must be distinguished from ‘citizenry’, 
which is more of a ‘legal people’. Citizenry ‘can be created from the top via the 
formation of institutions, including rights and citizenship’. 4  A demos in 
comparison, is a form of social people, created from the ground by the people 
and their subconscious attachment to one another, generated by a number of 
factors such as a shared history, a common language and common myths, all of 
which combine to create ‘subjective emotional elements such as solidarity and 
identity’.5  
                                                          
2 L. E Cederman, ‘Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a European 
Demos’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2001, p. 144. 
3 J. H. H. Weiler, U. R. Haltern and F. C. Mayer, ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, West European 
Politics, Vol. 18. No. 3, 1995, p. 10. 
4 M. Jolly, ‘A Demos for the European Union?’, Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2005, pp. 14-15. 
5 Jolly, ‘A Demos for the European Union?’, p. 15. 
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Now that I had my problem, I needed to try and solve it. The next step was to 
understand the force of language as a means of communication. If I were to 
consider the possibility that the language problem (as I perceived it to be) of 
the European Union could be overcome in order to create a community of 
participation without the condition of a common language, then understanding 
the nature of the beast was necessary.  It was at this point that I began to see 
Grimm’s reasoning behind linking the lack of communication opportunity to the 
lack of a European demos and why these two, for Grimm at least, are one in 
the same problem.  
Whilst vastly oversimplifying the field of study, Western linguistic theory tells 
us that each language encodes a particular experience of the world and that its 
use might predispose its speakers to see the world according to the experience 
encoded in it. In doing so, a common language becomes the founding building 
block of what we, as individuals, feel to be our identity in the collective sense. 
Our sense of belonging as a collective demos within a defined state-like entity 
has largely been determined by the language that we speak to others within 
that demos.  Returning to Grimm’s line of thought: “there can be no European 
public sphere because there is no European people (in the sense of a demos 
possessing a collective identity that would serve as a frame for political unity); 
and there can be no European people because there is no common European 
language”. If the reason why there is not currently true democratic 
participation is because there is no true or defined European demos, then 
surely the solution lies in creating that demos in a way that it is dissociated from 
the pre-condition of a common language. Grimm’s argument is based on the 
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idea that for a European public sphere to exist, a European people is necessary. 
His flaw was not seeing the possibility of a “people” without the pre-requisite 
of a common language.  His thinking is too rooted in the idea of demos (or 
collective identity) that we have commonly accepted in our Western, post-
Enlightenment, nationalistic way of thinking. However the fact is that this idea 
of collective identity is an artificial construction that we have come to accept. 
Therefore it should logically follow that it should be possible to deconstruct this 
idea in order to then re-construct new artificial components of identity 
formation to form a supra-national demos. By removing language’s position as 
the most significant marker in collective identity formation, it could be possible 
to form a collective demos at the European level which allows for democratic 
participation.  
In order to consider how this might be done it was necessary for me to look at 
the role language has played, along with other staple archetypes such as flags, 
anthems etc., in the forming of national identities.  Only through understanding 
how identity at the national level (post-Enlightenment) has been constructed 
could I hope to understand how a European demos without the common 
language factor could be shaped. That being said, the task does not only involve 
creating an idea for a defined European people or demos at the collective 
identity level, but also considering the need for a more solidly comprehensible 
definition of the Union itself.  In its current ill-defined, “supranational” state the 
lack of a concrete definition is a further hindrance to citizens’ identification with 
the Union.   
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Through exploring and understanding the reasons for the lack of a true 
European demos, this thesis culminates by making suggestions on how to move 
forward and potentially manoeuvre the barrier created by the lack of a 
common language to form a demos that isn’t reliant on it as a factor; which 
would hopefully go some way in improving the EU’s democratic legitimacy 
problem.  The European Union itself needs to be defined in a way that its 
citizens understand its nature. The competences of the Union have been 
continually advancing since its naissance; growing from a simple economic 
union, to a political, legal and social union over its lifetime.  As an entity, it is 
not like anything which has existed before; it is neither a federation nor a 
confederation; not a nation nor simply an international organisation. We tend 
to describe it as a supranational entity, a definition which goes no way in 
helping the citizen understand the relationship between the citizen and the EU.  
I argue that in order to begin this process the EU needs to have geographically 
defined borders. This links to the theory that in order for a people to define 
themselves, there must be an “Other” against which they can project an idea 
of what they are not.  If the EU does not set a limit on future accessions, then 
the European people will not know what they are as what they are not may one 
day become what they are. I also suggest that it is necessary to define the 
European Union in terms that do not evoke connotations of the nation. As if we 
wish to form a solid collective identity at the European level, it must not in any 
way conflict with, or even appear in name to conflict with our pre-existing 
national identities. 
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The other half of the battle concerns re-working our idea of collective identity 
in order to hypothesise about how a post-national European identity could be 
forged and thus create a European demos that feels able to actively 
democratically participate without having a common European language. This 
involves continuing discussion on the idea of “the other” as well as considering 
more positive archetypes that could be reinforced, such as the use of an 
identity formed around a future ideology rather than past myths (as with 
national identity). 
By moving away from traditional thought, a diverse, multilingual polity which 
includes the democratic participation of the European demos is actually 
possible for the EU. This approach evidently directly concerns my original 
contribution to the field of research. The novelty of my research is evident in 
two ways.  
 Firstly, to my knowledge, no attempt has been made to resolve the EU’s 
language problem, which is essentially a legal and political democratic 
legitimacy problem, by suggesting that it can be overcome if we redefine 
our accepted notions of identity in the post-national sense.  Rather than 
trying to solve the language problem with a language solution, I have used 
an approach which takes into account language as a concept in its own right, 
rather than just language and the law. By doing so, I have been able to 
consider solutions that legal scholars would not, solutions which are also 
novel in their own right. In the final chapter of this thesis I suggest that in 
order to form a European demos which does not conflict with pre-existing 
national identities, yet is also able to overcome the pre-condition of a 
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common language, we should form European collective identity using the 
format but not the content of national identity.  
 Secondly, throughout the final chapters of the thesis I am critical of the 
approach the EU has thus far taken in its attempts to forge a European 
identity, that is to say, its decision to emulate markers of national identity. 
However, this criticism lead me to the idea that if European identity is to 
have the same strength as national identity, yet not come into conflict with 
it, we should follow the format of national identity formation, but not in any 
way try to emulate its content (see Chapter 5, Sections 3.a and 3.b). As was 
stated above, the European public sphere must be truly defined and re-
created, given that the communication between political authority and 
people is an important source of legitimacy in Western democracies.   
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THESIS OUTLINE 6 
There are 5 chapters in this thesis, plus this Introduction and a Conclusion. As 
the introduction has already laid out, the hypothesis that will be tested 
throughout this thesis is: Is creating a solidly defined European demos the 
answer to the EU’s language problem?  
Chapter One opens the thesis by outlining and discussing what the actual 
language situation of the European Union is. The chapter discusses several 
elements of the position of languages within the EU, such as the legislation 
which is in place to protect linguistic diversity, the treaty prescribed language 
distinctions, and the ECJ’s approaches to linguistic interpretation. Chapter Two 
then moves on to consider the implications that the EU’s multilingual situation 
has on linguistic human rights and the legal certainty aspect of the Rule of Law.  
Chapter Three then has the role of explaining why a multilingual entity such as 
the EU will inevitably create such problems by delving into the world of 
linguistic theory as a means of explaining language both as a tool for 
communication and as a feature of our subconscious which impacts our 
thoughts processes and plays a significant role in our collective identity 
formation, and what this therefore means for multilingual political entities such 
as the EU. This chapter looks at the EU through the eyes of a linguist to discover 
                                                          
6 Structuring my thesis in such a way was a conscious choice given the diverse nature of subjects 
covered throughout. In view of the fact that the content ranges from EU Law, to linguistic theory, to 
identity formation, it made logical sense to begin by firstly laying out the language situation of the EU, 
followed by the resulting problems which present themselves from this, before then offering an 
explanation as to why these problems occur (using linguistic theory), and then finally presenting 
potential solutions given the theoretical knowledge gained about language as a concept. 
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whether theoretical linguistic considerations could point the EU towards a 
solution for its multilingualism caused problems.  
The understanding of language as a concept gained through Chapter Three 
leads to the conclusion that there is no simple language solution to the 
problems created by multilingualism in the European Union. That in fact, the 
problems caused by the multilingual nature of the EU stem from language’s 
position as a significant marker of collective identity. As such, Chapter Four 
starts from the position that it is necessary to delve further into language as a 
marker of collective identity if a solution is to be found which mitigates the day-
to-day problems caused by multilingualism and allows for democratic 
participation without a common language. Chapter Four discusses what is 
meant by “identity” and also what steps have been made to form a European 
identity. This chapter is rather descriptive and arguably opens more issues than 
it solves. This is because Chapters 4 and 5 are two sides of the same coin in their 
exploration of identity, existing European identity and its downfalls, and how a 
European identity could and should be forged which could resolve the 
legitimacy problems caused by the multilingual nature of the European Union. 
Therefore many issues raised in Chapter Four are left unresolved until Chapter 
Five, when they are discussed in relation to a possible solution rather than as 
an existing problem.  
Chapter Five is where my original contribution really comes to fruition. It 
considers how a European collective identity could be formed; firstly based on 
the path that the EU has thus far followed, and secondly if we were to be able 
to start from scratch. I explore the existing theories of Constitutional Patriotism 
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and Deep Diversity in order to demonstrate their weaknesses (and strengths) 
against my own theory.  
The solutions presented are undoubtedly highly theoretical in nature, yet their 
content can be justified given the detailed consideration of linguistic theory and 
examination of identity and European identity that came before them.  They 
offer a means of alleviating the practical burden that multilingualism places on 
the institutions of the European Union, as well as presenting a means of 
lessening the consequences this multilingualism creates for legal certainty, 
foreseeability of the law, accessibility of the law and participatory 
communication possibility between the citizen and the institutions of the EU. 
Thus, the suggested solutions are borne out of a justified theoretical view that, 
whether there are practical, linguistic barriers in place or not, democratic 
participation can be made possible through the forging of a demos. That is to 
say, through the act of making the collective feel as though they belong, which 
consequently makes them feel able to participate and communicate even if the 
practical barriers remain in place. 
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CHAPTER 1.  
MULTILINGUALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE SITUATION AT PRESENT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Unity/United in Diversity’ is the motto of the European Union, and as it stands 
today the EU must legislate in the 24 official languages that traverse its 28 
Member States, meaning that there are a total of 552 possible language 
combinations and as such linguistic concerns must be at the forefront of all 
legislative issues, be they social, political or economic.  
This chapter outlines the current linguistic regime of the European Union by 
discussing the legislation that is in place to protect the linguistic equality of the 
official languages of the Member States.  The Union prescribed distinctions 
between treaty languages, official languages, working languages and 
languages of the case is discussed as a means of demonstrating the lack of 
procedural inequality of languages that runs throughout the institutions of the 
EU in spite of the protective legislation in place. The teleological and literal 
methods adopted by the European Court of Justice when interpreting unclear 
legislation is then considered as a means of introducing the idea that the 
unequal treatment of languages can result in a lack of certainty and 
predictability in the law.  By considering certain prominent cases of the 
European Court of Justice this chapter reveals that the Union’s current situation 
presents numerous shortcomings such as the relative rather than absolute 
equality of languages and translation errors that lead to non-uniform law due 
to the impossibility of perfect translation. Finally, I introduce the discussion on 
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what this clear and evident linguistic uncertainty means for the existence of the 
legal certainty aspect of the Rule of Law within the European Union and its 
democratic legitimacy7 (a discussion which continues into the next chapter).  
The alternative option of a lingua franca is contrasted against the current  
linguistic regime, revealing that this choice would result in the ever-more 
problematic possibility that citizens would be unable to truly communicate with 
the political powers that govern them as ‘one’s language determines the 
structure of one’s thoughts and how one perceives the world’.8   
I ask you to keep in mind that the aim of this chapter is not to offer a fully 
comprehensive exploration of the translation, drafting and interpretation 
services of the European Union but rather to present the facts concerning the 
language situation of the EU and thus demonstrate a definite problem of 
unequal applicability and foreseeability of the laws of the EU caused by its 
multilingual nature. In doing so this chapter establishes the existence of an 
inherent problem of the EU and brings into question its democratic legitimacy. 
The inconsistencies highlighted below can be described as practical democratic 
legitimacy problems which, in reality, cannot feasible be overcome if the 
                                                          
7 ‘Legitimacy’, for the purposes of this thesis, encompasses the ideas purported by such academics as 
Joseph Weiler, David Robertson, Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione. Their works suggest that 
legitimacy has two components: one formal and one social; or one internal and one external. Formal 
legitimacy corresponds to legality and thus concerns the democratic institutions and processes of law-
making within the European Union. On the other hand, social legitimacy does not take procedures into 
account, but rather refers to a broad social acceptance of the system. (see: D. Fuchs, H. D. Klingemann, 
Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, pp. 4-
5). Based on these ideas of legitimacy, the question of legitimacy when raised in this thesis refers to the 
relationship between and existence/inexistence of both of these components.  There are of course the 
procedural (formal legitimacy) issues caused by multilingualism which are discussed at length in this 
chapter and the next. However, to ignore the social legitimacy impact of this would be to narrowly 
understand the issues at hand. Taking into account this social element, there are academics who are 
that democratic legitimacy is not possible without a true European demos being created (for example 
see the works of Alex Warleigh, Dimitris Chryssochoou and Christopher Lord referenced in ch. 4, section. 
3.c of this thesis). This is why the overarching solution (see ch. 4 and ch. 5) to the formal legitimacy 
issues raised in this thesis is one which looks to the power of social legitimacy (i.e. demos formation) to 
mitigate the issues surrounding procedural legitimacy. 
8 P. Trudgill, Sociolinguistics: an introduction to language and society, Penguin Publishing, 1983, p. 24. 
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institutions of the EU are to function on a day-to-day basis. What I believe must 
be done is discover a theoretical solution to a practical problem. If we cannot 
overcome the problem itself, we must instead make the citizens of the EU feel 
as though such problems do not affect their communication possibility, sense 
of equality and democratic participation with the European Union at large. 
Therefore, what follows in this chapter lays out the existence and extent of a 
serious legitimacy problem that I do not believe can be solved through changes 
in language regime or the implementation of more robust translation, 
interpretation and drafting services. 
 
CHAPTER 1. SECTION 1 
WHAT THE TREATIES SAY 9 
The multilingual nature of the European Union is what distinguishes it from 
other forms of international organisations. Linguistic concerns are of much 
greater issue for the European Union than other international organisations 
given that ‘unlike conventional international law, much of European [Union] 
law is directly and immediately applicable to individual citizens of its member 
states’.10 From its naissance it has been politically, economically, culturally and 
linguistically intertwined.  ‘Unlike international law that is generally transferred 
into each national system in order to be applied to that country’s citizens, the 
                                                          
9 For a comprehensive exploration of the EU’s approach to translation of legal texts and legislation see: 
ch.9 of The Ashgate Handbook of Legal Translation, edited by Professor Le Cheng, Ms Anne Wagner, Dr 
King Kui Sin; Martina Künnecke, ‘Translation in the EU: Language and the Law in the EU’s Judicial 
Labyrinth’, Maastricht Journal (2013), available at 
<http://www.maastrichtjournal.eu/pdf_file/its/mj_20_02_0243.pdf>; Susan Šarčević, Language and 
Culture in EU Law: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2015 
10 R. Huntington, ‘European Unity and the Tower of Babel’, Boston University International Law Journal, 
vol. 9, 1991, p. 327. 
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EU passes its own laws. Member states have transferred part of their 
sovereignty and some of their political power to the Union and, where a dispute 
arises, EU law takes precedence over national law.’ 11  The legal basis of 
multilingualism in the European Union can be found in 3 places: firstly, Article 
342 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union; secondly in Article 
22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which provides for protection of the 
linguistic diversity); and finally in Council Regulation no. 1/1958 EEC (which 
establishes the languages to be used by the then Community). In this first 
Regulation of the EEC, adopted by the founding Member States of France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1958, it states 
that the four languages of Dutch, French, German and Italian would be equally 
official, that all official EU documents would be written in each of these 
languages and that each language version was equally authoritative with no 
version being privileged as “the original”.12  This is further backed up by Article 
1 of the Regulation which determines that ‘The official languages and the 
working languages of the institutions of the Community shall be Dutch, French, 
German and Italian’. Successive enlargement has taken the number of official 
languages afforded this same equal authority up to 24.13   
REGULATION No 1 determining the languages to be used by the 
European Economic Community 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Having 
regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules 
governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, 
                                                          
11 A. Felici, ‘Translating EU law: legal issues and multiple dynamics’, Perspectives: Studies in 
Translatology, vol. 18, no. 2, June 2010, p. 95. 
12 EEC Regulation 1958/1/EEC determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community, Article. 4, [1958]. 
13 Since 1st July 2013 the 24 official languages are: French, German, Italian, Dutch, English, Danish, Irish, 
Portuguese, Spanish, Greek, Finnish, Swedish, Estonian, Latvian, Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Polish, Slovak, Slovene, Bulgarian, Romanian and Croatian. 
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without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure 
of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting 
unanimously; Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty 
is drafted is recognised as an official language in one or more of the 
Member States of the Community; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
 
Article 1 
The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of 
the Union shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, 
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, 
Spanish and Swedish. 
 
Article 2 
Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction 
of a Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be 
drafted in any one of the official languages selected by the sender. 
The reply shall be drafted in the same language. 
 
Article 3 
Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member 
State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall 
be drafted in the language of such State. 
 
Article 4 
Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted 
in the official languages. 
 
Article 5 
The Official Journal of the European Union shall be published in the 
official languages. 
 
Article 6 
The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of 
procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases. 
 
Article 7 
The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall 
be laid down in its rules of procedure. 
 
Article 8 
If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to 
be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general 
rules of its law. 
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This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in 
all Member States.14 
 
Although the European Union cannot be said to have an official language policy 
as such the above charter gives faith in the Union’s commitment to fostering a 
multilingual sphere in which the equal authority of official languages is 
legislatively determined.  Successive accession treaties also demonstrate a 
definite consideration for the equal respect of official languages and 
maintenance of the linguistic diversity of the Union.  Art.53 of The Treaty of 
Amsterdam 1997 states: 
This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Danish, Dutch, English, 
French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish 
languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, 
shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian 
Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the 
governments of the other signatory States. 
Pursuant to the Accession Treaty of 1994, the Finnish and Swedish 
versions of the Treaty shall also be authentic.15 
The continued legislative recognition of the importance of multilingualism and 
the equal authenticity of all official languages is not merely for the internal, 
institutional workings of the European Union but more importantly perhaps, 
the ability of the citizen to address the various institutions of the Union also.  
Originally enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 of Council Regulation 1/58/EEC, ‘the 
right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European 
Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union 
in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language’ has 
                                                          
14 EEC Council, Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community, 6 October 1958, Article 4. 
15 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C 340/1, Article. 53. 
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been preserved in successive treaty articles .16  The Union’s consideration for 
the need for national courts and citizens to understand the laws that are 
binding upon them is further laid out in the ‘Translating for a Multilingual 
Community’ booklet prepared by the Directorate General for Translation of the 
European Commission: 
The Commission serves the European Union and its citizens, a 
community quite different from that served by traditional 
intergovernmental organisations. Its legislation has to be published in 
the official languages of all the Member States because it becomes their 
national law as well and thus directly binding on all their citizens. So 
these citizens — and their national courts — must be able to read and 
understand it in their own languages. But well before that point, 
proposals must be aired for the widest possible debate at all levels — 
European, national and local — in forms accessible to non-linguists and 
non-diplomats. Everyone in the Union is entitled to contribute to the 
discussion in the official language of his or her choice. It is a question of 
transparency and democracy. This is why, right from the outset of that 
European project that evolved into the European Community and now 
the European Union, it was decided that the official languages would be 
those (initially four in number) of the Member States. This principle is 
enshrined in Regulation No 1 of 1958, which is amended each time a 
new country joins the EU to include its language or languages. But 
legislation is not the whole story. The European Union institutions have 
to be as accessible and open as possible, to the general public as well as 
to government departments and official and unofficial interest groups 
of all kinds. The Commission sees it as its duty to foster a democratic 
culture in which individual, local, regional and national characteristics 
are respected and safeguarded.17 (My italics) 
From this document we can see that the fostering of a democratic culture is 
viewed as being maintained by the equal respect for every Member State 
language.18  And by translating legislation into all official languages of the Union 
is ensuring literal accessibility to the law for the citizens.  However I would 
                                                          
16 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community [2007] OJ C306/01, Article. 34(b)2(d). 
17 Directorate-General for Translation, ‘Translating for a Multilingual Community’, European Commission 
[pdf], 4 March 2007, available at 
<http://www.lu.lv/materiali/biblioteka/es/pilnieteksti/dazada/Translating%20for%20a%20Multilingual%
20Community.pdf>, accessed 9 October 2013. 
18 See also: European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, 2001, available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:l10109&from=EN> which is 
concerned with democratic legitimacy, participation, transparency and the role of the Commission. 
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suggest that to advocate that merely ensuring legislation is translated into and 
published in every official language is not sufficient to stake the claim that 
official languages have the same equal status throughout the institutions of the 
European Union, and also that this by no means denotes that the law is 
accessible to all citizens. 
What follows is a discussion on how different ‘levels’ of language are 
distinguished within legislation and the procedural workings of the Union.  This 
is followed by a brief consideration of the position of minority languages and 
how their linguistic status enhances the assertion that languages are not 
treated equally under EU law. 
 
CHAPTER 1. SECTION 2 
LANGUAGE DISTINCTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 19 
In spite of the language regulations outlined above, each language spoken 
within the borders of every Members State of the Union does not have equal 
authenticity. The linguistic regime of the European Union distinguishes 
languages into separate categories: treaty languages, official languages, 
working languages and languages of the case.  ‘The Founding Treaties, the 
Consolidated Versions and the Accession Treaties are written in the treaty 
languages.  Article 358 TFEU (ex-Article 314 TEC) in conjunction with Article 55 
TEU says that the wording of every language version is equally authentic in the 
                                                          
19 Given that currently the 24 official and working languages of the EU are the same as the 24 Treaty 
languages, for the purposes of this thesis I will simply refer to the languages as official languages unless 
technical distinction between the categories of the languages is deemed necessary in the context of 
discussion. 
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EU Member States.’20 As preserved in Article 1 of Council Regulation 1 the 
treaty languages also operate as official languages of the Union.  Furthermore, 
Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) no 920/2005 of June 13, 2005 amending 
Regulation no 1 of April 15, 1958 uses both official and working without 
distinction.  Although working languages technically refers to the languages of 
internal correspondence between institutions of the EU, literature concerning 
EU languages often uses the terms synonymously and interchangeably. 21  
Urrutia and Lasagabaster note that there is a distinction between what we refer 
to as treaty languages, and official working languages.  They describe them as 
operating on a different plane as in matters concerning the use of official 
languages it is by a unanimous decision of the Council that the language 
framework of the EU may be established and modified (Article 290 of the EC 
Treaty).22   
As mentioned above, working languages quite distinctly also refer to the 
otherwise known as procedural languages of the institutions of the EU.  The 
European Commission formulates the majority of its primary texts in English, a 
practice which stands in stark contrast to the officially proclaimed 
multilingualism of the above Treaty Articles.23  Further to this, its day to day 
procedural work is carried out in French and English, and to a lesser extent, 
German, a linguistically biased practice which is passed on to both the 
                                                          
20 K. Luttermann, ‘Cultures in Dialogue.  Institutional and Individual Challenges for EU Institutions and EU 
Citizens from the Perspective of Legal Linguistics’, Journal of Language and Communication Studies, no. 
46, 2011, p. 26. 
21 J. Fidrmuc, V. Ginsburgh and S. Weber, ‘Ever Closer Union or Babylonian Discord? The Official-
language Problem in the European Union’, 2007, Appendix. 1, p. 41, available at 
<http://www.fidrmuc.net/research/FGW2.pdf>  
22 I. Urrutia and I. Lasagabaster , ‘Language Rights as a General Principle of Community Law’, German 
Law Journal, vol. 8, 2007, p. 481. 
23 S. Glanert, ‘Speaking Language to Law: The Case of Europe’, Legal Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2008, 
p.161. 
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Parliament and the Council.  The Parliament could also be said to demonstrate 
a bias towards the English language with regards to its preparatory work in an 
effort to speed up communication and so as not to burden an already stretched 
translation and interpretation service.  Due to time and budgetary constraints, 
relatively few working documents are translated into all languages. The 
European Commission employs English, French and German in general as 
procedural languages, whereas the European Parliament provides translation 
into different languages according to the needs of its Members.24    
Languages of the case concern the procedural role within the institution of the 
European Court of Justice.  As stated in Articles 342 TFEU (ex. Article 290 TEC) 
and Article 7 of Council Regulation No. 1, language use within the ECJ is 
governed by Articles 36-42 of the European Court of Justice Rules of 
Procedure.25  This states that the proceedings must be conducted in one of the 
official languages of the European Union which is chosen by the applicant, 
although where the defendant is a Member State or a national of a member 
state the applicant must choose an official language of that Member State.  Be 
that as it may, this does not speak for the working language of the ECJ in the 
sense that all deliberations, pleadings and draft judgments are discussed and 
prepared in French, unofficial as it may be.  Even the website of the English 
Parliament notes the use of unofficial translations and unofficial discussions 
within the procedural workings of the ECJ as being conducted solely in the 
                                                          
24 European Commission, Languages, ‘Official EU Languages’, European Commission [webpage], 5 July 
2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/eu-languages_en.htm>, accessed 3 October 
2013. 
25 European Court of Justice, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 25 September 2012, available at 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-10/rp_en.pdf> (accessed 16 October 
2012). 
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French language.26 (Section 4 below discusses the linguistic workings of the ECJ 
in much more detail). 
 
CHAPTER 1. SECTION 3 
LINGUISTIC INEQUALITY AND THE CASE OF MINORITY AND REGIONAL 
LANGUAGES 
 
There is undeniably a vast chasm between the limited linguistic diversity in the 
procedural workings of each institution and the Regulations cited above which 
portray an idyllic language regime under which the equal authority of languages 
could not possibly be compromised.  As the Kik affair demonstrated,27 ‘there is 
no constitutional principle of equality of languages that is binding on EU 
legislators in regulating the framework for internal use of languages at EU 
agencies, to the extent that the right of use of languages recognized in [ex] 
Article 21 of the EC Treaty is only applied at the institutions cited in the wording 
of the article, and not the rest’.28 
                                                          
26 Parliamentary Business, Publications and Records, 2007. The Workload of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union - European Union Committee Contents: APPENDIX 5: WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF 
ADVOCATE GENERAL SHARPSTON, [webpage]. Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeucom/128/12816.htm>, accessed: 15 
October 2013.  
27 See Judgement of C-361/01-P Kik v. OHIM [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2003:434 which states at point. 16 that: 
“Secondly, ruling on the substance, the Court of First Instance first considered whether there was a 
principle in Community law of non-discrimination as between the official languages of the European 
Communities. At paragraphs 58 and 59 of the contested judgment, it held as follows: In that regard, it 
must first be pointed out that Regulation No 1 is merely an act of secondary law, whose legal base is 
Article 217 of the Treaty. To claim, as the applicant does, that Regulation No 1 sets out a specific 
Community law principle of equality between languages, which may not be derogated from even by a 
subsequent regulation of the Council, is tantamount to disregarding its character as secondary law. 
Secondly, the Member States did not lay down rules governing languages in the Treaty for the 
institutions and bodies of the Community; rather, Article 217 of the Treaty enables the Council, acting 
unanimously, to define and amend the rules governing the languages of the institutions and to establish 
different language rules. That Article does not provide that once the Council has established such rules 
they cannot subsequently be altered. It follows that the rules governing languages laid down by 
Regulation No 1 cannot be deemed to amount to a principle of Community law.” Available at 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=48555&doclang=EN>. 
28 Urrutia and Lasagabaster, ‘Language Rights as a General Principle of Community Law’, p. 482. 
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In spite of the legislative claim that the institutions are working under the ethos 
that the 24 official languages are equally authoritative, in reality it could be 
argued that the EU has almost completely failed to truly recognise the equality 
of languages and thus neglected to carry out their duties under this ethos. 
Practically speaking there is justification for such a failure. In order to avoid such 
an arduous, drawn-out process of communication, most Council, Commission 
and Parliamentary issues are discussed in either French or English, or 
occasionally German. ‘Approximately 95% of legal texts adopted in co-decision 
procedures are drafted, scrutinised and revised in English. For practical reasons 
English has become a primary language used in the daily work of the 
institutions, except the CJEU, where for the same reasons French dominates.’29 
With the initial drafting, consultation and re-drafting of legislation being carried 
out in just one or two languages by both native and non-native speakers, the 
equality of communication rights is actively being dismissed.  Members of the 
European Parliament from Scandinavia (and doubtless others) are convinced 
that this gives native speakers of French and English an edge when it comes to 
setting agendas. 30   When it comes to the European Court of Justice the 
procedural linguistic superiority of the French language is evident. It would 
simply be untruthful not to admit that the factual relevance of the French 
language within proceedings before the Court of Justice does not have an 
influence on the interpretation of the law. 31  Furthermore, the EU’s official 
website appears to have no qualms in admitting that the procedural actions 
                                                          
29 O. Łachacz, and R. Mańko, ‘Multilingualism at the Court of Justice of the European Union: theoretical 
and practical aspects’, Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, vol. 34, no. 1, 2013, p. 80. 
30 R. Phillipson, English Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy, Ch. 4: Languages in EU Institutions, 
Routledge, 2003. 
31 S. A Dickschat, ‘Problems d'Interpretation des Traites Europeens Resultant de Leur Plurilinguisme’, 
Revue Belge de Droit International, vol. 4, 1968, p. 48, 57. 
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carried out by the Commission are done so almost exclusively in English, French 
or German and that the European Parliament only provides translation into 
different languages according to the needs of its Members, citing budgetary 
constraints as justification enough for this practice.32  It would not then be too 
much of a jump to describe the language regime of the European Union as 
relative and subject to the perceived necessity of translation by ‘Eurocrats’ who 
undoubtedly speak at least one of these procedural languages with a high level 
of proficiency. 
This inequality can be further demonstrated given that not all official national 
languages are afforded the status of official languages of the European Union.  
Luxembourgish (an official language of Luxembourg) and Turkish (an official 
language of Cyprus), despite being officially recognised national languages of 
their respective Member State nations, are not given such recognition by the 
EU.  This could potentially be justifiably explained given their relatively small 
numbers of speakers (Luxembourgish approx. 390,00033 and only approx. 1,400 
speakers of Turkish in Cyprus) and given that neither are the majority national 
language within their respective nation states.  However, that argument can be 
immediately dispelled by looking at certain minority languages that may have 
official political recognition within the Member States themselves.  ‘A lack of 
flexibility in the development of the Community’s language framework has 
resulted in the radical exclusion from all types of official use of non-state 
                                                          
32 European Commission, Languages, ‘Official EU Languages’, European Commission [webpage], 5 July 
2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/languages/languages-of-europe/eu-languages_en.htm>, accessed 3 October 
2013. 
33 F. Fehlen and P. Gilles, Laboratoire de linguistique et Unesco, Communiqué de presse: Le nombre de 
locuteurs du luxembourgeois revu à la hausse, Luxembourg, 24 February 2009, 
<http://infolux.uni.lu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Presse-UNESCO-2010-2009.pdf>, accessed 10 
October 2013.   
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languages regardless of their internal status.’ 34  The unsound logic can be 
demonstrated by comparing the number of native speakers of Catalan (11.5 
million and yet it is not afforded the status of being an official language by the 
EU as is it not a “State” language), with that of native speakers of Maltese (a 
mere 400,000 and yet given official status due to its position as a “State” 
language in Malta). Urrutia and Lasagabaster argue that ‘this is an anachronistic 
situation that needs to be corrected by going further into the principles of 
democracy, human rights and linguistic pluralism’35 and I am inclined to agree.  
That being said, the Council of Europe however has undoubtedly taken steps to 
offer certain levels of recognition to regional and minority languages.  Article 7 
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1992 states: 
1. In respect of regional or minority languages, within the 
territories in which such languages are used and according to the 
situation of each language, the Parties shall base their policies, 
legislation and practice on the following objectives and 
principles: 
a. the recognition of the regional or minority languages as 
an expression of cultural wealth; 
b. the respect of the geographical area of each regional or 
minority language in order to ensure that existing or new 
administrative divisions do not constitute an obstacle to 
the promotion of the regional or minority language in 
question; 
c. the need for resolute action to promote regional or 
minority languages in order to safeguard them; 
d. the facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of 
regional or minority languages, in speech and writing, in 
public and private life. 
Further to this, with respect to the regional languages of the autonomous 
regions of Spain the Union has taken progressive steps to further their level of 
recognition.  In 2005 the then President of the Committee of the Regions signed 
                                                          
34 Urrutia and Lasagabaster , ‘Language Rights as a General Principle of Community Law’, p. 483. 
35 ibid. 
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an agreement approving the use of Spanish regional languages in an EU 
institution36 and then in 2006 the European Parliament’s Bureau approved a 
proposal by the Spanish State to allow citizens to address the European 
Parliament in Basque, Catalan and Galician.37  Positive as these steps may be 
they still highlight the inexistence of true equality of languages within the 
borders of the EU, the implications of which will be discussed throughout this 
thesis.38 
The effects of not including some languages in the set of the official ones 
go beyond restricting access to information. Citizens prevented from 
communicating in the language of their choice may be unwilling or 
unable to fully participate in the political process. Furthermore, given 
that EU law takes precedence over national legislation, the citizens’ 
ability to receive information and to communicate in their own 
language has profound and direct implications for the economic and 
social fabric of the society and individual well-being. In an extreme case, 
linguistic disenfranchisement may even threaten the long-term of 
survival of some languages.39 
So, just how far does this procedural inequality go?  How can there be unity in 
diversity if that unity is based on an unequal recognition of languages and 
differing levels of legal certainty based on the inadequacy of language? These 
questions must be answered if we wish to avoid the conclusion that unity and 
diversity, rather than complementing one another, in fact undermine the 
other’s role.  What follows is an overview of case law dealt with by the 
European Court of Justice in which it has been called upon the ECJ to deal with 
the issue of language and either interpret articles, provisions or directives due 
                                                          
36 Europa Press Releases Database, ‘Committee of the Regions set to be first EU body to use regional 
languages at Plenary Session (16-17 November)’, European Commission [webpage], 15 November 2005, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_COR-05-119_en.htm>, accessed 20 September 2013. 
37 Barcelona Reporter, ‘Catalan Government Welcomes European Parliament Language Move’, 
[webpage], 29 June 2012, <http://archive.is/0Lxm>, accessed 10 October 2013. 
38 The discussion of minority languages however would form a thesis in itself and in not being the aim of 
this thesis will only be referred to as a supporting argument rather than offered as a direction of critical 
analysis or given in depth consideration. 
39 Fidrmuc et. al, ‘Ever Closer Union or Babylonian Discord?’, The Official-language Problem in the 
European Union, June 2007, pp. 3-4.  
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to translation inconsistencies between language versions of the law, or in some 
cases outright declare that certain language versions do not convey the law 
correctly.  This will give a more critical view of the actual language situation in 
the European Union in that how the language regime is practically applied is 
discussed. 
 
CHAPTER 1. SECTION 4 
LANGUAGES AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 40  
 
SECTION 4.a : THE ECJ’S APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION 41 42 
 
Article 19 para. 1 TEU (ex. Article 220 TEC) requires the Court to ensure that the 
law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaty,43  meaning 
                                                          
40 For a comprehensive discussion on the translation services of the European Union, see: Enlargement 
at the European Court of Justice: Law, Language and Translation, particularly pp. 806-812 on the pivot 
system. For a critical discussion on the ECJ’s approach to multilingual interpretation, see: M. Derlén, 
‘Multilingual interpretation of CJEU case law: rule and reality’, European Law Review, 2014; and, E. 
Paunio, Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU Law: Language, Discourse and Reasoning at the European 
Court of Justice, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013; and L. M. Solan, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual 
Statutes by the European Court of Justice’, Brook. Journal of  International Law., 2008. For an in-depth 
discussion on how the ECJ’s multilingual jurisprudence is produced and the implications of the process 
of such production on the EU legal landscape, see: Karen McAuliffe, ‘The Limitations of a Multilingual 
Legal System’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, vol. 26, no. 4, 2013. 
41 “The rules governing language use at the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance are set out in 
their respective Rules of Procedure. For every action before the Court of Justice and Court of First 
Instance there is a language of procedure which must be used in written pleadings or observations 
submitted and for all oral pleadings in the action. Any of the 24 official languages of the European Union 
may be used as the language of procedure in a case. The language of procedure of the case must also be 
used by the Court in any correspondence, report or decision addressed to the parties in the case. Only 
the texts in the language of procedure are ‘authentic’ (i.e. legally binding).” See: K. McAuliffe, ‘Language 
and the institutional dynamics of the Court of Justice of the European Communities: lawyer-linguists and 
the production of a multilingual jurisprudence’, in Gueldry M (eds) How Globalizing Professions Deal 
With National Languages: Studies in Cultural Conflict and Cooperation, Lewiston, Queenstown, 
Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010, pp. 239-263. 
42 Legislative interpretation at the ECJ, as with legislative interpretation in national judicial systems, 
takes place as a matter of course and is not only due to translation errors and the multilingual nature of 
EU law. However, given the intent behind this thesis I will be focusing discussion on the ECJ’s 
interpretation when it is the multilingual nature of law that has caused inconsistency or ambiguity 
between language versions.   
43 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht , 7 February 
1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39218.html>, accessed 15 February 2016, art. 19, para. 1.  
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that the main goal of the ECJ when applying Union law is to interpret the 
legislation at hand in a manner which considers the intent of the legislature and 
to further the goals of the enacted directive or regulation.44 This goal is of 
upmost importance as ‘a presumption of uniformity is necessary for the ECJ to 
claim authoritative status within the EU legal order’.45  
The Court of Justice aims to produce statements of law that mean 
exactly the same thing in every language in which they are published 
and through such statements to ensure the uniform application of EU 
law. ‘The law’ is an overwhelmingly linguistic institution. EU law, and in 
particular the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, is coded in language, 
and the concepts used to construct that law are accessible only through 
language. Thus, the role of language and translation in the production 
of the Court’s jurisprudence is of primary importance.46 
This tasks the ECJ with quite an exclusive competence in the interpretation of 
Union law, and the principle of equal authenticity obliges them to compare 
every language version in order to ascertain whether there are any differences 
in meaning present.  Interpretation is necessary as discrepancies between 
different language versions of the same law do often present themselves, and 
such discrepancies can impede the interpretation process.  This may be 
because, as all language versions are “equally authentic” and must be given 
“the same weight” (as prescribed in CILFIT and EMU Tabac respectively) it 
proves difficult to uphold such a pledge if the interpretive outcome is to be 
rational and reasoned.  And if the language versions differ from one another, 
                                                          
44 L. M. Solan, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the European Court of Justice’, Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law, vol. 34, no. 2, 2009, p. 279. 
45 K. McAuliffe, ‘Precedent at the Court of Justice of the European Union: The Linguistic Aspect’, Law and 
Language. Current Legal Issues, vol. 15, 2013, p. 485. 
46 K. McAuliffe, ‘Language and the institutional dynamics of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities: lawyer-linguists and the production of a multilingual jurisprudence’, in Gueldry M (eds) 
How Globalizing Professions Deal With National Languages: Studies in Cultural Conflict and Cooperation, 
Lewiston, Queenstown, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2010, 239-263, p. 3, fn. 6. 
30 
 
then surely interpretation of the reasoning behind the legislation will also differ 
depending on which language version is being considered.47 
Having such a high degree of legal, political and linguistic pluralism throughout 
the Union means that the ECJ must focus on specific methods of interpretation 
in order to attempt to maintain a semblance of consistency across language 
versions.  To truly understand what interpretation methods are employed by 
the ECJ, the types of legal arguments it used, its techniques of exegesis, and its 
rules of logic that make of legal reasoning a form of practical reasoning must 
be considered. 48   Firstly, the ECJ utilises literal interpretation whereby the 
literal meaning of the words of the provision are considered.  This approach 
considers the text, context and purpose of the legislation in question.  The 
Court coordinates different versions of texts in the official languages and if the 
legal provision is clear it is unusual for the Court to depart from this meaning.  
It has been suggested however that an approach such as this, which is focused 
on the interpretation of the grammatical context and the analysis of common 
parlance within (autonomous) EU law must necessarily be limited.49  Limited as 
this approach is the ECJ often employs teleological interpretation, a justified 
practice laid out in the CILFIT case: ‘every provision of Community law must be 
placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of E.C. law as 
a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution 
                                                          
47 For further, in depth discussion on this see: Cornelis J. W. Baaij, Fifty Years of Multilingual 
Interpretation in the European Union. In: Peter Tiersman and Lawrencce Solan eds. 2012. The Oxford 
Handbook of Language and Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, Ch. 15, p. 218.  
48 M. P. Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law-Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 2008, p. 2.  
49 H. Rösler, ‘Interpretation of EU law’, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law, vol. 2, 2012, 
p. 979.  
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at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied’.50  As the CILFIT 
case ruling suggests, teleological interpretation considers legislative provisions 
in the light of the purpose, values, legal, social and economic goals they aim to 
achieve.  According to General Advocate Miguel Poiares Maduro: ‘Teleological 
interpretation in EU law does not refer exclusively to a purpose driven 
interpretation of the relevant legal rules. It refers to a particular systemic 
understanding of the EU legal order that permeates the interpretation of all its 
rules’.51  This means that a particular systemic understanding of the EU legal 
order is needed in order to ascertain purpose at this level and as such the 
broader aims of the EU as an institution must also be considered when 
interpreting purpose and eventual meaning. 
Not only must the ECJ consider the broader aims of the EU as an institution, but 
also consideration of the equal authenticity rule is paramount given that each 
language version should have equal weight in the interpretation process.  In 
Van der Vecht the Court stated that ‘passage[s] should not be considered in 
isolation, but that, in cases of doubt, it should be interpreted and applied in the 
light of the versions existing in the other […] languages’. 52   Given that the 
number of official languages now stands at 24 it could be suggested that the 
judges of the ECJ have too great a discretion in the decision making and that 
their interpretation may lean too far in the direction of law-making.  ‘This is not 
only problematic with regard to the division of power, but also with regard to 
                                                          
50 ECJ, C-283/ 81 (Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health) 06/10/1982, para. 18. 
51 O. Pollicino, ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality 
Between Judicial Activism and Self-restraint’, German Law Journal, vol. 5 no. 3, 2004, p. 289, available at 
<http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=402>, accessed: 15 November 2012. 
52 Case C-19/67, Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v J. H. van der Vecht, [1967] Reference for a 
preliminary ruling: Centrale Raad van Beroep - Netherlands 
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the demand for legal certainty for the individual citizen.’53  Lawrence Solan 
explains that the linguistic practices of the ECJ should meet three goals: fidelity 
to the legislative purpose and intent of the drafters, equality of the official 
languages of the Member States, and efficiency.54  However, within a Union of 
24 languages it would seem obvious to state that the fidelity criterion is almost 
impossible to uphold as, as is demonstrated in Section 4.b, differing linguistic 
versions produce different nuances and so the judiciary will never be able to be 
faithful to every language version of the law.  This also raises questions about 
whether the equality criterion can be met as when interpreting legislation that 
is available in 24 languages, the judiciary will necessarily privilege the language 
version that they deem to be in accordance with their perception of the 
legislative intent of the drafters, thereby affording certain language versions a 
higher status than others.  Initial questions arise given that there is no logical 
or coherent explanation behind the interpretive method chosen by the ECJ 
when considering different language versions, and when or why it chooses to 
employ either the literal or teleological approach.  This consequently partially 
negates the predictability of laws given that uncertainty about what method of 
interpretation may be employed creates uncertainty about what the 
interpretation could potentially be. ‘There is no certainty in predicting what the 
ECJ will do next.  Since the deliberations or the personal opinions of individual 
judges are not publicly available, a look at the ECJ’s past legal reasoning is about 
                                                          
53 Luttermann, ‘Cultures in Dialogue’, p. 30. 
54 Solan, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the European Court of Justice’, p. 279. 
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all that the legal community has to work with.’55  And thus, such a lack of legal 
predictability affects legal certainty within the ECJ as an institution. 
 
SECTION 4.b : LIMITED LEGAL CERTAINTY IN CASE LAW 
Examples throughout ECJ case law demonstrate the recurring issue of a lack of 
legal certainty caused by translation errors in legal documents.  In fact, the ECJ 
has continually been faced with cases concerning linguistic discrepancies 
between different language versions of European law since its naissance.56  In 
the case Commission of the EU v. United Kingdom57 the ECJ found it necessary 
to compare the English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and 
Dutch versions of EU Directive 93/104 which concerned the minimum rest 
periods of workers.  The equal authenticity of all language versions proved 
ineffective with the ECJ ruling, and after consideration of many language 
versions, the ECJ ruled that the English version of the Directive had been 
interpreted too narrowly to include mandatory time-off, whereas other 
language versions merely stated the minimum rest requirements within the 
working week of any employee within the Union.   
The case of Lubella v Hauptzollamt Cottbus58 demonstrates the possibility for 
completely inaccurate translation and the consequences of such.  The case 
                                                          
55 Baaij, ‘Fifty Years of Multilingual Interpretation in the European Union’. In: Tiersman and Solan eds. 
2012. The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law, Ch. 15, p. 231. 
56 N. Urban, ‘One legal language and the maintenance of cultural and linguistic diversity?’, European 
Review of Private Law, 2000, p. 54. 
57 Case C-100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, [1985] E.C.R. 
11169. 
58 Case C-64/95, Konservenfabrik Lubella Friedrich Buker GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Cottbus, [1996] 
E.C.R, I-05105. 
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concerned the import of cherries within the Union, more specifically the import 
of “sour cherries”.   Although almost all language versions of the regulation 
specified “sour cherries”, the German version had been mistranslated and 
instead referred to “sweet cherries”.  In this instance there was no need for the 
ECJ to carry out its interpretive role as the error lay purely in the mistranslation 
as the German version was deemed to be inaccurate in its wording.   
The given case examples would suggest that the ECJ, in not being able to fulfil 
the judicial function of uniformly applying the law due to the language issues 
of the European Union, has dealt with the problem of multilingualism in a 
rather unsatisfactory way.  It could perhaps be suggested that in its attempt to 
ensure adherence to the principle of linguistic equality, the ECJ has sacrificed 
true legal uniformity.59  The case law demonstrates that whether it be through 
the need for comparison across numerous language versions, or whether it be 
due to translation inaccuracies, the result is the same: the ability of the citizen 
to rely on their own native language version of a regulation, directive or article 
can never be assured and as such, neither can the legal certainty of Union 
legislation.  The case judgement of North Kerry Milk Products Ltd. v. Minister 
for Agricultural Fisheries says it all:  
 The elimination of linguistic discrepancies by way of interpretation may 
in certain circumstances run counter to the concern for legal certainty, 
inasmuch as one or more of the texts involved may have to be 
interpreted in a manner at variance with the natural and usual meaning 
of the words.  Consequently, it is preferable to explore the possibilities 
of solving the points at issue without giving preference to any one of the 
texts involved.60 
                                                          
59 Urban, ‘One legal language and the maintenance of cultural and linguistic diversity?’, p. 55. 
60 Case C-80/76, North Kerry Milk Products Ltd. v. Minister for Agricultural Fisheries, [1977] E.C.R. 425, 2 
C.M.L.R. 769 at 781 
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If the Court itself is admitting that the written word does not necessarily mean 
what it would normally mean, how can the Union’s key value of the citizen 
having access to the law be served? 
{The table below serves to demonstrate that the frequency of cases in which linguistic 
issues have caused ambiguity has increased as the Union has enlarged.  The concern of 
linguistic continuity has therefore never been more pertinent.} 61 
Case Number Case Name Year 
   
C-26/62 van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen 
1963 
C-19/67 Soziale Verzekeringsbank v Van Der Vecht 1967 
C-29/69 Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm 1969 
C-6/74 Moulijn 1974 
C-80/76 North Kerry Milk Products Ltd. v. Minister for 
Agricultural Fisheries 
1977 
C-30/77 Regina v. Bouchereau 1977 
C-131/79 R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte 
Santillo 
1980 
C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of 
Health 
1982 
1. E.C.R. 1193 Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands 1983 
C-45/83 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München v 
Hauptzollamt München-West 
1984 
C-135/83 Abels v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalindustrie en 
de Electrotechnische Industrie 
1985 
C-19/83 Wendelboe v. L.J. Music APS 1985 
C-90/83 Paterson v. Weddell and Co Ltd 1984 
C-424/85 Frico v Voedselvoorzienings In- en Verkoopbureau 1987 
C-100/84 Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
1985 
C-349/85 Denmark v. Commmission 1988 
7. E.C.R. 3921 Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
1988 
C-298/94 Annette Henke v Gemeinde Schierke and 
Verwaltungsgemeinschaft Brocken 
1996 
C-177/95 Ebony Maritime and Loten Navigation 1997 
Joined Cases 
C-267/95, C-
268/95 
Merck v. Primecrown 1996 
C-64/95 Konservenfabrik Lubella Friedrich Bũker GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Hauptzollamt Cottbus 
1996 
C-13/95 Suzen v. Sehnacker Gabaudereinigung GmbH 
Krankenhausservice 
1997 
                                                          
61 This list is by no means exhaustive. Inconsistencies in translation and interpretive difficulties due to 
the multilingual nature of EU law is likely to take place at a much higher rate than demonstrated by this 
table. However it is difficult to assess at what level as it is only the most severe cases which are 
discussed in other academic research. What’s more, as mentioned in footnote 42, legislative 
interpretation at the ECJ is not always due to EU law’s multilingual nature.  
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C-296/95 The Queen v Commissioners of Customs and Excise, 
ex parte EMU Tabac and Others 
1998 
T-60/96 Merck and Others v Commission 1997 
C-236/97 Skatteministeriet v Aktieselskabet 
Forsikringsselskabet Codan 
1998 
C253/99 Bacardi GmbH v Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven 2001 
C-257/00 Nani Givane and Others v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department 
2003 
C-152/01 Kyocera Electronics Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt 
Krefeld 
2003 
C-428/02 Fonden Marselisborg Lystbadehavn v. 
Skatteministeriet 
2005 
C-28/03 Epikouriko Kefalaio v. Ipourgos Anaptixis 2004 
C-135/03 Commission v. Spain 2005 
C-250/03 Schulte v. Deutsche Bausparkasse Bardenia AG 2005 
C-265/03 Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 2005 
C-336/03 easyCar (UK) Ltd v. Office of Fair Trading 2005 
C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd 2006 
C-353/04 Nowaco Germany 2006 
C-484/04 Commission of the European Communities v. United 
Kingdom 
2006 
C-5/05 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v B. F. Joustra 2006 
C-13/05 Sonia Chacon Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA 2006 
C-63/06 UAB Profisa v Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos 
Respublikos finansų ministerijos 
2007 
C-275/06 Productores de Musica de España (Promusicao) v. 
Telefonica de España SAU 
2008 
C-54/07 Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor 
Racisme-bestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV 
2008 
C-375/07 Heuschen & Schrouff Oriental Foods Trading 2008 
C-340/08 M and Others v. Her Majesty’s Treasury 2010 
C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González62 
2014 
 
Further demonstrating this point about lack of legal certainty raised above is 
the case of Denmark v. Commission63 in which linguistic ambiguity surrounding 
the definitions of the words ‘meat’ and ‘fat’ arose with reference to 
Commission Regulation 187/80/EC.  The ECJ stated that: 
[t]here is no definition in Community law of the terms ‘meat’ and ‘fat’.  
Under those circumstances, the significance of those terms must be 
                                                          
62 The aspect of inaccurate translation was not a feature of the case itself, but rather a feature of the 
judgement in that numerous inconsistencies were discovered in the Italian translation of the judgement 
which undermines its meaning. 
63 Case C-349/85, Denmark v. Commmission [1988] E.C.R. 169. 
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determined by considering the general context in which they are used 
and their meaning in everyday language.64 
It is this reference by the ECJ to ‘meaning in everyday language’ or ‘ordinary, 
everyday use’ that I believe creates the greatest linguistic ambiguity when 
comparing official language versions in order to discover legal intent.   
‘Language is not simply a reflection of reality, it is a conceptual filter through 
which we constitute reality and see the world’,65 therefore how is it possible 
for ‘the ordinary meaning’ of a text or the ‘everyday use’ of a word be the same 
across speakers of different languages in each and every member state?  Each 
language reflects a unique world-view and culture complex, mirroring the 
manner in which a speech community has resolved its problems in dealing with 
the world, and has formulated its thinking, its system of philosophy and 
understanding of the world around it.66  Hence, words will inevitably evoke the 
concept of a reality that a particular linguistic sphere has shaped, thus meaning 
that legal certainty within the European Union is potentially an impossible 
aspiration.  ‘If the laws mean very different things to the various members, 
whether because of legal, cultural or other differences among them, the project 
cannot succeed, since there will be no Rule of Law for the members to follow.’67   
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Case C-349/85, Denmark v. Commmission [1988] E.C.R. 169, para 9. 
65 Phillipson, English Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy, p. 126. 
66 S. A. Wurm, ‘Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger of Disappearing’, Unesco [pdf], 2001, 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001236/123609e.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2013, p. 12. 
67 Solan, ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the European Court of Justice’, p. 279. 
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CHAPTER 1. SECTION 5 
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION?  
 
In his article ‘The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes by the European Court 
of Justice’, Lawrence Solan argues that the ECJ’s ability to compare different 
language versions brings out nuances that can help the investigator gain 
additional insight into the thoughts of the original drafter and for this reason 
predicts that the proliferation of languages in the EU actually aids the task of 
statutory interpretation, making it more likely that the court will come upon 
the intended goals of the legislation before issuing a ruling.68  Aside from the 
argument that this practice may reveal more about the thoughts of the 
translator rather than the drafter, I would argue that the simple fact that 
linguistic versions can differ undermines the legal certainty aspects of 
predictability and the foreseeability of judicial outcomes.69  As discussion in the 
chapters which follow will demonstrate at great length we must always keep in 
mind that any official drafter, translator or interpreter of EU law is bound by 
the linguistic sphere of their mother tongue, meaning that they will only be able 
to draft, translate or interpret European law within the cognitive limits allowed 
by their language. Moving between languages not only involves linguistic 
knowledge and understanding of each language, but also a knowledge of the 
diverse plethora of cultural traditions and histories experienced within the 
country of each language being translated from and into. And the problem with 
                                                          
68 Ibid. p. 293. 
69 E. Paunio and S. Lindroos-Hovinheimo also make this argument in, ‘Taking Language Seriously: An 
Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and its Implication in EU Law’, European Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 4, 
2010, p. 410. 
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this is thus: ‘assuming that each national epistemic community of lawyers will 
understand the CJEU’s judgments in a different way, their uniform application 
across the Union could be seriously hampered’. 70  The lack of uniform 
application directly affects the ECJ’s authority as a supra-national judicial 
system and thus questions its legitimacy both practically speaking and 
democratically.71 ‘As long as distinct European nations exist as socio-cultural 
realities, the legal languages of Europe will continue to reflect different socio-
cultural backgrounds’ and thus never be truly uniform in nature.72 
What is occurring is a situation in which legal certainty is trying to be created 
out of a system entrenched with linguistic uncertainty. This inevitably has 
consequences beyond the mere wording of the legislation in question. Legal 
certainty is an accepted necessary factor in the maintenance of the Rule of Law. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations defines the Rule of Law as: 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws 
that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the 
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
                                                          
70 Łachacz and Mańko, ‘Multilingualism at the Court of Justice of the European Union: theoretical and 
practical aspects’, p. 84. 
71 In order to be democratically legitimate, the ECJ must guarantee access to judicial remedies on the 
basis of equality. See document on the fundamentals of democracy as outlined in: Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, Democracy: Its Principles and Achievements, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1998, Geneva, available 
at <http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/DEMOCRACY_PR_E.pdf> which states at point. 17: 
“Judicial institutions and independent, impartial and effective oversight mechanisms are the guarantors 
for the rule of law on which democracy is founded. In order for these institutions and mechanisms fully 
to ensure respect for the rules, improve the fairness of the processes and redress injustices, there must 
be access by all to administrative and judicial remedies on the basis of equality as well as respect for 
administrative and judicial decisions both by the organs of the State and representatives of public 
authority and by each member of society.”, p. 6. 
Further to this, the United Nations confirms the need for access and inclusiveness in democratically 
legitimate governance: “Freedom of expression and access to information by strengthening legislation 
and media capacities” and “People have a say in decisions that affect their lives and can hold decision-
makers to account, based on inclusive and fair rules”. See United Nations, ‘Global Issues: Democracy 
and the United Nations’, United Nations [webpage], available at 
<http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/democracy_and_un.shtml>, accessed 23 March 2016. 
72 Ibid. p. 85. 
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separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (my 
formatting)73 
Given that the above case examples demonstrate that the complications arising 
from multilingualism when interpreting legislation diminish legal certainty, the 
equal enforcement of the law and the equality of all language versions, it could 
be argued that this central aspect of the Rule of Law is not upheld by the 
European Union.   
Referring to Art.6(2) of the EU Treaty which affords respect of fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, Schilling 
outlines the requirements the Rule of Law posits for European legislation.  
Accessibility and foreseeability of the law are paramount to the Rule of Law 
being adhered to in that without open publication of the law, and without the 
effects of the law being sufficiently clear, the citizen is unable to see and 
foresee the consequence of the law that they must adhere to: 
by choosing uniform interpretation, the ECJ necessarily privileges some 
language versions of laws over others. […] [T]his jurisprudence fail to 
fulfil the corresponding promise made to the citizens, and, as concerns 
the language versions which do not contribute to the interpretation 
finally maintained, is apt to interfere with the principle of foreseeability 
of legal consequences, inasmuch as the citizen is entitled to rely on his 
or her own language version of the law interpreted.74 
If the ECJ is referring to different language versions in its interpretation of the 
law, does that mean it is expecting citizens to do the same in order to ensure 
compliance with the law?  Surely not, as such a necessity significantly restricts 
the citizens’ access to said law and thus the accessibility requirement of the 
Rule of Law is inevitably lost.  Schilling attempts to counter the lack of 
                                                          
73 United Nations Rule of Law, ‘What is the Rule of Law?’, United Nations [webpage], 
<http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3>, accessed 3 December 2012. 
74 Schilling, ‘Language Rights in the European Union’, p. 55. 
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foreseeability created by the multiplicity of legal languages by suggesting that 
any solution providing for only one authentic version of Community law would 
make that law more accessible than it is under the present state of the law.75  
It is here that my opinion diverges from that of Schilling as although I can see 
the how this would significantly enhance accessibility and foreseeability in that 
the citizen would only be required to look in one other version of the law than 
that in his/her native language, even being fluent in the language of the official 
text (given the linguistic arguments I discuss chapter 3 of this thesis), the citizen 
would not be able to truly understand the nuances and concepts evoked from 
a law in a language that is not his/her native language.   
Schilling is not arguing for a Union-wide lingua franca, but suggesting one 
authentic version provokes similar arguments to those contesting the option of 
a lingua franca:  
The language policy in the European Union is both ineffective and 
hypocritical, and its ideas of linguistic equality and multilingualism are 
costly and cumbersome illusions.  Why have these illusions been kept 
up for so long?  First, because the French cannot accept the decline of 
their own linguistic power.  Second, because the politically correct 
ideologies of some sociolinguists constantly fuel opposition against the 
idea of English as a European lingua franca.  And third, because powerful 
translators’ lobbies fight for their raison d’être.76 
However, despite the clear and evident problems caused by the multilingualism 
of the EU, the alternative of a lingua franca is even more problematic.  If a lingua 
franca was chosen in order to avoid translation errors and the 
misinterpretation of law, the accessibility and foreseeability of the law would 
be even further restricted.  Even with an understanding of the lingua franca 
                                                          
75 Ibid. p. 65. 
76  ‘A Stateless Language that Europe must Embrace’, The Guardian Weekly [webpage], 19 April 2001, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2001/apr/19/languages.highereducation>, accessed 17 
December 2012. 
42 
 
language, the citizen would not be able to truly evoke the same understanding 
of a word.  Simone Galnert explains this idea very succinctly:  
The interpreter’s understanding of any rule is realised through her ‘pre-
understanding’, ie via an anticipatory apprehension of meaning.  Access 
to the text and to the question arising from it is already, perhaps, 
unconsciously, fashioned according to the historical tradition to which 
the interpreter belongs.  [The law cannot be accessed] in any other way 
than through the prism of language, which is not an external and neutral 
tool, but the medium of interpretive traditions’.77 
There is a generally accepted world-view that culture, history and tradition are 
implicit in a language.  In the case of English, for example, it may be argued that 
language carries cultural baggage, and promotes the social, economic and 
political values of the UK.78 
Comme la langue, le droit a dans ses origines, son développement et sa 
structure, un caractère foncièrement populaire et indigène qui 
manifeste le particularisme historique, culturel et national de chaque 
peuple. ‘La langue et le droit ont une histoire, c’est-à-dire qu’il y a en 
eux un lien qui réunit le passé au présent, la nécessité à la liberté’ écrit 
Grimm;79 ‘Le droit positif d’un peuple est partie intégrante de sa langue 
et comme celle-ci, prend naissance et se développe de manière 
organique’, écrit quant à lui Gustave Hugo.80-81-82  
Following on from this view of how the law and language work together we can 
see that equal integration of all linguistic groups would not be possible with a 
lingua franca.  It would lead to a communication impossibility between the 
citizen and the governing political powers as the citizen would not be able to 
                                                          
77 Glanert, ‘Speaking Language to Law: The case of Europe’, p. 166. 
78 C. Longman, ‘English as a Lingua Franca : A Challenge to the Doctrine of Multilingualism’, The 
Language Question in Europe and Diverse Societies, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 196. 
79 Leçon inaugurale prononcée par J. Grimm à l’Université de Berlin en 1841 : Uber die Alterthumer des 
deutschen Rechts,’ in VI. Schr., Bd 8, p. 547, cité apr A. Dufour (1974) 164. 
80 G. Hugo, ‘Les lois ne forment pas la seule source des vérités juridiques,’ 4 (1815 :4) Civilistisches 
Magazin 117. 
81 Marie-Jeanne Campana, ‘Vers un langage juridique commun en Europe?’, European Review of Private 
Law, vol. 1, 2000, p. 35. 
82 English Translation: As with language, the law, in its origins, development and structure has a 
fundamentally common and local nature which expresses the distinctive historical, cultural and national 
identity of each nation. Language and the law have a history, that is to say, that there is a link which 
reunites the past with the present, need with freedom. The substantive law of a nation is an integral part 
of its language and as such, comes into being and grows in an organic way. 
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truly express their world view of a particular issue if they were forced to do so 
in a foreign language.   This would inevitably lead to a linguistic hierarchy 
whereby native speakers of the lingua franca would have more effective 
communication possibilities with governing powers and potentially more 
means by which to influence the laws that govern them: 
Democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The average citizen feels 
at ease only when he discusses political questions in his own language. 
As a general rule, only elites are fluent in more than one language and 
have the chance to maintain and develop their linguistic skills 
continuously and feel at ease discussing political questions in different 
languages in a multilingual atmosphere.83 
It would surely be an infringement on the Human Rights of every citizen if their 
access to laws by way of lack of understanding was not guaranteed.  And surely 
such a right as freedom of speech would be infringed if that ‘speech’ had to be 
in a language other than your mother tongue.   
The main linguistic problem for the EU lies with the fact that perfect 
translations are, strictly speaking, impossible because they require finding 
exact equivalents where none exist.84  The problem does not always lie with 
finding an exact linguistic translation, but more with finding one which is 
functional, practical and teleological.  We cannot have a single legal language 
across the EU because there is no single culture, history or language of 
communication across the EU.  It therefore could be argued that the only 
possible hope to have any sort of political and cultural homogeneity in a 
political entity is through a common, native, language.  Practically speaking, 
without this possibility in the supranational entity of the European Union we 
                                                          
83 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 214. 
84 Robert Huntington, ‘European Unity and the Tower of Babel’, p. 328. 
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must make our choice from the lesser of two evils:  we either accept that, with 
the equality of all official, working languages comes the fact that the legal and 
linguistic certainty of European law cannot be guaranteed, and so the existence 
of accessibility and foreseeability aspects of the Rule of Law with the sphere of 
the European Union is therefore questionable, as well as the fact that the 
multilingual nature of the EU is an obstacle to creating closer ties between its 
citizens and potentially the development of further political or even economic 
activity.  Or, we decide upon a lingua franca which would most certainly 
alienate citizens from having a true political voice which demonstrates the 
world view encoded in their native language. That being said, there are most 
definitely solutions to the language problems of the EU that lie outside the 
realm of practical linguistic solutions. Rather than solve the problem practically 
it would serve better to delve further into the deeper problems multilingualism 
causes by understanding the democratic implications of multilingualism at the 
EU level. By doing so, and by understanding language as a concept we can 
unearth the reasons why language plurality causes such issues and thus resolve 
it in a more conceptual way instead of putting a short term solution in place.  
Given this conclusion the following chapter explores the wider democratic 
implications of the problems caused by multilingualism at an institutional level 
discussed in this chapter (in particular the implications for legal certainty (as a 
significant feature in formal definitions of the Rule of Law) and minority 
language rights will be discussed). This is followed by an exploration of language 
as a concept by exploring Western linguistic theories on language as a means 
of then exploring a more conceptual and philosophical solution to the problems 
created by multilingualism in the EU. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
MULTILINGUALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
LINGUISTIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADHERENCE TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
RULE OF LAW  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced the idea that the multilingual situation of the 
European Union can pose some serious questions regarding the legal certainty 
aspect of the Rule of Law, and also regarding the required need for 
foreseeability and accessibility of the law.  Such procedural, formal features of 
the Rule of Law must be observed given that adhering to the Rule of Law is 
necessary for any democratic “state-like” entity. Instances such as the case 
examples previously discussed in Chapter One demonstrate how complications 
arising from multilingualism can diminish legal certainty, the equal enforcement 
of the law and the equality of all language versions. In fact, accessibility and 
foreseeability of the law are referred to in Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty which 
affords respect of fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, referring to them as paramount aspects of the 
Rule of Law that must be adhered to given that without open publication of the 
law, and without the effects of the law being sufficiently clear, the citizen is 
unable to see and foresee the consequence of the law that they must adhere 
to.  Thus, the practice of the European Courts of Justice in referring to different 
language versions of the law in order to determine intent and meaning notably 
restricts the citizens’ access to said law, and hence the formal accessibility 
requirement of the Rule of Law is inevitably lost.  The consequence of such is 
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surely an infringement on the human rights of every citizen if their access to 
laws by way of lack of understanding cannot be guaranteed.  And, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, surely such a right as freedom of speech would be 
infringed if that ‘speech’ had to be in a language other than your mother tongue 
unless, of course, we completely redefine the meaning of 'freedom'.  If both the 
EU’s ability to uphold human rights and its ability to uphold certain features of 
the Rule of Law are put into question, the democratic legitimacy of the EU at 
large becomes uncertain given that both must be present for a democracy to 
legitimately exist. 
This chapter explores the extent of the human rights issues this linguistic 
inadequacy provokes with a means of revealing whether the EU's current 
linguistic regime could be said to infringe the linguistic human rights of its 
citizens.  This will then lead into discussion on how any potential human rights 
issues resulting from the Union’s current multilingual linguistic regime could 
possibly affect the standing of the Rule of Law in the political structure of the 
EU as a whole. 
The chapter firstly considers the key international instruments on human rights 
in order to better understand the extent of linguistic human rights within the 
international community so that following discussion can debate whether or 
not the EU, as an intergovernmental organisation, can be said to be either 
legally or morally in breach of linguistic human rights.  This is because as an 
Intergovernmental Organisation, the EU is bound by customary international 
law and thus has indirect obligations arising from member state agreement and 
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accession to certain international human rights instruments.85 
An in-depth discussion on the extent of linguistic rights within certain, specific 
international and European treaties and conventions reveals that language 
rights are ill-defined across all international instruments and that the minimal 
protection they are in fact granted is not done so through specific language 
rights, but through general human rights that have an implied linguistic 
dimension. Discussion then moves on to the implications the Union’s 
multilingual situation at large has on the EU’s ability to truly uphold the Rule of 
Law, as well as considering the implications poorly defined and implemented 
language rights has on the Rule of Law’s position at EU level.  
The aim of this chapter is not to offer in depth discussion on the law relating to 
linguistic and minority language rights, however it is necessary to consider and 
critically discuss the legislation and subsequent literature on minority language 
rights given that this demonstrates positive action in the field of international 
linguistic rights.86  Rather, the aim is to look at the international and EU specific 
linguistic legislation and obligations that the EU is bound by in order to ascertain 
whether or not the Union, in its current linguistic regime and approach to 
multilingualism, is in fact breaching the human rights of its citizens by not 
guaranteeing true legislative and practical equality to all of the languages 
                                                          
85 T. Ahmed and I. de J. Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law 
Perspective’, The European Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 4, 2006, p. 771. 
86 There is a wealth of international law materials on the rights of minorities. For example, see: P. 
Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991; P. Macklem, 
‘Minority rights in international law’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 6, no. 3-4, 2008, 
pp. 531-552; G. Pentassuglia, Minority Groups and Judicial Discourse in International Law: A 
Comparative Perspective, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009; T., Li-ann, Managing Babel: The 
International Legal Protection of Minorities in the Twentieth Century, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005; 
M. Weller, ed. Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of the International Courts 
and Treaty Bodies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
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spoken within its borders. The chapter also aims to demonstrate a lack of 
adherence to the Rule of Law in a “thin”, procedural sense by exampling that 
certain procedural features of the Rule of Law, notably those of foreseeability 
and accessibility of the law, cannot be adhered to given the multilingual nature 
of the European Union.  As such, the above considerations will serve to highlight 
deeper, more democratically significant issues about the EU than the practical 
problems discussed in the previous chapter given that in order to be deemed 
as democratically legitimate, the EU must adhere to upholding the Rule of Law 
and protecting human rights. By exploring the language situation of the EU at 
this depth, I aim to gain a deeper understanding of the democratic implications 
of multilingualism in order to be one step closer to discovering a viable 
democratically conceptual solution to the practical problems of multilingualism. 
 
CHAPTER 2. SECTION 1 
THE EXTENT OF LINGUISTIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW  
In order to understand exactly how the linguistic human rights of the citizens of 
the European Union are negatively affected by the problems arising from 
multilingualism we must first understand the exact nature and meaning of these 
rights that are potentially being infringed and where they come from. In doing 
so I aim to firstly ascertain whether the European Union is in fact bound to 
protect these rights at all, and secondly demonstrate how the multilingual 
nature of the EU not only causes practical problems but also leads to 
democratically significant problems.  Given that competence on linguistic 
diversity and minority rights remains with the individual member states rather 
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than with the intergovernmental organisation of the EU, when considering 
issues relating to the potential infringement of human rights by the European 
Union it is necessary to highlight and discuss international human rights law as 
the member states of the European Union have agreed to certain international 
declarations and are thus bound by them which directly affects the position and 
legislative boundaries of the EU in this matter.  ‘As an intergovernmental 
organization and subject to international law, the EU can be said to be bound 
by customary international law (binding on all nations without the need for 
formal treaty obligations), treaties to which it is a party, and human rights 
treaties entered into individually by Member States through the principle of 
succession or substitution.’ 87   International organisations are subjects of 
international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon 
them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or 
under international agreements to which they are parties.88 
The legal bases upon which human rights are applicable to all UN 
activities can be derived first of all from the inherent nature of human 
rights. Human rights are part of being a human being and therefore such 
rights are automatically part of the legal framework applicable to those 
with power to affect the enjoyment of those rights. Secondly, there is a 
delegation by member states to the UN of their responsibilities under 
human rights law. States cannot set up an autonomous international 
actor that can obviate human rights standards that the states 
themselves are bound by.89 
Hence, discussing key international instruments is of indubitable relevance 
given that they impose a certain obligation on the EU as an international 
organisation made up of member states that are signatories to such 
                                                          
87 T. Ahmed and I. de J. Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law 
Perspective’, p. 771. 
88 International Court of Justice, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO 
and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980, ICJ Rep 73, pp. 89-90. 
89 White, ‘Towards a Strategy for Human Rights Protection in Post-Conflict Situations’, in N. White and D. 
Klaasen (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post Conflict Situations, 2005, p. 463, 464. 
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international instruments. 
 
SECTION 1.a : KEY HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS INFLUENCING THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS  
The key international and European instruments regarding language rights tend 
to be those specifically concerning the protection of minority languages and 
cultures.  Key United Nations instruments include; Article 27 of the 90 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which affords minority 
rights protection to minorities in all signatory states; the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities 1992 91 ; and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination 196592.  In an exclusively European context, 
the Council of Europe enacted the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages (ECRML) 199293 and the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCNM) 199594.  However the most generally applicable 
and yet most important documents in the field of human rights are, 
internationally speaking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights95, adopted 
                                                          
90 Article 27, UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>, accessed 2 November 2013. 
91 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135,  
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm>, accessed 2 November 2013. 
92 UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195,  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx>, accessed 2 November 2013. 
93 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: 
Application of the Charter in Denmark, 2nd Monitoring Cycle, 26 September 2007, ECRML (2007) 6, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/report/EvaluationReports/DenmarkECRML3_en.pdf>, 
accessed 2 November 2013. 
94 Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 February 
1995, ETS 157, : <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm>, accessed 2 November 
2013. 
95 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available 
at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>, accessed 2 November 2013. 
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and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, and in 
a distinctively European context, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR)96. 
Yet, before considering exactly what rights these instruments provide for the 
citizens of the European Union in respect to language, it is fundamental to 
highlight the fact that the EU is not bound by either the European Convention 
on Human Rights or the case law and judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights, despite the Lisbon treaty outlining that this should happen by 
2012.97  This means that in order to receive protection from the European Court 
of Justice, the human right in question must first be accepted as a ‘Community’ 
human right, i.e. have recognition within the Union’s legal order, which the 
articles of the ECHR do not necessarily or automatically have.  International (and 
domestic) law is relevant to the law of the European Union only in the sense 
that it provides guidance or inspiration for the substantive content of the 
‘general principles’.98 
The special significance given to the ECHR99 is a positive step in the EU’s 
                                                          
96 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5,  
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97 See: H. Brady, ‘The EU and human rights: a new era under the Lisbon treaty?’, Centre for European 
Reform, for OSI under the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) [pdf], May 2010, 
<http://www.eepa.be/wcm/dmdocuments/OSI_Lisbon_Treaty_Implications_2010-06.pdf>, p. 3,  
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<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html>, accessed 6 
March 2015.   
98 Case 29/69, Stauder v. Ulm [1969] ECR 4119; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. 
Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491; Case 
36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior [1975] ECR 1219; Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 
[1979] ECR 3727; Case 5/88, Wachauf v. Germany [1989] ECR 2609; Case C–13/94, P v. S and Cornwall CC 
[1996] ECR I–2143; Case C–36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I–9609. For further reading on general principles 
and human rights, see P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn., 2003), chs 
8–9; T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC law(1999); J. Usher, General Principles of EC Law (1998). 
99 See, e.g., Case C–94/2000, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur Général de la Concurrence, de la 
Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (Commission of The European Communities, Third party) 
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recognition of the relevance of human rights principles outside the 
Community system to developments within the Community system. 
However, as mentioned, the EU is not bound to comply with the letter 
of the ECHR or case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
[...] The ECJ does refer to other international human rights instruments 
when considering the content of fundamental rights in EU law. [...] 
However, it seems that Advocates General will not generally rely on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights without good 
reason, 100  and although the ECJ occasionally acknowledges the 
existence of the ICCPR, it is difficult to find an example where it has 
actually relied on its provisions.101  From the ECJ’s perspective, then, it 
is apparent that, apart from the ECHR, other international human rights 
treaties are not given a great deal of weight. Moreover, human rights 
treaties are considered only as useful guides to human rights protection 
within the EU. They are not directly legally binding upon the 
institutions.102 
 
As we know, the principle of supremacy dictates that in a conflict of laws 
between EU law and national, domestic law, EU law is supreme.  However, with 
respect to individual domestic laws regarding the protection of human rights, 
the ECJ has expressly noted that Union law should not threaten the protection 
of human rights, despite not being directly bound by the provisions of the ECHR. 
 
SECTION 1.b : HOW ARE LANGUAGE RIGHTS DEFINED?  
Given this standpoint and the apprehension that, in spite of a lack of legal 
                                                          
[2004] ICR 66, para.23; Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst AG v Commission [1989] ECR 2859, para. 13. 
100 E.g., Case C–168/91, Konstantinidis v. Stadt-Altensteig [1993] ECR I–1191, where AG Jacobs referred to 
the ICCPR because the ECHR had no specific rule on name changes (see para. 35 of the AG’s Opinion). In 
Case C–337/91, Van Gemert-Derks [1993] ECR I–5435, AG Darmon considered the ICCPR because it was 
expressly raised by the national court questioning its request for a preliminary ruling (see para.2 of AG’s 
Opinion). This attitude towards the ICCPR as a treaty of second resort by the AGs may be changing. See, 
e.g., Opinion of AG Tizzano, para. 95, in Case C–397/03, Archer Daniels Midland Company and Archer 
Daniels Midlands Ingredients Ltd v, Commission, 7 June 2005, referring to ICCPR Art. 14(7); Opinion of AG 
Kokott, para. 41, in Case C–105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino 11 Nov. 2004. 
101 For the most part where the ECJ does consider the ICCPR, it is as a prelude to finding that it is not 
relevant to the circumstances of the case: Case C–249/96, Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I– 
621, para. 44 relating to ICCPR, Art. 2(1); Case C–60/92, Otto BV v. Postbank NV [1993] ECR I–5683, para. 
11 relating to ICCPR, Art. 14; Case 374/87, Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3283, para. 31 relating to 
ICCPR, Art. 14. The CFI has been more ready to rely on the ICCPR in recent cases. 
102 Ahmed and Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law Perspective’, 2006, 
pp. 774-775. 
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obligation, the institutions of the European Union (more specifically the ECJ) 
find moral direction from such human rights instruments as the ECHR, and in 
acknowledging the relevant international and European instruments the 
questions must then be posed: what exactly are the language rights that these 
instruments afford and how are they defined?  At this point it rather quickly 
comes to light that although numerous international and domestic instruments 
have been enacted regarding linguistic rights protection since the United 
Nations International Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the exact nature, 
definition and extent of these rights has not yet been clearly termed, meaning 
that they grant very limited rights.  The right to use whatever language you 
chose in a public forum/in public life (life that interacts with the state) is not 
enshrined in any international human rights document.  The European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950,103 like its international counterparts, makes no direct mention of a right 
to freely use any language of one's choosing.  In fact, ‘the practical meaning of 
language rights has not yet been established anywhere’.104  It would seem that 
the problem with language rights within these instruments is that the 
protection they are granted is not done so through specific language rights, but 
through general human rights that have an implied linguistic dimension, such 
as a right to anti-discrimination measures, freedom of expression, of assembly 
and association and rights to respect for private and family life.105  Article 19 of 
                                                          
103 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), 4 November, 1950. 
104 D. A. Kibbee, “Presentation: Realism and Idealism in Language Conflicts and Their Resolution”, in 
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both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights are both examples of international recognition of 
expressive rights of peoples.106 
Freedom of language as a universal right is not territorially 
circumscribed and everyone is entitled to it, whatever the language s/he 
speaks. Freedom of language includes the right to use one’s mother 
tongue or any other language, both in speech and in writing.  Linguistic 
intolerance and repression of non-dominant languages is regarded to be 
inconsistent with fundamental rights. Freedom of language only 
guarantees the right to freely determine one’s linguistic behaviour.  Its 
scope is the private sphere.  It does not deal with a particular need of 
freedom of minorities but a general and abstract freedom: individuals 
are regarded in their abstract nature, not as members of the majority or 
the minority.107 
Despite describing freedom of language as a ‘universal right’, Xavier Arzoz is 
quick to qualify this by highlighting that the scope of this universal right remains 
in the private sphere.  The right of freedom of expression and opinion has an 
implied linguistic dimension as this freedom includes the freedom to choose 
the language of expression: ‘A state may choose one or more official languages, 
but it may not exclude, outside the spheres of public life, the freedom to express 
oneself in a language of one’s choice’.108  Thus meaning that although it is not 
permissible to discriminate based on a citizen’s private right to express 
themselves in the language of their choice, publicly the state and therefore the 
EU as an international organisation is not necessarily obliged to recognise this 
language and converse/interact with the citizen in the language that they chose.  
This attitude towards universal language rights is directly reflected in the 
                                                          
106 R. K. M. Smith, ‘Moving Towards Articulating Linguistic Rights – New Developments in Europe’, MSU-
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European Union’s approach to language equality, in that official languages, 
regional minority languages and dialects are all afforded differing levels of 
Union wide recognition (as was discussed in the previous chapter).  The 
linguistic regime of the European Union distinguishes languages into separate 
categories: 1. treaty languages, 2. official languages, 3. working languages and 
4. languages of the case leading to an undeniable divergence between the 
motto of “United in Diversity” and the actual limited linguistic diversity in the 
procedural workings of each institution. 
As was revealed in earlier discussion in this chapter, despite preconceptions, 
the EU is not technically, legally bound to the letter of the provisions laid out in 
international human rights instruments. Thus meaning that the question of 
whether or not it is adhering to customary international law and international 
human rights documents, and whether a lack of adherence would result in a 
breach of a citizen’s human rights may not be a valid question at all.  Does this 
then mean that the EU is not in fact breaching the human rights of its citizens 
in not equally recognising all mother tongues that exist within its borders?  
What then is the EU bound by? 
The ICJ has found that the ‘rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person’ in international law are erga omnes in nature. That is, 
they are considered to be ‘the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection.’ Thus, […] any breach by the EU of human 
rights in [Customary International Law] CIL, even if it does not 
necessarily disclose a violation of international law as between the 
Member States, will amount to a violation of international obligations 
owed to all other states.109 
Be that as it may, this does not mean that the EU would be in violation of any 
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human rights given that even under Customary International Law there is no 
legal obligation to actively promote language equality or the even equally 
recognise all languages in public life.  All that the EU would be bound by under 
CIL is an obligation to respect the right to use any language in private life.   
In a strictly European context, Article 342 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union provides that ‘The rules governing the languages of the 
institutions of the Union shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in 
the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, be determined by the 
Council, acting unanimously by means of regulations’.110  Although this provides 
for the equality of the official languages of the Union, there is no provision in 
any treaty that provides for the equality of all languages.  The judgement given 
by the ECJ in the Kik affair111 demonstrates this lack of commitment by the 
institutions of the European Union to uphold their promise of equality of 
languages as the ECJ judged that the references to language made in the EC 
Treaty ‘cannot be regarded as evidencing a general principle of Community law 
that confers a right on every citizen to have a version of anything that might 
affect his interests drawn up in his language in all circumstances’.112 
Given the lack of obligation imposed in any international document, along with 
the ECJ's assertion in the Kik judgement that Union treaties do not bind the 
institutions of the Union to confer the same linguistic rights on each and every 
citizen within the borders of the EU, it cannot be concluded that the multilingual 
                                                          
110 Article 342, European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:EN:PDF>, accessed 5 October 2013. 
111 Case T-120/99, Cristina Kik v. OHIM 2001 E.C.R. II-2235, para. 58, upheld on appeal (Case C-361/01 
Cristina Kik v. OHIM 2003 E.C.R. I-8283, para. 82). 
112 Kik v. OHIM 2001 E.C.R. II-2235. 
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regime of the EU technically breaches the linguistic human rights of any of its 
citizens.  Despite the lack of legal obligations imposed on them, the institutions 
of the EU have demonstrated a continuous flow of positive action in the area of 
language promotion.  What follows is a brief consideration of such positive 
actions as a means of assessing whether this action is enough, or whether it is 
merely a means of keeping the more serious issue at bay.  This leads to the 
question being posed whether the current inequality practised in the linguistic 
regime of the EU should in fact constitute a technical sanction enforceable 
breach or not. 
 
SECTION 1.c : POSITIVE ACTION TAKEN BY EU INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
PROTECTION OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS 113 
As the linguistic rights are not specifically prescribed for and are rather derived 
from other, more concrete rights such as freedom of expression, it would not 
be wrong to describe them as weak, negative rights.  No European or 
international instrument demands that languages (minority or not) be actively 
promoted or demands governments to enforce positive steps in order to 
maintain their existence.  Surely in a world where it is estimated that over 200 
languages have been lost over the last three generations and where it is 
believed that 90% of the languages currently spoken in the world will be extinct 
                                                          
113 Discussion of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) has been omitted given that it 
makes minimal reference to linguistic or minority rights and thus I chose not to include in in a section 
which specifically concentrates on positive action taken by EU institutions. The only references to 
linguistic equality in the ECFR appear at Article 21 which states: “Any discrimination based on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or 
sexual orientation shall be prohibited”; and at Article 22 which states: “The Union shall respect cultural, 
religious and linguistic diversity”.  
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by 2050114 the airy and weightless wording such as ‘should’ and ‘encourage’ 
within these international instruments should be replaced by more forceful 
language imposing enforceable consequences for non-adherence. 
The fact that the exact nature, definition and extent of these rights has not yet 
been clearly termed, and the limited rights this thus grants does not however 
mean that the EU does not take positive action in the promotion of language 
and minority linguistic rights within its borders.115 The ECJ is certainly under an 
obligation to respect the language right of a citizen in a public forum is that of 
criminal proceedings.  The European Convention on Human Rights provides that 
anyone facing a criminal charge should be provided with the services of an 
interpreter, free of charge, if he/she doesn’t understand the language of the 
trial.116  But as the ECJ is not necessarily bound by the provisions of the ECHR, 
this right to a fair trial was safeguarded in the 2010 Directive in the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings.117 
In addition to this, there are a number of Commission initiatives and policies 
                                                          
114 D. Ward, ‘Language cull could leave people speechless’, The Guardian [webpage], 25 May 2002, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/may/25/research.world>, accessed 3 November 2013.   
115 Although not an institution of the European Union, the Council of Europe has also taken steps to 
recognise and promote language and minority language rights. In the field of education, Article 14(1) of 
The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities states that ‘the 
parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the rights to learn 
his or her minority language’, with Article 14(2) proscribing that ‘the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, 
as far as is possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to 
those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught in the minority language or for receiving 
instruction in this language’.   The Council of Europe has a number of initiatives in place to promote 
linguistic diversity and language learning in the field of education which are carried out within the 
framework of Article 2 of the European Cultural Convention.   Once more though, upon reading the 
wording of both the Framework Convention and the initiatives undertaken by the Council of Europe, 
there is never any affirmative obligation imposed to compel them to treat languages of any status, 
official or minority, with any equality.  Encouragement and promotion seems to be the order of the day 
with no mention of ‘must’, ‘obliged’, ‘compelled’, ‘required’ or other such duty imposing language. 
116 Justice: Building a European Area of Justice, ‘Right to Interpretation and Translation’, European 
Commission [online], Last updated 15 June 2015, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-
rights/right-translation/index_en.htm>, accessed 2 November 2013. 
117 Council Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in Criminal Proceedings, 2010/64/EU, 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:280:0001:0007:en:PDF>, accessed 21 
November 2013. 
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which have the manifest aim of promoting language learning and minority 
language use across the states of the European Union.  To name a few: The 
European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages , founded in 1982, although now 
no longer in existence, had financial support provided by the Commission and 
aimed to strengthen fellowship and collaboration between minority language 
communities and promote and support diverse communities. The European 
year of languages 2001 aimed to raise the awareness of the wealth of linguistic 
diversity within the European Union, encourage multilingualism and to 
encourage lifelong learning of languages through specific funded initiatives and 
activities across the member states. 118  In 2004 the European Commission 
appointed a Commissioner with responsibility for education, training, culture 
and multilingualism with the direct role of promoting “the peaceful co-
existence of people from many different language communities”, and to 
facilitate the protection of cultural identity and linguistic diversity.119  And most 
recently active is the European Commission’s action plan “Promoting Language 
Learning and Linguistic Diversity” (2004-2006), which aimed to encourage all 
European citizens to be able to communicate in at least two languages other 
than their mother tongue.120 
The maintenance of the cultural heritage of European states is seen as a key aim 
of the European Union in order to preserve the individual customs and 
                                                          
118 Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘European Year of Languages 2001’, Eur-Lex [online], Last 
updated 6 December 2005, 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelong_learning/c11044_en.htm>
, accessed 2 December 2013. 
119 R. G. Parry, ‘History, human rights and multilingual citizenship: conceptualising the European Charter 
for Regional or Minority Languages’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2010, p. 331. 
120 Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, ‘Action Plan on Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity’, Eur-
Lex [online], Last updated 13 September 2011, 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/education_training_youth/lifelong_learning/c11068_en.htm>
, accessed 21 November 2013. 
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traditions of the area, a key element of which is the preservation of minority 
and regional languages.  The European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages has been described as the most advanced of any international 
document in the area of language rights. 
[The Charter] may be expected to help, in a measured and realistic 
fashion, to assuage the problem of minorities whose language is their 
distinguishing feature, by enabling them to feel at ease in the state in 
which history has placed them. Far from reinforcing disintegrating 
tendencies, the enhancement of the possibility of use of regional or 
minority languages in the various spheres of life can only encourage the 
groups who speak them to put behind them the resentments of the past 
which prevented them from accepting their place in the country in 
which they live and in Europe as a whole.121 (my italics) 
Yet once again, as with the language used to describe the aims and objectives 
of the initiatives noted above, the Charter uses very weak language such as 
‘help’, ‘enhance’ and ‘encourage’, none of which imposes any legal obligation 
on the institutions of the European Union to guarantee the language equality 
of minority languages and regional dialects across the member states.  As Rhona 
Smith comments: 
The Preamble to the Charter makes it clear that its overriding purpose 
is cultural; the protection and promotion of regional and minority 
languages as a threatened aspect of Europe's cultural heritage. The 
Charter aims directly at the language, not at the speakers,  since there 
is no individual or group rights for speakers of the language, although 
the implementation of the Charter vis-a-vis a given language will 
naturally have repercussions for the lives of its speakers.122 
What this suggests then is that the EU is protecting languages in the abstract 
sense.  The value of preserving all languages that are spoken within the borders 
of the EU seems to be understood and appreciated by the EU given the cultural 
heritage it carries with it, yet the actual function of language as a 
                                                          
121 Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 4 November 1992, ETS 148, 
available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de78bc34.html>, accessed 22 March 2016. 
122 R. K.M. Smith, 'Moving Towards Articulating Language Rights – New Developments in Europe’, p. 444. 
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communicative tool between citizen and 'government' (for want of a better 
word) has been disregarded. It would seem that despite its ethos of language 
preservation and the equal treatment of all languages, the limited recognition 
of the plethora of languages in the EU is one of the elements alienating groups 
of citizens from the institutions. 
 
SECTION 1.d : WHAT THIS ALL MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF LINGUISTIC RIGHTS 
WITHIN THE EU 
What is clear is that whether considering the position of minority languages or 
whether considering the position of official, state languages,  there exists only 
a mere moral obligation on the institutions of the EU to actively treat, practise 
and promote all languages equally.  ‘The literature on linguistic human rights is 
very hortatory and at times strident.  It echoes “shalls” and “shoulds” and 
“musts”.’123  Not only that, but (as discussed in the previous chapter) given the 
day-to-day practising of only a few official languages, it could be argued that the 
EU is almost creating more minority languages in its maltreatment of all official 
languages other than French, English and possibly German, thus developing an 
ever more complex linguistic hierarchy in the daily workings of its institutions. 
It can therefore be concluded that with regards to human rights there may not 
be a technical, legal breach of (loosely defined) linguistic human rights in that 
the EU is under no obligation to positively promote minority languages or 
recognise all languages equally in the public sphere.  It can however be 
                                                          
123 C. B. Paulston, ‘Epilogue: Some Concluding Thoughts on Linguistic Human Rights’, 127 International 
Journal of the Sociology of Language, 1997, p. 188. 
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affirmatively stated that the European Union has an active language regime 
which finds its legal basis in the provisions of: firstly, by consulting and being 
morally bound in certain aspects by the European Convention on Human Rights; 
secondly, the legal obligation of its member states that are signatories to certain 
international human rights instruments; and finally, the most comprehensive 
international legal document in the field of linguistic rights and minority rights 
protection, The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. 
Although there is no technical breach of linguistic human rights by the EU, this 
cannot be solely blamed on the European Union’s lack of explicit laws protecting 
such rights.  More so, the complete lack of defined, tangible linguistic rights in 
any international legislation has likely given the EU the impression that they do 
not need to expressly define or protect these rights either.  There is also the fact 
that a large number of the international declarations and resolutions defending 
human rights are non-binding in nature, rather they merely set standards and 
offer moral standpoints that should be followed.  The issue of definition (or lack 
of rather) is something that will be discussed at greater length in following 
sections regarding the Rule of Law.  With regards to human rights however, it is 
evident that the lack of concrete definition in the area of linguistic human rights 
both in international documents and EU treaty provisions is what is allowing the 
current unequal linguistic regime to prevail.    
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CHAPTER 2. SECTION 2 
THE EU AND THE RULE OF LAW 
In the previous chapter, it was asserted that the multilingual situation in the 
European Union and the lack of linguistic equality practised by its institutions 
could possibly mean that the EU is failing to fulfil certain formal requirements 
of the Rule of Law; specifically the accessibility and predictability aspects of 
legal certainty. As such, the democratic legitimacy of the European Union may 
be questioned in that adhering to formal attributes of the Rule of Law is a 
necessary characteristic of democratic entities. However, if questioning 
whether the institutions of the EU are upholding certain requirements 
demanded by the Rule of Law, it is of course necessary to define exactly what 
the Rule of Law is in the context of the European Union. The principle of the 
Rule of Law 'has progressively become a dominant organisational paradigm of 
modern constitutional law and is commonly recognised as one of the 
foundational principles undergirding and legitimating all European 
constitutional systems' 124  even if it is not expressly written into the 
constitutions of those states.  Although the EU may not be a state in the 
traditional sense of the word, the functions and roles its various institutions 
provide means that in order to be seen as a democratic entity, adherence to the 
Rule of Law is inevitably one of its founding principles.   
The aim of the following discussion is not to debate the definition of the Rule 
of Law, or the relative merits of differing definitions; but rather the aim is simply 
                                                          
124 See, e.g., J. Kokott, ‘From Reception and Transplantation to Convergence of Constitutional Models in 
the Age of Globalization’, in C. Starck (ed.), Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy. A 
Comparative Analysis, Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999, p. 97-102. 
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to reveal that the formal attributes of legal certainty, accessibility and 
foreseeability of the law feature in most procedural, “thin” definitions of the 
Rule of Law. In doing so, this will provide evidenced justification to declare that 
the various institutions of the European Union are not adhering to the Rule of 
Law if the legal certainty cannot be guaranteed, or if accessibility and 
predictability (foreseeability) of the law are not assured due to its multilingual 
nature and/or inadequate laws protecting procedural language equality. 
 
SECTION 2.a : DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW 
Since the nineteenth century the British concept of the Rule of Law has been 
closely linked to the views of Albert Venn Dicey, and of course being of British 
origin, this is the idea that the author of this thesis connotes when defining the 
rule of law.  Dicey gave three meanings to the Rule of Law: 
First, the rule of law means the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes 
the existence of arbitrariness; a man may with us be punished for a 
breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else. [Secondly, the 
rule of law guarantees] equality before the law, or the equal subjection 
of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the 
ordinary law courts. [And thirdly, the rule of law signifies] that with us 
the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries naturally 
form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the 
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the 
courts; that, in short, the principles of private law have with us been by 
the action of the courts and  Parliament so extended as to determine 
the position of the Crown and of its servants; thus the constitution is the 
result of the ordinary law of the land.125 
Although much criticism and academic debate inevitably still exists about the 
principles both included and omitted from Dicey's idea of the Rule of Law, along 
                                                          
125 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 187 (1889 , 10th ed. 1982, pp. 
202-203. 
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with criticism surrounding its anachronistic nature, it cannot be denied that the 
principles he laid out by and large form the idea of Rule of Law held within the 
British constitution. In a much more recent consideration of what the Rule of 
Law constitutes, Lord Bingham identified eight principles as being integral to 
the Rule of Law in any democratic society, the first of which states that there 
must be ‘accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable rules’.126 Similarly in the 
modern era, American legal scholar Ronald A. Cass draws on the ideas of Hayek 
and Fuller when discussing the integral features that the Rule of Law should 
contain. Cass sees the Rule of Law as involving ‘principles predictability’, 
emphasising the importance of: 
1) Predictability being based on rules; 
2) Sufficiently clarity for predictability; 
3) Accessibility.127 
Cass further explains that the Rule of Law ‘pulls society in the direction of 
knowable, predictable, rule-based decision making, toward limitations on the 
alignment of power with legitimacy’.128 
Of course to directly apply Dicey's, Lord Bingham’s, Cass’s or any other theorist’s  
definition of the Rule of Law when assessing the adherence of the institutions 
of the European Union to its principles would be unfair given the differences in 
meaning that traverse the different constitutions of the member states.  What 
the definition of the Rule of Law is causes numerous problems in itself. Firstly 
because the specific elements that constitute the Rule of Law solely with regard 
                                                          
126 Lord T. Bingham, ‘The rule of law’, The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 66, no. 1, 2007, pp. 67-85; B. Z. 
Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
127 S. Zifcak, Globalisation and the Rule of Law, Routledge, 2004, p. 14. 
128 R. A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
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to the national constitutions is a source of continuous debate for legal 
academics. And secondly because the different member states that constitute 
the European Union also have varying ideas of what the Rule of Law is that 
relate to the legal and cultural heritage of their state.   
Not only is the Rule of Law associated with different possible types of 
relationships between State and law and between law and moral but it 
is also rooted in different European legal traditions, making the scope of 
this notion, which is quite vague in any case, also dependent on the legal 
tradition in which the concept is used.129 
Certain academics advocate a 'strict separation between the Rule of Law as 
applied in the national context of the Member States and the Rule of Law to be 
employed within the system of Community law.  It should be up to the EU law 
alone to define the essence of EU Rule of Law'.130  This is because to incorporate 
the national ideas of member states as to what the boundaries of the Rule of 
Law are would privilege the citizens of the state whose ideas and boundaries of 
Rule of Law are incorporated and thus stop the EU Rule of Law from being a 
unifying concept that sees everyone as equal before the law.  Such difference in 
what the Rule of Law means can even be seen by simply looking at the 
difference in how the term 'the Rule of Law' has been translated in the 
languages of different member states.131  Gosalbo-Bono refers to the French 
term Etat de droit, the Spanish Estado de Derecho, the Italian Stato di Diritto 
and the German Rechtsstaat, noting the inclusion of the element of statehood 
in their terminology, something that the English Rule of Law does not connote.  
If this lack of cohesion exists purely in the terminology, surely the differences in 
                                                          
129 D. Kochenov, 'The EU rule of law: cutting paths through confusion', Erasmus Law Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 
2009, p. 9. 
130 Kochenov, 'The EU rule of law: cutting paths through confusion', 2009, p. 7. 
131 R. Gosalbo-Bono discusses this at great length in his paper 'The Significance of the Rule of Law and its 
Implications for the European Union and the United States', in University of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 
72, 2010-2011, p. 229. 
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meaning and the connotations emanating from the terminology must be ever 
more great.  That being said, the Rule of Law most certainly contains common 
procedural themes across different formal theoretical models. Principles of 
certainty and equality, as well as accessibility, predictability and foreseeability 
tend to feature in most accounts, and it is these features that are integral to this 
body of work. Such formal characteristics can be seen in the United Nations’ 
definition of the Rule of Law: 
For the United Nations, the Rule of Law refers to a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and 
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.132 
Despite the fact that UN declarations only provide a moral guidance rather than 
binding legal obligations, the member states of the EU, as democratic entities, 
are morally guided by the declarations of this international institution.  
Therefore this definition could be viewed as a common, even if non legally 
binding, Rule of Law that exists between the 28 Member States of the EU. Thus, 
I will use this definition as a comparative tool in order to assess whether the EU 
has a fully formed concept of the Rule of Law that its institutions must uphold 
and critically assess whether legal certainty, accessibility and predictability are 
in fact upheld despite the multilingual nature of the Union.  Hence, following 
discussion on what the Rule of Law is and how it has developed for the 
institutions of the EU, the aforementioned definition will be used as a 
                                                          
132 United Nations Rule of Law, ‘What is the Rule of Law?’, United Nations [webpage], 
<http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3>, accessed 3 December 2013. 
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comparative tool. 
 
SECTION 2.b : WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW FOR THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION? 
How the Rule of Law has been described in relation to the European Union has 
changed over the years.  Looking firstly at the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992 which affirms that the member states are 'Confirming their attachment 
to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the Rule of Law'.133  This seems to be a weak 
acknowledgement that as a democratic entity the Community (as it was known 
at the time) should demonstrate acknowledgement that the Rule of Law forms 
part of its ethos, but nothing more.  The Treaty on the European Union was 
amended in 1997 and included a provision in the form of Article 6(1) which 
stated that 'The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the Rule of Law, 
principles which are common to the Member States'.134  'Article 6(1) EU is clear 
that the Rule of Law is one of the 'principles which are common to the Member 
States'. How true is it, actually, given the huge discrepancies existing between 
the concepts corresponding to the Anglo-American 'Rule of Law' in the legal 
traditions of [27] other Member States?'135  This was subsequently followed by 
the addition of Article 7 into the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam which allowed for 
                                                          
133 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht , 7 February 
1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5; 24 December 2002, available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html>, accessed 13 July 2013, 
Preamble. 
134 Ibid. article 6(1). 
135 Kochenov, 'The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths through Confusion', p. 17. 
69 
 
EU sanctions in the case of serious and persistent breach of the principles 
mentioned in Article 6(1) TEU by any member state.136  Article 2 of the Treaty 
on the European Union makes distinct reference to the fact that the European 
Union is a Union based on the value of the Rule of Law: 
[T]he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy,  equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the member states in a society in which pluralism, 
non discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.137 
More recently, the ‘Treaty of Lisbon contains many other elements aiming at 
the further democratisation of the functioning of the Union. It details and 
reinforces the values and objectives on which the Union is built, notably the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law (Article 1a, Lisbon)’.138 
A more solid confirmation of the Union's position regarding the Rule of Law 
came quite early on however.  The first example of the European Union's 
relationship with the Rule of Law being taken a step further to being described 
as a 'Community based on the rule of law' comes from the European Court of 
Justice's case judgement in the Parti écologistes Les Verts case in 1986.  The ECJ 
stated that: 
[T]he European . . . [Community] is a [Community] based on the rule of 
law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid 
a review of the question whether the  measures adopted by 
them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. 
In particular... the Treaty established a complete system of legal 
remedies and  procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to 
                                                          
136 L. Pech, 'A Union Founded on the Rule of Law: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principle of EU Law', European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 6, 2010, pp. 360-361. 
137 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), article 2. 
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review the legality of measures adopted by the institution.139 
That being said, the ECJ’s approach to upholding the Rule of Law has been 
academically criticised in that the teleological approach to interpreting EU law 
which the ECJ has adopted is often said to collide with the principle of legal 
certainty: ‘Interpreting EU legislation by reference to systemic and, in particular, 
teleological considerations is said to run contrary to ideas associated with the 
principle of legal certainty, especially that of predictability. On this view, 
teleological interpretation disregarding the wording of a rule makes 
adjudication within the context of EU law particularly unpredictable.’140  
It can be clearly determined from these examples that the institutions of the EU 
overtly intend to demonstrate a willingness to uphold the Rule of Law. By 
making continual reference to its commitment to upholding the Rule of Law in 
treaties, as well as the ECJ’s decision to specifically outline the Rule of Law as 
being a founding basis of the Union, we can determine that the EU considers 
the upholding of the Rule of Law to be of significant importance for its 
democratic legitimacy. The problem is however, that just as with many national 
constitutions, the EU does not specifically outline what the Rule of Law means 
for its purposes, meaning that the EU’s intentions aside, we are still no closer to 
understanding what the Rule of Law is for the EU. 
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SECTION 2.c : NO DEFINITION EQUALS NO RULE OF LAW? WHAT THIS MEANS 
FOR THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE EU 
What the above evidences is that 'the Treaties are silent on what the substance 
of the concept might be, ‘not indicat[ing] which meaning [of the Rule of Law] 
should prevail in the Community law context'. Clearly, the Union Rule of Law 
cannot be identical to any of the Rule of Law concepts that developed within 
the legal systems of the Member States. Simultaneously, it can potentially build 
on the ensemble of these concepts'.141  Looking again at the Rule of Law as a 
concept that is universally recognised by the United Nations as an integral 
necessity for the human rights of democracies to be upheld, there must be a 
breach on some level by the European Union as certain aspects of the Rule of 
Law are not being guaranteed because of public linguistic inequality.  
'Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels is at the heart 
of the United Nations’ mission. […] The principle that everyone – from the 
individual right up to the State itself – is accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, is a 
fundamental concept.' 142  Thus as it stands, if we take the Rule of Law 
requirement of legal certainty as laid out in the UN definition and other 
definitional theories stated earlier, it could be argued that the EU is not 
adhering to the Rule of Law, more specifically the aspects of certainty, 
predictability and accessibility of law. How can there be legal certainty of any 
kind as both predictability and accessibility are impossible without a definition?  
There is nothing concrete in a definitional sense in existence at EU level that the 
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peoples of the EU would be able to have access to or predict outcome from.  
Perhaps using the various meanings that traverse the member states as a 
template to create a solid definition is the best solution.  'National 
understandings radically differ, and, on the other hand, that the Union cannot 
rely on this constitutional principle as it does not constitute a state [...] it is 
difficult to see why the Union should not be able to redefine the meaning and 
scope of the Rule of Law to fit the distinct features of its autonomous legal 
order. 143   This is an entirely valid point as a definition encompassing the 
different Rule of Law principles that traverse the boundaries of the EU member 
states is undoubtedly what is needed given that in the current situation it is 
impossible to attribute any technical breach to the EU as it cannot be in breach 
of something that does not have a definitive meaning either within its 
legislation or case law.  That being said, is picking and choosing which elements 
of the Rule of Law it wants to incorporate to suit its own needs a good thing 
either?  
It is possibly the lesser of two evils as at least a statutory definition would 
provide recourse for the citizens and at least deliver the accessibility element 
of legal certainty.  Admittedly, the EU may just be taking the lead from national 
constitutions which undeniably often offer vague definitions of the Rule of Law 
and rarely give concrete values that build its essence.  Yet why then does the EU 
insist on basing its Union principles and values on such ill-defined concepts?  
Surely as a relatively 'new' political entity with such broad competences across 
its member states it could set a precedent and offer a mutually agreed upon 
                                                          
143 Pech, 'A Union Founded on the Rule of Law’, p. 363. 
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definition that is laid out in legislation. Doing such would create a higher level 
of certainty about the Rule of Law than nations have thus far been able to 
provide for their citizens. This could therefore be a potentially defining feature 
of the European Union moving forward; creating a greater level of certainty in 
an area that the nations have failed to do so.144 
Putting aside the fact that even at national level there is difficulty in defining 
the Rule of Law, and the fact that it would be difficult for the EU to decide on a 
definition that did not favour the ideas of certain nations have about the Rule 
of Law, the creation of a concrete definition (which is realistically highly unlikely) 
would also bring about its own problems given that multilingualism within the 
EU would lead to multiple inevitable inconsistencies that would arise from the 
issue of imperfect translation.  Having a definition that was laid out in legislation 
would navigate around the problems arising from a complete lack of a definition, 
yet predictability of the law would still be questionable given the various 
different connotations that may emanate from the different language versions.  
That being said, 'predictability' doesn't necessarily mean that every person 
should interpret the law in the same way as reducing legal certainty down to 
just predictability is unworkable given that laws must be changeable to 
accommodate for progression.  However, the procedure and legal reasoning of 
the ECJ must be predictable if we cannot rely on the language of the law to be 
predictable in itself.  And as was mentioned earlier, the ECJ’s teleological 
approach to interpretation itself collides with the legal certainty aspect of the 
Rule of Law. Given the level of multilingualism in the European Union, the risk 
                                                          
144 See Chapter 5 discussion on a rights-based Union and the need for definition of rights at EU level. 
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comes not just from removing the citizen from being able to understand the 
adjudication process and its predictability, but also the legal expert or lawyer.  
One thing I am certain of however, is that questioning the meaning of 
something that actually exists as a defined concept in the legislation of the EU 
offers more opportunity for recourse than questioning the meaning of 
something that doesn't have a definition.  'To use it merely as a tag, not as a 
tool, seems to be a waste of its potential.'145  
The problem is that the Rule of Law can’t be defined in any meaningful way. 
Even national legal systems are unclear on what the Rule of Law is within a 
single country with a single majority mother tongue language. For the EU 
however, there is not only this problem, but also the problem of having a 
defined Rule of Law that would emanate the same meaning when translated 
into all 24 languages of the EU.  Thus, a definition of what the Rule of Law is for 
the EU would be a start but it would not solve the problem at large as the 
multilingualism issue cannot be overcome with simple definition. This chapter 
and the last has shown that the problems of multilingualism permeate all 
corners of the day-to-day workings of the EU and also its very democratic 
foundations. If the EU is unable to uphold such formal features of the Rule of 
Law as foreseeability and accessibility, then it could not be confidently claimed 
that the EU adheres to the Rule of Law. As such, given that adhering to the Rule 
of Law is a necessary feature of democracy, its democratic legitimacy is further 
questioned. If there can be no practical solution to this we need to find a 
                                                          
145 For an unflattering analysis of the general state of the EU legal theory, see N. Walker, 'Legal Theory 
and the European Union: A 25th Anniversary Essay', Oxford Journal Legal Studies, vol. 25, 2005, p. 581. 
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conceptual one, a process which begins with understanding language 
conceptually. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There are 2 battles at hand, the first of which is definitional. The EU must define 
the exact nature and extent of language rights in order to offer greater recourse 
to have these rights upheld. It must also define what it means by the Rule of 
Law in order to offer a greater level of certainty and thus increase their 
democratic legitimacy by creating a greater level of predictability and 
accessibility to the law. By doing so the EU would be demonstrating positive 
action and the willingness to uphold these fundamental necessities of 
democracy.  The second is not something that can be so easily and readily 
solved. Even with defined language rights and a clearly laid-out definition of 
what the Rule of Law is for the EU, the ever-prevalent problems caused by the 
multilingual nature of the EU would still be present. As was concluded in the 
Chapter One, this is not something that can be solved with a practical solution, 
but instead requires a stronger understanding of language as a concept if we 
want to overcome the practical problems it is causing. In hindering the 
accessibility and predictability of law the EU’s language situation is actively 
negatively affecting its democratic legitimacy, meaning we must gain greater 
understanding about 2 things: language(s) as a concept (in understanding the 
nature of the problem conceptually we can then come to a conceptual solution); 
and the demos (in that you cannot have a democracy without a demos), and of 
course, how these two things are intertwined. 
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Although it has been clearly demonstrated that the EU is not technically in 
breach of any international legal obligations, it is clear that this is merely 
because of a lack of definition. This lack of definition only increases the ever 
complained about democratic deficit within the European Union as key 
principles of democracy (human rights and the Rule of Law) are not being 
upheld to their full potential.  For the situation to change it is necessary that 
linguistic inequality be classed as a human rights breach and thus for the EU 
have some sort of accountability when equality is not upheld and for there to 
be enforceable sanctions when this is breached.  ‘Language is intrinsically linked 
to the development of both an individual human consciousness and a sense of 
group or cultural identity.  The protection of language and linguistic rights 
therefore becomes essential to the protection of human dignity.'146  And the 
main thing standing in the way of these rights not being upheld is quite simply 
the ill-defined nature of the essential democratic elements of both linguistic 
human rights and the Rule of Law within the European Union.  Without the 
express protection of language rights and minority rights the EU risks eroding 
certain, less dominant identities and inevitably losing a vast amount of the 
cultural heritage it claims to protect. 
The following chapter explores language as a concept by looking at it through 
various ideas formed in Western linguistic theory. The hope is that by 
understanding language and eventually its power in identity and demos 
                                                          
146 J. P. Gromacki, ‘The Protection of Language Rights in International Human Rights Law: A Proposed 
Draft Declaration of Linguistic Rights’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 32, 1991-1992, p. 515. 
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formation, I will be able to move towards discovering a theoretical solution to 
the democratic legitimacy problems multilingualism presents the EU with. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
WESTERN LINGUISTIC THEORY: UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE AS A CONCEPT 
IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MULTILINGALISM IN 
THE EU 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The implications for truly adhering to certain aspects of the Rule of Law (as 
highlighted in the previous chapter and as attributed to the issue of linguistic 
diversity within the EU) undoubtedly contributes to the oft cited democratic 
deficit of the EU as an institution.  It was constitutional theorist Dieter Grimm 
who made a significant link between his thesis that the EU lacks a genuine basis 
of democratic legitimation and the issue of language.147  He wrote: 
The importance of the language factor for the possibility of European 
democracy is often underestimated, partly because a democracy 
concept confined to the area of organized opinion formation 
predominates...partly because of a failure to perceive the dependency 
of democracy on communication opportunity.  Pointing to multilingual 
states like Switzerland, Belgium or Finland...does not refute this.  [A] 
country like Switzerland had formed a national identity well before 
constitutionalization and relates its multilingual political discourse to it... 
By contrast the absence of a European communication system, due 
chiefly to language diversity, has the consequence that for the 
foreseeable future there will neither be a European public nor a 
European political discourse...The European level of politics lacks a 
matching public.148 
Thus far in this thesis a mass of problems that are brought about for a 
multilingual political/legal/economic/social post nation-state such as the EU 
have been identified.  What follows is a discussion of various theories on 
                                                          
147 P. A. Kraus, A union of diversity: language, identity and polity-building in Europe, Cambridge 
University  
Press, 2008. p. 141. 
148 D. Grimm, ‘Does European need a Constitution’, European Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1995,  
pp. 295-296. 
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language which I believe explain why these problems occur and mean that 
multilingualism is an insurmountable practical obstacle for a unified EU (in its 
currently (ill-)defined state/existence) to exist.  The ultimate aim is to maintain 
linguistic diversity by finding new bases upon which to build a unified state/post 
nation-state that understands the reasons why the current system cannot and 
will not continue to thrive.  In order to arrive at this point, however, this chapter 
essentially explores the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity and 
ensuring a language hierarchy does not become even more solidified than 
already at present in the day-to-day workings of the institutions of the European 
Union. 
Extensive consideration of the academic works in the field has revealed a 
distinct lack of in depth exploration into the reasons why the linguistic issues 
within the European Union are a continuously prevailing concern.  There is a 
distinct lack of thorough application of and explanation through linguistic 
theory, as well as a lack of deliberation on how such linguistic barriers could be 
minimised in order to facilitate a more democratically legitimate Union.  As well 
as gaining a deeper understanding of language in order to find a solution to the 
democratic legitimacy issues of the European Union, further importance of such 
contemplation comes from the fact that, if we are to make possible further and 
continued integration within the EU, and in order to ensure the EU project does 
not fail, we must first understand exactly why it is that a weakly defined, multi-
lingual post-national entity will inevitably stumble when attempting to foster 
integration and mould a citizenry. Upon reading this chapter the hope is that 
the reader will come to understand the influence that language holds over our 
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reality and thought process otherwise they will not fully be able to grasp the 
severity of placing the use of certain languages over others in political debate 
and law-making procedures.  I am not claiming that this doesn't happen in other 
multilingual states, but how it is happening in the EU is different due to the 
sheer number of languages that must be considered as well as the lack of 
unifying identity, the existence/creation of which could possibly help us to 
overcome the problems caused by multilingualism (as will be discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five).  To argue that multilingual democracies such as 
Switzerland, Belgium and Finland can be compared with the situation in the EU 
is to completely misunderstand the vastly different dimensions of language 
pluralism at the level of the Union as well as to lack a comprehension of the 
historical constitutionalising processes of such countries.   
This chapter will begin by posing 'the language question' and the importance of 
its consideration for multilingual polities given the value placed on the politics 
of recognition, ultimately demonstrating that 'meaning' is something that 
language alone is unable to convey.  Following this, the relationship between 
language and the law, and language and communication within a legal system 
is discussed in relation to the democratic credibility of the EU given its linguistic 
diversity.  All of this is considered with the aim of providing evidence for the fact 
that, whatever angle we look at the EU from: socially, politically, economically, 
or culturally, the language question and the issue of multilingualism is all 
pervasive and must be given a great amount of consideration.  The chapter goes 
further in its exploration of linguistic theory in relation to the EU than others 
that have come before it to demonstrate the fact that in order to tame the beast 
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that is multilingualism, we must understand the beast, down to the original 
component of simple 'language' and its dominating effect on numerous aspects 
of individual, collective, social and political life. 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 149 
Theoretical discussion begins with the musing on language of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, considered by many to be the father of modern linguistics.  He was 
an advocate of the expressivist model of language which held that language 
served as a medium of self-expression and that language was a means not only 
to describe reality, but also to discover reality, that we are bound by the 
linguistic limits within which our mother tongue allows us to perceive, de-
construct and create our reality.  The influence that von Humboldt's work had 
on the linguistic theories of later theorists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee 
Whorf is considered with specific reference to the linguistic relativity hypothesis.  
This is a simple concept which offers hypotheses about language encoding a 
particular experience of the world which thence predisposes its speakers to see 
the world according to the experience encoded in it and thus offers a means of 
explaining why it is that such linguistic issues arise when dealing with multi-
lingual legislation.  If a language encodes a particular experience of the world, 
its use might predispose its speakers to see the world according to the 
                                                          
149 In this chapter, it is not my objective to discuss the merits and criticised inconsistencies within any of 
the theories I discuss. Although I must note that all theories considered are contested and do not have 
concrete evidence proving their worth.  Rather, I am discussing and applying them because I agree with 
their position and views and I believe they explain the problems caused by multilingualism in the EU, 
and offer an insight into the role of language in collective life which could go some way in leading to a 
solution to the democratic legitimacy issues created by the multilingual nature of the EU. 
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experience encoded in it.  And the reason this cannot function in the 
multilingual setting of the European Union is because perfect translations are, 
strictly speaking, impossible because they require finding exact equivalents 
where none exist.150  The problem does not always lie with finding an exact 
linguistic translation, but more with finding one which is functional, practical 
and teleological.  We cannot have a single legal language across the EU because 
there is no single culture, history or language of communication across the EU: 
beyond a few natural meanings which are encoded in most languages 
(e.g. basic colour terms), the majority of meanings in languages, and in 
different varieties of a language, are  crystallised in response to the 
social, economic, technological and theoretical needs of the cultures 
concerned.151 
It therefore could be argued that the only possible hope to have any sort of 
political and cultural homogeneity in a political entity is through a common, 
native, language.  These are all aspects that will be covered in this chapter. 
This chapter will also feature the consideration and application of the theories 
of Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of structural linguistics, whose structural 
view of language considers the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign in relation 
to the concept it denotes.  In considering these theories with regard to the 
sphere of the EU, a fully comprehensive linguistic perspective to the language 
barrier concerns of the European Union can be understood by giving a level of 
theoretical explanation that legal scholars often do not take into consideration.  
Understanding these linguistic theories is imperative in order to critically assess 
the possibility of finding a deeper, more conceptual solution to the problems 
                                                          
150 R. Huntington, ‘European Unity and the Tower of Babel’, 9 B.U. Int’l L. J., 1991, p. 328. 
151 P. Goodrich, ‘The role of linguistics in legal analysis’, Legal Discourse, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987, p.  
530. 
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caused by multilingualism in the European.  By gaining a deeper level of 
comprehension about the various roles and importance of language these 
theorists put across, the following questions will be posed: does our native 
language determine our way of seeing the world or is it the other way round? 
How does this relationship between language and world view affect integration 
within the EU? And finally, can this understanding of language lead us to a 
conceptual solution to the practical barriers multilingualism puts up in the EU?  
 
CHAPTER 3. SECTION 1 
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT, LANGUAGE AND THE COLLECTIVE 
“But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.” (George 
Orwell, 1984) 
 
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of 
thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because 
there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be 
needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined 
and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten." (George Orwell, 1984) 
 
Beginning the main thrust of this chapter with quotes from George's Orwell's 
chef d'oeuvre, 1984, sets the tone for the idea of language being presented 
throughout the thesis.  The plot of the novel is well known; The Party believe 
that if they eradicate any language from the English language which has 
significations against party ideals, then there will be no uprising or revolt against 
the party as through the limitation of language they will eventually limit the 
ability to even think of such a thing.  The Party create 'Newspeak', a new version 
of the English language which has the function of restricting and controlling the 
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population by narrowing the range of thought, thus making it impossible to 
express – or even conceive of – a concept which deviates from the Party line.  It 
is essentially a demonstration of how language can be exploited to serve the 
interests of a political party or a certain social group.  It is mind control through 
the manipulation of the mechanisms of language.  Of course 1984 is a fictional, 
distopian novel which exaggerates the author's grievances with the power held 
by our political leaders, but its depiction of the power of language over thought 
is an important lesson nonetheless; if our language knowledge is limited, so too 
is our ability to think, create and conceive of certain concepts. 
“Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together 
again in new shapes of your own choosing.” (George Orwell, 1984) 
 
So what exactly is language; this all powerful tool of which I speak?152 The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines language as, ‘The system of spoken or written 
communication used by a particular country, people, community, etc., typically 
consisting of words used within a regular grammatical and syntactic 
structure’;153 and the online dictionary as, ‘A body of words and the systems for 
their use common to a people who are of the same community or nation, the 
same geographical area, or the same cultural tradition’.154 Moving away from 
dictionary definitions and more towards academic definitions, American 
anthropologist Joel Sherzer says that ‘Language is both cultural and social. It is 
                                                          
152 Language has several different meanings depending on individual opinion and area of study. For 
example, a linguist, a grammatologist, a semiologist and even an anthropologist will have greatly 
differing opinions on what language is, and will even dispute among themselves within their fields as to 
its definition. 
153 “language”, The Oxford English Dictionary online, 2016, 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/105582?rskey=6tXfUa&result=1#eid>, accessed 14 June 2013.  
154 “language”, Dictionary.com, 2016, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/language>, accessed 14 
June 2013. 
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cultural in that it is one form of symbolic organization of the world. It is social 
in that it reflects and expresses group memberships and relationships’. 155 
However he goes on to elaborate that ‘discourse is an elusive area, an imprecise 
and constantly emerging and emergent interface between language and culture, 
created by actual instances of language in use and best defined specifically in 
terms of such instances’.156 All definitions mentioned, whether for general or 
academic purpose, make reference to language and the collective, the 
community, the group. The OED is the most vague (or perhaps cautious) of the 
definitions, referring only to the collective in the sense of a people, or a country. 
The online dictionary however is more detailed and particular in its reference, 
citing a geographical grouping, a nation even, and also cultural traditions when 
defining language. The academic definition provided by Sherzer also refers to 
language in a cultural sense, and also puts language in the context of society, 
not only as a means of communication within society, but as an expression of 
the group itself.  From these definitions we can already begin to see the 
inseparable link that exists between language and the demos. Something that 
will be of greatest significance for the rest of this thesis. 
 
SECTION 1.a : LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 
Much has been said in the introduction about the insurmountable barrier of 
language diversity when creating a polis and how it creates a potentially 
impassable obstacle for further integration in the EU:  'Whenever it comes to 
                                                          
155 J. Sherzer, ‘A Discourse Centred Approach to Language and Culture’, American Anthropologist, New 
Series, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), p. 296. 
156 Sherzer, ‘A Discourse Centred Approach to Language and Culture’, p. 296. 
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defining 'hard' criteria of cultural heterogeneity in Europe's multilingual 
constellation, the terrain of language is almost unavoidably brought into 
focus.'157  It is an unavoidable inevitability that the language question will be 
discussed when considering the political and cultural heterogeneity of the 
European Union given that language could arguably be said to be the main 
component of cultural differentiation that runs throughout the EU.  It remains 
such an important element given the importance of the language question in 
understanding the 'politics of recognition' as well as the implications linguistic 
diversity has for the constitution of a democratic political order and the conflict 
potentials typical of multilingual political settings.158 Let it be known though, it 
could not be said that language is the only barrier that must be navigated when 
attempting to unify such a geographically wide-reaching mass of people: 
varying economic strengths and GDP,  common law legal systems versus civil law 
systems, differing standards in education and access to higher education, 
healthcare, cultural heritage, the list goes on.  This following discussion in no 
way suggests that language is the only barrier when attempting to align nation-
states politically, economically and socially, or that it is the only barrier to 
further integration, or even that it is the only cause of the EU’s democratic 
deficit.  What is considered rather is the often suggested instance that a polis 
or demos cannot exist without a common language and seeing as how the 
continuous integrating tendency of the EU suggests the aim of a further and 
continued integration in all aspects of 'state' life, multilingualism is definitely 
one of the most significant barriers to cross.  After all, language is not only a 
                                                          
157 Kraus, A union of diversity: language, identity and polity-building in Europe, p. 76 
158 Kraus, A union of diversity: language, identity and polity-building in Europe, p. 77 (these issues are  
discussed by Kraus throughout ch.4 of his book). 
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means to comprehend the world: it is even a means to recognise it.  It is a 
mental device to enable the mind to comprehend what it sees. 159   By 
understanding language as a concept and later its role in demos formation, 
perhaps we can move towards a system which can surpass the surface level 
problems caused by multilingualism and go straight to rebuilding the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy without worrying about the practical issues language 
causes. 
It must be acknowledged that human beings have far more concepts (distinctive 
cognitive capacities) than words for expressing them.  This idea that a given 
language commits its users to a distinctive philosophy was expressed by 
Lichtenberg: 'Our false philosophy is incorporated in our whole language; we 
cannot reason without, so to speak, reasoning wrongly. We overlook the fact 
that speaking, no matter of what, is itself a philosophy'.160  Roman Jackobson 
wrote that 'the true difference between languages is not in what may or may 
not be expressed but in what must or must not be conveyed by the speakers'.161  
What Lichtenberg and Jackobson are essentially saying is that reason and 
meaning are not in themselves encapsulated by the words that we speak when 
we speak a language.  It goes far beyond that into the realms of history and 
culturally accepted artefacts that have developed over time, the effects of 
which create conceptual filters that determine what we actually mean when we 
speak a language.  When we evaluate any social system, our evaluation is 
necessarily encapsulated in our own system perspective. The capacity to 
                                                          
159 B. Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', Journal of Air Law and Commerce, vol. 50, 1984-1985, p. 797. 
160 M. Black, ‘Linguistic relativity: the views of Benjamin Lee Whorf’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 68, 
no. 2, 1959, pp. 232-234. 
161 R. Jakobson, ‘On linguistic aspects of translation’, On translation, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 30-39. 
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formulate language and other symbol systems entails the capacity - or perhaps 
better - the incapacity not to respond to the meaning of the symbol systems.162  
Thus our individual linguistic capacity to create and respond both feeds and is 
dependent on the communicative society in which its creation has become 
embedded.  Peter Kraus succinctly explains, with reference to the writing of 
Herder, Humboldt and Taylor, why this is imperative for the communicative 
relationship between the state and the individual: 
Language is a resource we need for individual communication.  By 
acquiring this resource, we are attached to a specific, culturally defined 
community.  […] [Language] becomes a matter of a collective support 
that, in modern polities, translates into institutional provisions devoted 
to reproducing this web.  Thus, if the dignity of individuals is to be 
respected, the linguistic and cultural identity of their communities of 
origin must be recognised to a satisfactory extent as well. […] By 
recognising a language we do not recognise a language 'in itself'.  The 
point rather is to recognise a linguistic community and, ultimately, the 
individual speakers who form the community.163 
What can be reasonably concluded from the above analysis is the need for 
linguistic consideration for the politics of recognition within a communicative 
political space. I will now aim to validate the need to discuss and further 
consider the relationship between language and the law, and language and 
communication within a legal system; two highly necessary relationships to 
consider when the democratic credibility of the EU is in question in relation to 
its linguistic diversity. 
 
 
                                                          
162 O. C. Lewis, ‘Law, Language, and Communication’, Case Western Reserve Law Review, vol. 23, 1971-
1972, p. 312. 
163 Kraus, A union of diversity: language, identity and polity-building in Europe, pp. 80-81. 
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SECTION 1.b : LANGUAGE AND LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION  
Aside from the issue of legal language being a language unto itself, a topic 
worthy of a thesis in itself (but not strictly relevant to the language issue being 
discussed at present in this thesis), the law, in its over-arching, all-encompassing 
and complete meaning, could not be conceived of without language.  Legal 
concepts exist only within the confines of the language in which they are written.  
The reality of the binding force of the law is expressed to those it governs 
through the medium of language.  Many nations operate under a common law 
system, deriving their law from judicial precedent and custom rather than 
statute or a written constitution, but this system also uses language of a 
different kind as it is known and expressed from person to person through 
communication and expression within particular contexts.  It would therefore 
unjustly narrow any analysis if the law and politics of the EU was discussed 
without considering the issue of multilingualism.  Seeing law and linguistics as 
two separate entities that merely exist under the same faculty heading of 
'Humanities' would be to severely restrict the possibility of a complementary 
relationship that could uncover solutions to problems in both disciplines. Many 
academics in both fields believe that an interdisciplinary relationship between 
language and legal studies would surely enhance legal studies and legal theory 
studies:   
Language - and this consideration surpasses all the others - is at every 
moment everybody's concern; spread throughout society and 
manipulated by it, language is something used daily by all. '" Although 
this may be doubted in the case of law, this doubt speaks only to our 
habit of leaving language to linguists (and to communicators, god forbid), 
law to the lawyers, and health to the doctors.164 
                                                          
164 J. W. Mohr, ‘From Saussure to Derrida: Margins of Law’, Queen's Law .Journal, vol. 18, 1993, p. 354. 
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The relationship between law and language goes beyond the expression of law 
in either written or spoken language however, right back to the etymological 
roots of the words themselves: 
The intimate connection between law and language is confirmed when 
looking into the etymological roots of both expressions. A first 
impression is derived from the fact that the Latin word "lex" means 
"law," but in the combination "lexicon" it has the meaning "word." Now 
let us compare "lex" and its genitive "legis" or its nominative plural 
"leges" with the Greek word "logos," which stands for "word" but also, 
as in logic, for "idea. ' Indeed, the common word is "legein," which 
means among others, "to speak."' When we put the words "lex," 
"logos," and "legein" together, we realize immediately how law, 
language, and thought interrelate.165 
This etymological explanation not only connects the meanings of 'law' and 
'language', but also links 'language' to 'thought'.  If the original roots of 
structured language as we know it (specifically with regards to Western 
languages that are derivatives of Latin, of which English is one) demonstrates 
these concepts as being closely related then surely this is evidence enough of 
the need to understand this relationship more within a multilingual polity. Every 
language constitutes a kind of logic - an expression in which law, language, and 
thought come together - that has a strong, although not inevitably 
determinative, influence on our thoughts.166 
What happens to law that exists through and in language if it is transferred into 
a different language? If the structure of a particular language plays an important 
role in defining our thinking, it may well be that a particular language can only 
express certain legal ideas and that the limits of our particular language are the 
                                                          
165 Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', p. 798. 
166 Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', p. 799. 
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limits of our legal reasoning.167  This factor increases exponentially with each 
enlargement of the EU as tested hypotheses about the influence of language 
over thought and vice versa suggest that the differences in our ability to 
conceive of and express thought through language vary more greatly between 
different language groups.  The farther apart the language structures are from 
one another, the greater might be the change in the law. This results from the 
fact that when a legal rule is implanted into a different language context, the 
linguistic dynamics of the language might drive it in an unexpected direction.168   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, propositum 7, (1933). 
168 See Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', p. 801. See also G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik:  
Studienausgabe mit dem Text der Centenarausgabe 73 (1884), for whom words only have a meaning in 
the whole of a sentence. See also J. Bentham, ‘Essay on Language’, in Essays on Bentham: studies in  
jurisprudence and political theory 10 (H. Hart ed. 1982) – discussing the idea that this principle may be  
transferred to the connection between legal notion and language. 
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SECTION 1.c : LANGUAGE GROUPS IN EUROPE 
Figure 1. 169 
 
 
                                                          
169 Languages of Europe [map] [image], in Fouberg, Erin, Human Geography: People Place, and 
Culture, 11th edition (AP edition), Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 144, image available at  
<http://teacherweb.ftl.pinecrest.edu/snyderd/mwh/projects/cov/maps/MapLang.htm>, 
(accessed 20 October 2014). Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Wiley publications. 
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As is shown in Figure 1 above, the 24 official, working languages of the EU are 
spread across 8 different language groups: Dutch, German, English, Danish and 
Swedish belong to the Germanic group (although almost half of English 
vocabulary has Romance origins); Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian and 
Romanian to the Romance group; Polish, Slovak, Czech, Solvene, Croatian and 
Bulgarian to the Slavic group; Irish to the Celtic; Lithuanian and Latvian to the 
Baltic; Greek to the Hellenic; Estonian, Finnish and Hungarian to the Finno-Ugric 
language group; and Maltese belongs to the Hamito-Semitic (also called Afro-
Asiatic) group (not featured on above map). This figure further increases if we 
include the minority and regional languages that are also active within the 
boundaries of the EU.  Different language groups will usually have different verb, 
subject, object placement within a sentence, some have gendered nouns 
whereas others don't, the conjugation of verbs can sometimes alter the 
structure and meaning of an entire phrase.  The point being if the structure and 
technical construction of languages in different language groups vary 
considerably, it seems highly likely that so then can the meaning evoked from 
the sentence itself.170 
                                                          
170 In his article 'Linguistic Diversity versus Legal Unity in Europe: Beyond the Chicken-and-Egg 
Discussion', The Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2, 1, 2007, V. Smith notes: 'Herslund and colleagues 
have suggested a universal distinction between 'endocentric' and 'exocentric' representations of reality 
as encoded into the formal structure of particular languages, with the Germanic and the Romance 
languages as clear-cut examples of the opposing prototypes. In short, the key observation is that 
Germanic languages are organised around concrete information by having a relatively high lexical and 
informational weight in the verbs, i.e. in the centre of the proposition (hence endocentric), whereas 
Romance languages are organised around more abstract information by having a higher lexical and 
informational weight in the nominal arguments, i.e. outside the centre of the proposition (hence 
exocentric). He further footnotes that a number of language-specific comparative studies supporting this 
typology are presented in Herslund, M (ed) (2003) Aspects linguistiques de la traduction, Presses 
Universitaires de Bordeaux; Korzen, 1 (2005) 'Endocentric and Exocentric Languages in Translation' (13), 
Perspectives: Studies in Translatology 21; Korzen, I and D'Achille, P (eds), Tipologia linguistica e societ. 
Due giornate italo-danesi di studi linguistici Roma, 27-28 Novembre 2003. Quaderni della Rassegna 42 
Franco Cesati Editore; Baron, I (ed), Language and Culture. Copenhagen Studies in language 2,9 
Samfundslitteratur. 
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For the law however, the issue is not only one of how our predispositions based 
on our language or language group affect our perceptions: 
it could be argued, law imposes a certain form on our pre-legal 
understanding of the world, i.e. the substance, by offering technical 
concepts and principles developed for that very purpose - which may 
also differ significantly from one legal system or tradition to the next. […] 
legal orders too may differ considerably as to which circumstances are 
selected to be legally determinative, even when the real-world 
circumstances at issue are otherwise comparable.171 
Perhaps then our particular linguistic spheres create boundaries within which 
we can create and conceive and hence our legal systems and certain legal 
concepts are formed within the remits of what our linguistic sphere allows.  
Civilization is uniquely and specifically in-formed by a given language; that 
language is the unique and specific matrix of its civilization.172  Concerning the 
EU this possibility could hinder integration and state-citizen communication 
possibilities for a number of reasons.  For instance, a law that does not 
correspond to the linguistic sensitivities of our society is not regarded as "our 
law" but is seen as something foreign. Without a conducive language, positive 
law cannot create legal mindedness.173  If the citizen does not see European law 
as relating to them because its structure differs to the linguistic and legal 
mindedness they themselves are used to within their national law, they will be 
less likely to see themselves as European or identify with the political structure 
as a whole.  To repeat the words of Grimm referenced in chapter one: 
Comme la langue, le droit a dans ses origines, son développement et sa 
structure, un caractère foncièrement populaire et indigène qui 
manifeste le particularisme historique, culturel et national de chaque 
peuple. ‘La langue et le droit ont une histoire, c’est-à-dire qu’il y a en eux 
un lien qui réunit le passé au présent, la nécessité à la liberté’ écrit 
                                                          
171 V. Smith, 'Linguistic Diversity versus Legal Unity in Europe: Getting Beyond the Chicken-and-Egg 
Discussions', The Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 2, 1, 2007, pp. 128-129. 
172 G. Steiner, 'Whorf, Chomsky and the Student of Literature', New Literary History, Vol. 4, No. 1, The 
Language of Literature (Autumn, 1972), p. 18. 
173 Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', p. 803. 
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Grimm;174 ‘Le droit positif d’un peuple est partie intégrante de sa langue 
et comme celle-ci, prend naissance et se développe de manière 
organique’, écrit quant à lui Gustave Hugo.175-176-177 
To feel as though living within the confines of and under the protection of a 
legal system the citizen must identify with it, something which goes far beyond 
the simple word of the law being written in their native tongue. The issue is not 
whether the law can be translated into each official language of the EU correctly 
(the perils of which were previously evidenced in Chapter One), but whether 
the translation decided upon is practical and evokes the same understanding of 
legal structures and a world view that concords with that of the language in 
question.   
Many of his most inimitable forms of expression, all of his objective 
thinking, most of his  daily communication, most of his storage of 
culture and its transmission in space and time, almost all of his 
environmental adjustment, socialization, societal organization and 
social action, rest upon language. It is his primary instrument of 
enlightenment.178 
 
Our language is linked to our particular history, our culture, how our society has 
fared in home and foreign affairs over the centuries; it is our filter through which 
we perceive and understand the world around us and as such is not something 
that can be easily translated.  Of course when domestic law is being written this 
                                                          
174 Leçon inaugurale prononcée par J. Grimm à l’Université de Berlin en 1841 : Uber die Alterthumer des 
deutschen Rechts,’ in VI. Schr., Bd 8, p. 547, cité apr A. Dufour (1974) 164. 
175 G. Hugo, ‘Les lois ne forment pas la seule source des vérités juridiques,’ 4 (1815 :4) Civilistisches 
Magazin 117. 
176 M-J. Campana, ‘Vers un langage juridique commun en Europe?’, European Review of Private Law 1, 
(200), p. 35. 
177 English Translation: As with language, the law, in its origins, development and structure has a 
fundamentally common and local nature which expresses the distinctive historical, cultural and national 
identity of each nation. Language and the law have a history, that is to say, that there is a link which 
reunites the past with the present, need with freedom. The substantive law of a nation is an integral part 
of its language and as such, comes into being and grows in an organic way. 
178 J. O. Hertzler., ‘Toward a Sociology of Language’, Social Forces, Vol. 32, No. 2, (1953), p. 109. 
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is not an issue as it will be discussed and deliberated in the native language of 
the individual country.  The problem for the EU is that the institutions heavily 
rely on English, French and German for internal deliberations. This means that, 
given the relationship between language, thought and worldview, the mere act 
of discussing and deciding in one of these languages could lead to the cultural, 
political and social preferences of their language country being inadvertently 
privileged over those of the language countries that are not used for discussion.  
If an institution is deliberating in English for example, the boundaries of the law 
being discussed might be dependent on the linguistic limits of English and may 
unwittingly be more compatible with the national systems in place in England 
and potentially encourage English values and policies over others: 
Thought is language internalized and we feel and think as our particular 
language impels  and allows us to do. Tongues differ even more 
profoundly than do nations. They also are monads, "perpetual living 
mirrors of the universe" each of which reflects or, as we would now put 
it, "structures" experience according to its own particular sight-lines and 
habits of cognition. No two languages construe the same world.179 
The main linguistic problem for the EU lies with the fact that perfect translation 
are, strictly speaking, impossible because they involve finding exact equivalents 
where non exist.180  'A word operates phonologically and grammatically [and] 
by virtue of its denotation, connotations, potential or actual collocations and by 
virtue of its place in a particular semantic field […] so that to 'understand' a 
word is a complicated process where we are required to synthesise meanings 
derived simultaneously from many sources.'181 
                                                          
179 Steiner, 'Whorf, Chomsky and the Student of Literature', p. 16. 
180 R. Huntington, ‘European unity and the tower of Babel’, Boston University International Law Journal,  
vol. 9, 1991, p. 328. 
181 J. F. Wallwork, Language and Linguistics: An Introduction to the Study of Language, London, 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1969, p. 98. 
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CHAPTER 3. SECTION 2 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND LANGUAGE: WHAT CAN THE EU 
LEARN FROM LINGUISTIC THEORY? 
 
Linguistics could be described as being the discovery of meaning behind 
language and thus turning to linguistic theory will undoubtedly aid us in our 
discovery of meaning behind the multilingual law.  When discussing the issue 
of language/multilingualism in relation to the EU, or Europe as a continent, it is 
difficult to know where to start in the long linguistic history of the continent in 
order to justify its relevance to the field and then to subsequently decide which 
theorists to look at.182  Given the Christian heritage of Europe as a continent183 
and the acknowledged reference to 'devotion to the spiritual and moral values 
which are the common heritage of their peoples' (my italics) as early on in the 
EU's history as the signing of the Statute of the Council of Europe in London 
1949 ('spirituality' has continually been referenced in later treaties), certain 
academics have found it necessary to go as far back as considering Biblical 
references to language: 
In order to tackle these provocative questions, let us first consider the 
status of language in human thinking in general. This evaluation takes us 
back as far as Adam and Eve. The Bible tells us that in the beginning 
"Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every 
beast of the field."' Thus, man recognizes the world around him through 
                                                          
182 In his paper 'Concepts of Language Underlying the 18th Century Controversy about the Origin of 
Language', John Viertel discusses the sources of Wilhelm von Humboldt's theory of language by 
revealing the historical context of the concepts of language that developed out of the 18th century. This 
includes discussion on: The Cosmologies of the Ionian philosophers of the 6th century, B.C., Plato's 
Theaetetus, Nominalist theories such as that of Hobbes in his 'Objections to Descartes' Meditations', 
Herder in his essay on the Origin of Language, Wolffian Johann Peter Suessmilch in his 'Versuch eines  
Beweises', and Jacques Rousseau's 'Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men' 
to name a few. Footnote Source: pp. 109-132 in: Dinneen, Francis P.; Problems in Semantics, History of 
Linguistics, Linguistics and English. Washington, DC; Georgetown UP; 1966. 
183 For further discussion on the spiritual and religious heritage of Europe within the constitutional and  
political framework of the European Union see: R. McCrea, ‘The recognition of religion within the 
constitutional and political order of the European Union’, LEQS Paper 10 (2009) which discusses such 
issues as: religion as a source of the constitutional values of the EU, recognition of the role of religion in 
law-making, the pluralistic public morality of EU law, and limitations on public morality within EU law. 
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the  medium of language, and language enables him to grasp and to 
define reality. Through language he attains power.184 
Aside from the above biblical reference, a brief departure from the main 
direction of discussion in this chapter to tell the biblical tale of the Tower of 
Babel is most certainly justified.   
Genesis 11: 1-Now the whole earth used the same language and the 
same words. 2-It came about as they journeyed east, that they found a 
plain in the land of Shinar and settled there. 3-They said to one another, 
"Come, let us make bricks and burn them thoroughly." And they used 
brick for stone, and they used tar for mortar. 4-They said, "Come, let us 
build for ourselves a city, and a tower whose top will reach into heaven, 
and let us make for ourselves a name, otherwise we will be scattered 
abroad over the face of the whole earth." 5-The LORD came down to see 
the city and the tower which the sons of men had built. 6-The LORD said, 
"Behold, they are one people, and they all have the same language. And 
this is what they began to do, and now nothing which they purpose to 
do will be impossible for them. 7-"Come, let Us go down and there 
confuse their language, so that they will not understand one another's 
speech." 8-So the LORD scattered them abroad from there over the face 
of the whole earth; and they stopped building the city. 9-Therefore its 
name was called Babel, because there the LORD confused the language 
of the whole earth; and from there the LORD scattered them abroad 
over the face of the whole earth.185 
According to the story then, God's punishment for the Tower of Babel was to 
render communication between men difficult, so that man could not attain the 
height of God and the heavens.  Without a single language man could not attain 
everything that he wished as the punishing multiplicity of languages created too 
great an obstacle for communication, and worse the inability for language to 
convey an understanding of truth.  Considering the Christian heritage of Europe 
as a continent, the EU was thus formed on the confounding confusion of 
multilingualism inherent in its spiritual heritage as demonstrated in this biblical 
tale.   It is also worth briefly noting the oft mentioned similarity between the 
                                                          
184 Grossfield, 'Language and the Law', p. 795. 
185 The Bible: Contemporary English Version, Harper Collins, London, 2000, Genesis 11: 1-9. 
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Louise Weiss building (the principal building of the European Parliament) in 
Strasbourg and Pieter Bruegel's painting of his vision of the Tower of Babel 
(Vienna version). 
 
Figure 2: Pieter Bruegel's Tower of Babel (Vienna version) 186 
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                          
186 Pieter Brueghel Elder, 1563, The Tower of Babel: Oil on Canvas [painting] [image of painting],  
Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. Image of painting available at 
<http://artgallery10p.weebly.com/uploads/9/2/6/1/9261226/5442338_orig.jpg>, (accessed 20 October  
2014). 
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Figure 3: Louise Weiss Building – Seat of The European Parliament in Strasbourg 
187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hybrid of the artist's impression of the Tower of Babel and the Louise 
Weiss building 188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 Pehlemann, Wolfgang, 2008, Louise Weiss Building [photograph], available at  
<http://www.pehlemann.com/assets/images/European_Parliament_Europaisches_Parlament_Parlemen 
t_europeen_Strasbourg_France_Louise_Weiss_building_Frankreich__Foto_2008_c_Wolfgang_Pehleman 
n_IMG_0096.jpg>, accessed 20 October 2014. 
188 Unknown Author, ‘Hybrid image of The Tower of Babel and The Louise Weiss Building’ [web image], 
available at <http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/imagenes_sociopol/globalization41_06.gif>, accessed 
20 October 2014. 
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From the above discussion we can see that it would be possible to justify 
theoretical considerations beginning at any point in the history of Europe, 
however my justification in commencing with the theories of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt comes from the fact that he is considered the father of modern day 
linguistics, and therefore the father of linguistics as it was thought of at the time 
of the naissance of the European Community project.  As discussion below 
reveals, von Humboldt's musings on multilingualism as a hindrance on true 
communication and understanding are the more widely accepted views on the 
language-thought relationship debate in our society today, and thus it simply 
makes sense to commence using his theories rather than others that may have 
preceded. 
 
SECTION 2.a : WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT 
Despite being highly influenced by the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and 
Johann Gottfried Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt is considered by many to be 
the founding father of modern day linguistics.  What is meant by modern day 
linguistics is the way we currently think of the relationship between language 
and communication and language and thought, compared with how differently 
this relationship was perceived prior to the 19th century.  Von Humboldt was 
one of the chief proponents of the Romantic view of language. Prior to the 19th 
century the referential view of language was the dominant model of language.  
This model had been in favour from the time of Plato up to at least the Neo-
classicists in the eighteenth century.  The referential model pertained that signs 
are like mirrors the meaning of which derives from the objects they represent.  
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By contrast, in the nineteenth century, an expressivist model of language 
emerged according to which language, functioning less like a mirror than a lamp, 
serves as a medium of self-expression.189 
Given that this thesis has the aim of demonstrating exactly why it is that 
multilingualism will cause insurmountable obstacles for a multilingual political 
entity such as the EU, it would be remiss to not consider the views of Wilhelm 
von Humboldt given his great contribution in changing how we perceive the 
relationship between language and thought and thus how this affects aspects 
of social life, including communication between the citizen and the state.  Von 
Humboldt’s views on language were extremely influential on the study of 
language in the nineteenth century and were largely responsible for the 
development of linguistics as a distinct field of study at this time (distinguishing 
the field from merely being thought of as a sub-field of psychology as was 
previously the case). He was responsible in particular for what subsequently 
linguists would come to call the diachronic emphasis in the field, that is, the 
study of language as it develops and changes over time by focusing on the 
etymology of words and changes in syntactic structures.190 
Whereas earlier writings seemed to present 'national character' as a result of 
linguistic variation, Humboldt rather emphasizes the importance of national 
character as original cause of, and a continued influence on, language 
variation191: 'this emphasis, however, invests Humboldt's language theory with 
                                                          
189 R. L. W. Clarke,  'Wilhelm von Humboldt On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language  
Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species (1836)', LITS2002  
Notes 07C [pdf], <http://www.rlwclarke.net/Courses/LITS2002/2005- 
2006/07CHumboldtOnLanguage.pdf>, accessed 16 June 2013, p. 1. 
190 Clarke, 'Wilhelm von Humboldt On Language', p. 3.   
191 M. L. Manchester, The Philosophical Foundations of Humboldt's Linguistic Doctrines, Studies in the  
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a racialist aspect, since language-one of the main forms of cultural transmission-
no longer constitutes or forms peoples so much as it expresses their absolute 
difference'.192  In his essay 'The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and its 
Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind'193 (Über die Verscheidenheit 
des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung 
des Menschengeschlechts), Humboldt's model of language is summarised as 
thus: 
the character and structure of a language expresses the inner life and 
knowledge of its speakers, and that languages must differ from one 
another in the same way and to the same degree as those who use them. 
Sounds do not become words until a meaning has been put into them, 
and this meaning embodies the thought of a community. What 
Humboldt terms the inner form of a language is just that mode of 
denoting the relations between the parts of a sentence which reflects 
the manner in which a particular body of men regards the world about 
them. It is the task of the morphology of speech to distinguish the 
various ways in which languages differ from each other as regards their 
inner form, and to classify and arrange them accordingly.194 
Von Humboldt held that language is a means not only to describe reality, but 
also to discover reality.  We are bound by the linguistic limits within which our 
mother tongue allows us to perceive, de-construct and create our reality.  
Humboldt writes that the differences in languages indicate a different 
"Weltansicht" (world-view) meaning that different languages draw our 
thoughts into particular and differing patterns through which we view the world.  
In a piece published in 1812, 'Essay on the Languages of the NewWorld' (written 
                                                          
History of the Language Sciences, vol. 32, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1985, p. 118. 
192 J. Grossman, ‘Wilhelm von Humboldt's Linguistic Ideology: The Problem of Pluralism and the Absolute  
Difference of National Character: Or, Where Do the Jews Fit in?’, German Studies Review, vol. 20, no .1, 
1997, p. 34. 
193 Also known as 'On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and Its Influence on  
the Mental Development of the Human Species' or 'The Heterogeneity of Language and its Influence on  
the Intellectual Development of Mankind', first published in 1836. 
194 Free online Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Karl Wilhelm von Humboldt’, Free online Encyclopaedia 
Britannica [website], 2015, <http://www.1902encyclopedia.com/H/HUM/wilhelm-von-humboldt.html>,  
accessed 16 June 2013. 
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in French), von Humboldt wrote: <Le monde dans lequel nous vivons est donc 
exactement celui dans lequel nous transplante l'idiome que nous parlons> ('The 
world in which we live is exactly that into which we are transplanted by the 
language which we speak').195   
Von Humboldt takes this idea further by discussing the idea of 'world-view' in 
relation to the acquisition of foreign languages.  He states that: 
As the individual sound stands between man and the object, so the 
entire language steps in between him and the nature that operates, 
both inwardly and outwardly, upon him.  He surrounds himself with a 
world of sounds, so as to assimilate and process within himself the world 
of objects.  Man lives primarily with objects, indeed, since feeling and 
acting in him depend on his presentations, he actually does so 
exclusively, as language presents them to him.  By the same act whereby 
he spins language out of himself, he spins himself into it, and every 
language draws about the people that possesses it a circle whence it is 
possible to exit only by stepping over at once into the circle of another 
one.  To learn a foreign language should therefore be to acquire a new 
standpoint in the world-view hitherto possessed, and in fact to a certain 
extent is so, since every language contains the whole conceptual fabric 
and mode of presentation of a portion of mankind.  But because we 
always carry over, more or less, our own world-view, and even our own 
language-view, this outcome is not purely and completely 
experienced.196 
Given the theory expressed by Von Humboldt here we can now understand the 
logic behind the discussed issues presented in the previous two chapters 
regarding the problems relating to translation inconsistencies and the effect this 
has on the accessibility and foreseeability requirements of the Rule of Law.  Not 
only does translation cause problems given the impossibility of translating 
concepts rather than mere words, but we must also consider the impossibility 
of escaping our own world-view held in our language.  If discussions at 
                                                          
195 H. Mueller, ‘On re-reading von Humboldt’, Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, vol. 19, 
1966, p. 104. 
196 Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its  
Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species, Ed. Michael Losonsky, Trans. Peter Heath,  
Intro. Hans Aarsleff, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 60. 
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institutional level in the European Union are taking place in a lucky few 
languages (mostly English, French and German), then the world-views 
contained within these languages will inevitably prioritise concerns that are 
contained within the limits that their linguistic sphere allows.  This may not 
necessarily mean that the concerns of the countries speaking these languages 
will be prioritised (although this may well be the case also as was discussed in 
Chapter One) but rather that certain ways of thinking about the world, certain 
solutions to problems and certain manners in which to unite a people for 
example, may not be able to be grasped or even conceived of if the linguistic 
sphere and world-view of those creating policy does not allow them to do so.  
Von Humboldt does however go further than this in suggesting a definite link 
between the language and the shaping of a nation's mental power: 
insight into the true essence of a nation, and into the internal 
connection of a single tongue [...] depends wholly on consideration of 
the overall individuality of mind. For only through this, as nature has 
furnished it and circumstances have worked on it, is the character of the 
nation bonded together, on which alone depend the deeds, 
arrangements and thoughts which that nation produces, and in which 
lie the power and virtue that are again handed down to individuals.197 
He even argues that language is 'deeply entangled in the spiritual evolution of 
mankind', to the extent that 'at every stage of its local advance or retreat, and 
the state of culture at any time is also recognizable in it'.198   
What von Humboldt presents us with throughout his works is the idea that 
there is a definite determinacy between language and world-view meaning that 
language and thought, language and culture, and language and nation cannot 
be separated from one another as each depends on the other for its existence, 
                                                          
197 von Humboldt, On Language, p. 21. 
198 von Humboldt, On Language, p. 24. 
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form and evolution.  Despite claiming that the power of the individual, 
(compared with the might of language) is minimal, von Humboldt surprisingly 
does not go as far as suggesting that it is not possible for man to also hold 
certain power over the medium of language.  He sees possibility in overcoming 
the tyranny of language and the barriers it creates within the human mind.   
Even in his own native language man is free, inasmuch as language is a process 
and the development goes in the direction of greater perfection in the process 
of making the articulated sound capable of expressing thought. 199  'Nobody 
means by a word precisely and exactly what his neighbour does, and the 
difference, be it ever so small, vibrates, like a ripple in water, throughout the 
entire language.  Thus all understanding is always at the same time a not-
understanding, all concurrence in thought and feeling at the same time a 
divergence.'200  There is therefore a principle of freedom rather than complete 
determinacy in language as the speaker is freely and willingly expressing his 
particular world-view which, even though shaped by the linguistic sphere of his 
mother tongue, is particular to himself or herself and the experiences that 
individual has thus far encountered in life.  This once again raises the question 
about whether freedom of speech can truly be free within the European Union 
when some discourse between EU institutions and the citizen (excluding 
criminal proceedings of course) is held in a language other than the citizen's 
native language. 
These theories of Von Humboldt's has earned him the title of father of modern 
day linguistics to many academics in the area as he is credited with connecting 
                                                          
199 Meuller, ‘On Re-Reading von Humboldt’, pp. 106-107. 
200 von Humboldt, On Language, p. 63. 
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the study of language to the national romanticist program by proposing the 
view that language is the very fabric of thought, that is that thoughts are 
produced as a kind of inner dialog using the same grammar as the thinker's 
native language.  This view was part of a larger picture in which the world view 
of an ethnic nation, their 'Weltanschauung', was seen as being faithfully 
reflected in the grammar of their language. 201   In one of his strongest 
statements, he proposed: 'Users of markedly different grammars are pointed by 
their grammars towards different types of grammars and different evaluations 
of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as 
observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world'.202  The 
theory triumphed by Von Humboldt, combining of our language fields and 
world-view with what we perceive as our society, has since been elaborated 
upon and become well known in the field through the work of Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf.  Von Humboldt's work paved the way for what many know 
as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or linguistic relativity hypothesis, which is where 
discussion will now turn. 
 
SECTION 2.b : EDWARD SPAIR AND BENJAMIN LEE WHORF: THE LINGUISTIC 
RELATIVITY HYPOTHESIS  
Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf were highly influenced by the way in 
which von Humboldt considered the relationship between language and 
thought and how this related to a linguistic group's world-view.  Their names 
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are most frequently associated with the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis which 
can be summarised as the theory that differences in language can lead to great 
differences in thought and experience due to the fact that each language 
embodies a certain world-view which differs from the world-views embodied in 
other languages, and thus leads to the speakers of different languages to 
perceive and think about the world in different ways.203  The 'weak' version of 
the hypothesis suggests that language limits thought, whereas the 'strong' 
version proposes that language determines thought: 'The Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, as usually formulated, searches for isomorphisms between 
grammar and culture and views language as either providing the means for 
thought and perception, or, in its stronger form,  conditioning thought, 
perception, and world view'.204 
It was Sapir who first turned to von Humboldt's idea that languages in 
themselves contained the key to understanding the differing world-views of 
people.  In studying different languages he noted that the grammatical systems 
between languages could differ so greatly that in his opinion there was never 
enough similarity to allow for perfect translation between them: 'Sapir also 
thought because language represented reality differently, it followed that the 
speakers of different languages would perceive reality differently'. 205  Sapir 
stated that: 
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the 
                                                          
203 Effects of linguistic relativity have been shown particularly in the domain of spatial cognition and in  
the social use of language, but also in the field of color perception. See, Benjamin L.ee Whorf., ‘Science 
and Linguistics’, Technology Review, vol. 44, 1940, pp. 229-231, 247-248; E. Sapir, Language: An  
introduction to the Study of Speech, 8th ed., New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1949; E. Sapir, ‘The status 
of linguistics as a science’, Language, 1929, pp. 207-214. 
204 Sherzer, ‘A Discourse-Centered Approach to Language and Culture’, p. 295. 
205 P. Baofu, The Future of Post-Human Semantics: A Preface to a New Theory of Internality and  
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world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at 
the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of 
expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one 
adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that 
language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of 
communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real 
world" is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language habits 
of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be 
considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which 
different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world 
with different labels attached ... We see and hear and otherwise 
experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our 
community predispose certain choices of interpretation.206 
For Sapir this meant that 'our customs of speech are the outcome of a 
cumulative dialectic of differentiation: languages generate different social 
forms, these forms further divide languages'.207  However, Sapir did not agree 
with the idea of complete linguistic determinism, stating that: 
[The forms of each language] establish a definite relational feeling or 
attitude towards all  possible contents of expression and, through 
them, towards all possible contents of experience, in so far, of course, 
as experience is capable of expression in linguistic terms.208 
And in a later piece of work: 
It would be naïve to imagine that any analysis of experience is 
dependent on pattern expressed in language. Any concept, whether or 
not it forms part of the system of grammatical categories, can be 
conveyed in any language. If a notion is lacking in a given series, it 
implies a different configuration and not a lack of expressive power.209 
His student and colleague, Benjamin Lee Whorf was more so a proponent of the 
'stronger version' of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, stating that the tool of 
perception, or 'thought world' constructs 'the microcosm which each man 
carries about within himself, by which he measures and understands what he 
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19. 
208 E. Sapir, 1924, 'The Grammarian and His Language', American Mercury 1, pp. 149-155. (Reprinted in  
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can of the macrocosm'.210  According to Whorf, there is no 'universal objective 
reality', there is only 'an aggregate of "segmentations" made by different 
language-cultures'. 211   Whorf does not however claim that there are no 
rudimentary universal neuro-physiological apprehensions of time, space, 
identity, and sequence common to the human species, but rather that these 
universals ramify and take on local specification as soon as the infant enters the 
world of his particular speech212: 
Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon 
it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study 
shows that the forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable 
laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the 
unperceived intricate systemizations of his own language-shown readily 
enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, 
especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a 
language-in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. And every language is a vast 
pattern- system, differing from others, in which are culturally ordained 
the forms and categories by which the personality not only 
communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of 
relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the 
house of his consciousness.213 
From this we can see that Whorf progressed his ideas beyond those of Sapir 
and von Humboldt before him. Through studying Native American languages he 
attempted to demonstrate the ways in which differences in grammatical 
systems and language use alter and affect the speaker's perceived the world. 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The 
categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we 
do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the 
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions 
which has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely by the 
linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into 
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concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are 
parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that 
holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns 
of our language [...] all observers are not led by the same physical 
evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic 
backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.214 
Sapir and Whorf, much like von Humboldt before them, evidently view and 
theorise about language as a psychological or mental phenomenon which 
either forms or very heavily influences our perceptions of the world around us.  
In contrast to this way of thinking about language, Ferdinand de Saussure saw 
language as primarily a social fact, stating that 'the culture of a nation exerts an 
influence on its language, and the language, on the other hand, is largely 
responsible for the nation'.215  What I aim to establish in including the theories 
of de Saussure here is that whether we agree with language theories which 
consider the relationship between language, thought and world-view (von 
Humboldt, Sapir and Whorf), or whether we agree with the structuralist 
approach of de Saussure discussed below, the concluding consequences for the 
multilingual regime of the EU remain the same, as is demonstrated below. 
 
SECTION 2.c : FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE AND THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE 
SIGN 
Ferdinand de Saussure, much like von Humboldt, is another figure who is often 
referred to as 'the father of linguistics', except de Saussure is credited with the 
founding of semiology, which he described as 'the science that studies the life 
of signs within society'.  De Saussure believes that semiology is the study of 
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what constitutes signs and the laws that govern them, meaning that it could 
discover the laws applicable to the signs employed in language and to the signs 
in social life more generally.  In relation to language, within his semiological 
model of society de Saussure included his linguistic model of structural 
linguistics, which aimed to uncover the structures that determine our place in 
the world and which alone can give us meaning; such is the nature of 
'structuralism'.  As a field in itself, 'structuralism argued that the systematic form 
of language, rather than the particular linguistic elements of actual spoken 
words, gave rise to intelligibility [and] meaning was contained in the 
intralinguistic system', thus displacing the role of the speaker. 'The speaker was 
now dependent on language itself to engage in meaningful activities. The 
meaning available to a subject was that opened up by the conceptual ordering 
his or her language afforded. The subject was better understood as a product 
of culture, an identity created in language, a potentiality limited by the language 
that defined the conventions of a world.' 216  The structuralist approach to 
language would suggest that the speaker is more of a vessel in which the 
structural limits of a language define the speaker's ability to define society. 
Turning specifically to de Saussure's linguistic structuralism, he makes the 
assumption that language is a system of forms, of relations between constituent 
units, or as he calls them, signs.  He wrote about how 'the linguistic sign unites, 
not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image', further explaining 
that: 
the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign […]. I propose 
to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace 
concept and sound-image respectively by  signified [signifié] and 
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signifier [signifiant]. […] The bond between the signifier and the 
signified is arbitrary.  Since I mean by sign the whole that results from 
the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the 
linguistic sign is arbitrary. 
What de Saussure means by this is that the relationship is arbitrary as there is 
no logical link between a 'concept' and a 'thing'.  A 'door' may well be called 
something entirely different, what matters is that this meaning is generally 
accepted by the collective community, not that it is logically linked in some pre-
linguistic knowledge way to the 'thing' itself.  Thus, the signifier and the signified 
have a completely arbitrary relationship.  De Saussure elaborates upon this, 
stating that 'language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of 
each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of others'.217  For him 
this means that 'value is therefore not fixed so long as one simply states that it 
can be “exchanged” for a given concept, i.e. that it has this or that signification: 
one must also compare it with similar values, with other words that stand in 
opposition to it.  Its content is really fixed only by the concurrence of everything 
that exists outside it'.218  Thomas C. Heller remarks in relation to de Saussure's 
distinction that 'signs in a system are differentiated from other signs in the same 
system not by their "essence," or "natural place" within a linguistic order that 
mirrors the world, but only by certain differences wholly internal to the system 
of language itself that mark them off from other constituent units'. 219  It is 
therefore the relationship between different signs that gives rise to meaning 
within the language system rather than a specific substance that is related to 
the specific sign itself. 'It is "constructed"- not a reflection of individual 
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experience of world or desire, but rather the product of shared systems of 
signification.' 220  Words do not signify anything outside of the relationships 
within the system they belong to and as such, meaning arises precisely because 
each sign has an identity given to it by its systematic differentiation from related 
terms in the language.221  
Considering the structural linguistic model of language that de Saussure 
advocates, it is clear how his explanation of language systems could have severe 
consequences for communication and translation within multilingual polities 
such as the EU.  De Saussure lays it out for us quite simply: 
If words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact 
equivalents in meaning from one language to the next; but this is not 
true [...] Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find in all the foregoing 
examples values emanating from the system.  When they are said to 
correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are purely 
differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by 
their relations with the other terms of the system.  Their most precise 
characteristic is in being what others are not.222 
As the signifier and the signified have an arbitrary relationship, and as the 
linguistic sign as a whole is constructed along with the culture and tradition of 
that linguistic grouping, we cannot rely on words in translated documents 
conveying the same signified as that which was intended by the designated 
signifier in the initial language version.  Only if we were able to embrace the 
sum of word-images stored in the minds of all individuals could we identify the 
social bond that constitutes language.223  The problem lies with the fact that in 
respect of the law, significations are accessible only to those who recognize the 
sign, which is especially important when we consider that ignorance of the law 
                                                          
220 Heller, 'Structuralism and Critique', p. 142. 
221 Heller, 'Structuralism and Critique', p. 142. 
222 de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, pp. 116-117. 
223 de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 13. 
115 
 
is no defence.  In relating de Saussure's theory to the law, Mohr explains that, 
like language systems 'law, too, as an everyday activity has to have some 
semblance of sense and order and again we must realize that this is mainly 
constituted by a disciplinary system which one has learned and follows, even if 
it does not make any sense. Any characterization we find in cases is pieced 
together along diachronic structures such as pre-existing rules, precedents, and 
documents applied to "facts" which have mainly been constituted by the same 
disciplinary knowledge'.224 Evidently, this structural disciplinary knowledge will 
vary in form and substance from language to language. 
The arbitrary nature of the sign demonstrates how approaching the language 
question from de Saussure's structuralist linguistic approach also hinders 
communication possibilities (between the citizen and the institution at large) 
within a multilingual polity such as the EU, and thus puts into question the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy.  The reason different languages (most notably across 
different language groups) evoke different concepts of the world and different 
world views therefore could be said to be due to the arbitrary nature of the 
linguistic sign. If there is no logical link between the sign and the signified 
(referent), how could the same concepts emanate from different signs for the 
same signified (referent)?   
As Saussure states in his Course on General Linguistics: 'Linguistics then works 
in the borderland where the elements of sound and thought combine; their 
combination produces a form, not a substance'.225  This would suggest then that 
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the structural differences between languages, and the lack of a relationship 
between the signifier and the signified (thus the arbitrary nature of the sign) 
means that legal translations will inevitably fail to capture the true concept 
being conveyed in the original language version.  Whereas the main issue if we 
take the language-thought-world view considerations of von Humboldt, Sapir 
and Whorf would be that due to deliberation being carried out in either English, 
French or German, the world-views contained within these languages may 
prioritise concerns that are contained within the limits that their linguistic 
sphere allows.  The danger with this is that certain ways of thinking about the 
world, certain manners of interaction between 'state' and citizen, may not be 
able to be grasped or understood by citizens who speak a language other than 
that of deliberation if their linguistic sphere and world-view does not allow 
them to do so. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By this point I would hope to have given a comprehensive understanding of my 
reasoning behind diverging into the realm of linguistic theory – the plethora of 
information it has revealed in relation to how language as a mechanism and 
concept works – and what this therefore means for multilingual political entities 
such as the EU.  I firmly believe that many of the boundaries that hinder 
democratic participation possibilities stem from the EU's underestimation of 
the power of language over thought and socialisation.  Looking back to von 
Humboldt's theory on 'world-view' there would be an inevitable 
communication impossibility between the governing political powers and the 
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citizen as communication of world-view is a near impossibly feat.  And the more 
serious problem lies with the issue of laws being discussed and created in one 
language and thus one world-view being dominant in the creation of laws that 
affect numerous linguistic diversities and thus numerous world-views.  A 
potential further consequence of this would be that those citizens who speak 
the language that a certain law was originally discussed and created in, would 
have more effective communication possibilities with governing powers and 
potentially more means by which to influence and interact with the laws that 
govern them.  The case law demonstrates that whether it be through the need 
for comparison across numerous language versions, or whether it be due to 
translation inaccuracies, the result is the same: the ability of the citizen to rely 
on their own native language version of a regulation, directive or article can 
never be assured and as such, neither can the legal certainty of Union legislation. 
This chapter focussed on looking at the EU through the eyes of a linguist to see 
if theoretical linguistic considerations could point the EU towards a solution for 
its multilingualism caused problems. Relating this back to the issue discussed in 
Chapter One of whether we should support a Union-wide lingua franca, it 
becomes ever more evident given the linguistic reasoning above why this would 
not be a solution to the linguistic problems that arise.  By understanding of the 
application of Western linguistic theory to the sphere of the European Union I 
explained why it is that the Rule of Law cannot exist within such a multilingual, 
ill-defined sphere such as the European Union, and thus how the multilingual 
situation of the EU affects its democratic legitimacy. Discussion moved on to 
consider the theoretical rationale into the linguistic reasoning why it is that a 
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multi-lingual, post-national entity will inevitably stumble when attempting to 
foster integration, in order to begin on the pathway to finding potential 
solutions to this insurmountable problem in later chapters.  This chapter 
demonstrated that the European Union’s current ethos of ‘unity in diversity’, 
specifically in reference to the 24 official languages, is undoubtedly one of the 
main reasons for the Union’s lack of cultural unity and common identity 
amongst its citizens. 
By looking at different approaches to linguistics (linguistic relativism as well as 
structuralism) it was shown that no matter which linguistic approach is 
considered, the outcome for the problems of multilingualism remains the same.  
What has been shown is that, in order to navigate around the language issues 
of the European Union, we must look beyond the language regime towards a 
solution that does not necessarily rely on language being a solution to the 
language problem.  What it is meant by this is that in looking at identity 
construction I will look for an alternative solution to the language question 
without looking for a linguistic/language solution – a change in language policy 
will not fix anything, the problem is too deep rooted in the inherent nature of 
language as a concept and as a primary feature of identity.   
The constitutional lawyer is particularly sceptical about the chances of 
establishing a European community of participation without first 
creating a European community of communication.  He uses a 
straightforward line of argument to stress this point: there can be no 
European democracy because there is no European public sphere; there 
can be no European public sphere because there is no European people 
(in the sense of a demos possessing a collective identity that would 
serve as a frame for political unity); and there can be no European 
people because there is no common European language.226  
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So the question becomes then, how do we create a community of 
communication without a common language? If language holds such great 
power over our democratic participatory capacity because of its primary role in 
identity formation, could we not look beyond language into identity formation 
at the European level that does not have language as one of its defining features? 
This will be the remit of the remainder of this thesis. 
As a final note to this chapter, I must rather humorously note that the irony has 
not escaped me that perhaps the limitations caused my own linguistic sphere 
are stopping me from finding a solution to the problem.  If I cannot think outside 
of the limits of my native language, perhaps my native language does not allow 
for the thought that would solve this issue: 
We can only know what our systems of knowledge allow us to know. But 
if language ecology is not the answer, could there be an argument that 
western (European) knowledge – bound up in western European 
languages – can do without the collected knowledge of other forms of 
language around the world? It would seem hard to argue so, given the 
levels of inequality and threats to our environment being carried out in 
the industrialised world, which operates within discourses constructed 
in and through majority languages, while local varieties of language 
contain valuable local knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that as linguists, 
we have a moral imperative to help maintain and promote global 
linguistic diversity.227 
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CHAPTER 4. 
WHAT IS IDENTITY? WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“It doesn’t seem possible to be European without a projection into a 
world which doesn’t yet exist and even, as we will see, can't be 
adequately qualified according to the classic notions of political 
science.”228 
 
This chapter begins with a quote which points to its conclusion. This chapter 
will be a journey of identity; an exploration of the impact of language on our 
collective identity formation, a discussion on what it means to have an identity, 
and consideration of what identity is for the European Union at present and 
why it is failing in its attempts to create a collective identity for its citizens. All 
of this is necessary given that the previous chapters have uncovered language’s 
primary role in identity formation. From this discovery, I believe that language 
by itself is not the origin of the problems it causes that subsequently lead to 
questioning the EU’s democratic legitimacy. In fact, the root of the problem 
comes from language’s role in identity formation, which suggests the possibility 
that if we solve the EU’s demos problem by suggesting ways of forging a 
European identity that do not contain the requirement of a common language, 
we could perhaps overcome the issues surrounding democratic participation 
and democratic legitimacy. 
The previous chapter explored at great length the theories behind the 
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mechanics of language, its effect on world-view, and how this impacts the multi-
lingual entity of the European Union when it comes to democratic participation, 
democratic legitimacy and European integration.  Language, or more 
specifically multilingualism, has undoubtedly limited the democratic 
participation and also integration possibilities within the European Union 
between the Member States, but it is not the only factor.  The larger issue to 
consider is identity, which of course includes the significantly influential role of 
a common language, but there are also many other factors to consider.  In order 
to navigate around the language issues of the European Union, we must look 
beyond the language regime and search for a solution that does not necessarily 
rely on language being a solution to the language problem.  What I mean by this 
is that in looking at identity construction I will look for an alternative solution 
to the language question without looking for a linguistic/language solution. 
Identity as a construct is very complex.  In order to have a comprehensive 
discussion on how a European identity that has the strength of national 
identities can be formed, we must first understand what exactly it is that is 
meant by identity.  This means exploring the difference and relationship 
between individual and collective identity, as well as distinguishing between 
identity and identification; two differing yet intertwining notions. 
Whatever the eventual aim of the EU, establishing itself as a legitimate 
economic, political, legal and cultural community will continually be met with 
criticism and disagreement as there is not yet a fully formed or defined 
European collective. I reiterate the words of Grimm: “There can be no European 
democracy because there is no European public sphere; there can be no 
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European public sphere because there is no European people (in the sense of a 
demos possessing a collective identity that would serve as a frame for political 
unity); and there can be no European people because there is no common 
European language”.  What Grimm is saying cannot be doubted if we are to take 
identity in the form that it is commonly understood from the post 
Enlightenment idea of national identity formation.  But what if we were to look 
at identity in a different way, using different symbols and different archetypes? 
Could we then conceive of a European identity which did not supplant national 
ones but in fact existed alongside them? Could we conceive of a European 
identity that did not require language in order for the collective to feel able to 
democratically participate? These questions do not come with a simple answer.  
To even consider the possibility involves firstly looking at what we actually mean 
when we say ‘identity’ and secondly looking at what kind of identity exists, if 
any, within the EU as it stands.  Undoubtedly the EU is in the process of 
developing some sort of supra-national/post-national identity, but this 
statement in itself raises several issues.  Why is it still in-process when the EU 
has such wide-ranging competencies and powers over the citizens of its 
Member States?  What exactly is a supra-national or post-national identity? And 
what archetypes is it based around? 
These are just some of the issues around the European identity that are 
considered throughout this chapter.  One thing that the research for this 
chapter has not relied in any part on is Eurobarometre studies which obtain 
their data on citizens’ feelings of attachment and belonging to the EU through 
standardised questionnaires.  These have not been relied upon as it is my 
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opinion that identity, and especially collective identity, is subconscious and 
abstract in nature and therefore cannot be studied or measured in such a way.  
Although such studies might provide relevant data on how citizens feel, they 
would not be greatly useful in understanding the failings of collective identity 
formation at the European level.  In being artificially constructed through the 
use of symbols, identity is a greatly unconscious manifestation and thus 
something that the individual could not fully conceive of even if they were 
knowledgeable in the area of identity formation. Understanding must instead 
come from consideration of the concept itself, not those who it is felt by. 
Discussion of the above issues comes to the conclusion that the European 
Union needs to lead the way in creating new and different artefacts upon which 
contemporary identity can thrive on rather than relying on the traditional 
archetypes used by national identity formation if it is to create a Union where 
true democratic participation is possible.229  ‘For people to feel European, the 
European Union institutions have to become more meaningful and inclusive for 
ordinary citizens. The main challenge for the EU integration project is to invent 
new ways and materialize in practice a sense of belonging with Europe.’230 
Given that the standards of national identity formation are relatively new in 
their existence (as new as the concept of nation state as we currently 
understand it), there is hope that we can once again formulate something novel 
and unprecedented that fits into the supranational existence of the Union. 
Doing so would add great integrity, legitimacy and stability to contemporary 
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identity formation at the European level.231 
 
CHAPTER 4: SECTION 1  
LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY; AN INTRODUCTION 
“Language is the mother of thought, not its handmaiden.’ Karl Kraus 
Having understood the significance of language on how we, as individuals 
within a certain linguistic group, perceive the world around us and the immense 
effect the perceptive possibilities of our mother language places on our world 
view, consideration must now turn to what influence this has on our identity as 
a collective and why its impact is so very forceful when it comes to hindering 
integration within the EU and the formation of a European identity?  After all, 
if ‘each language reflects a unique world-view and culture complex, mirroring 
the manner in which a speech community has resolved its problems in dealing 
with the world, and has formulated its thinking, its system of philosophy and 
understanding of the world around it’ 232 , then is that not also how we 
subconsciously construct our group or collective identity over time also?  Is our 
collective identity not formed by the histories that we, as a group, share 
between each other in a common language; our common philosophies and our 
overcoming of problems as a collective?   
                                                          
231 As was stated in the introduction of this thesis; this chapter is rather descriptive and arguably opens 
more issues than it solves. This is because Chapters 4 and 5 are two sides of the same coin in their 
exploration of identity, existing European identity and its downfalls, and how a European identity could 
and should be forged which could resolve the legitimacy problems caused by the multilingual nature of 
the European Union. Therefore many issues raised in this chapter are left unresolved until Chapter Five, 
when they are discussed in relation to a possible solution rather than as an existing problem. 
232 Wurm, Stephen. A., ‘Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger of Disappearing’, Unesco [pdf], 2001, 
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The post-modern concept of identity considers language to be undoubtedly 
one of the most important aspects of identity construction given that the 
postmodern concept of identity is based on the idea that identity is constructed 
by discourse.233   ‘The postmodern idea of identity presents a fragmentary, 
hybrid and dynamic notion of the self. Postmodernists argue that ‘‘identity 
processes are fundamentally ambiguous and always in a state of flux and 
reconstruction’’.’ 234   This postmodern view of identity must therefore be 
looked at in two ways: 1) its reliance on discourse as a key constructing factor 
and 2) its fluidity and changeability.  What this statement on postmodern 
identity process suggests however is that our identity is reliant on discourse 
and therefore linguistic communication within a society. Yet to rely on 
discourse as a constructing factor of our identity as Europeans doesn’t seem 
like a possibility not only given the multilingual nature of the European Union, 
but also given what was discussed in the previous chapter on language and its 
effect on world view. It is not necessary to repeat my concerns over the current 
language situation within the European Union as they have already been 
discussed at great length in the previous chapters, yet it is worth restating here 
the realisation from the earlier that neither a lingua franca nor equality to all 
languages of the EU is a suitable solution for the democratic legitimacy 
problems posed by the EU’s multilingual situation. What follows is hence an 
exploration of identity formation. This chapter delves into the numerous 
components of identity. Only in knowing its full substance can there be hope of 
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resolving the language problems of the European Union through a novel form 
of identity formation that does not rely on discourse in the same way our 
national identities currently do. 
 
CHAPTER 4. SECTION 2  
WHAT IS IDENTITY? 
“For people to feel European, the European Union institutions have to 
become more meaningful and inclusive for ordinary citizens. The main 
challenge for the EU integration project is to invent new ways and 
materialize in practice a sense of belonging with Europe.”235  
 
Before discussing identity specifically in relation to the European Union or 
before attempting to create a structure for a solidly defined European identity, 
it is first necessary to consider what is in fact meant by the term ‘identity’ for 
the purposes of this thesis. Although individual identity is not the topic of 
discussion in relation to the EU, it remains vital to understand the distinction 
between individual identity and collective identity and how the two interact.  
Identity has different meanings to different people.  We carry numerous 
identities with us on both the individual and collective level; gender identity, 
sexual identity, political identity, legal identity and cultural identity are just a 
few that spring to mind.  We cannot exist without our identities, and on the 
collective level, our societies cannot exist without a defined collective identity, 
subconscious though it may be.  Identities provide us with a psychological 
strength of attachment to the archetypes and symbols that have been 
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artificially constructed within the borders of the society within which we live, 
which in turn gives us the feeling of belonging. Understanding the components 
of collective identity formation is undoubtedly essential if social and cultural 
integration on an EU level are desired, and if true democratic participation is to 
take place within the EU. Three significant features of collective identity are 
discussed with the aim of understanding how and why these concepts form a 
collective identity: 1) a shared history, 2) common myths and identification with 
artificial symbols, and 3) the collective identification with the nation and 
national identification.  It is argued that the EU should subvert these ideas to 
form a collective identity in new and different ways to those relied upon in 
national collective identity formation. 
 
SECTION 2.a : DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE 
IDENTITY 
Undoubtedly numerous problems exist concerning how to define the term 
“identity”, both at an individual and collective level. The inherent ambiguity of 
the term poses a great difficulty when it comes to discussing it in the context of 
the European Union and a European identity. ‘Identity is a demanding concept 
as it aims to deal with persistence and change, similarity and difference, 
objectivity and subjectivity, the collective and the individual level of social and 
political understanding of the self, all at the same time.’236  The paradoxically 
opposed concepts of similarity and difference that are contained within the 
                                                          
236 S. Duchesne, Sophie, ‘Waiting for a European Identity…Reflections on the Process of Identification 
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2008, 9 (4), p. 402. 
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general definition of identity can certainly cause confusion, but our ‘self’ 
(individual) and our ‘group’ (collective) are equally influential and co-
dependent when it comes to our identity.  
Acceptance of diversity implies the dialogue between different 
identities. Identity is a dynamic concept and involves the self-
identification of individuals with certain values and symbols. The 
concept of identity is used with respect to individuals: “…All identity is 
individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or, in 
other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of 
behaviour and collective symbols. The real question is how the 
dominant reference points of individual identity change over time and 
with the changing of institutional environment” (Balibar & Wallerstein, 
1991). No form of identity is ever complete, nor totally stable.237 
This definition would suggest that our identity is built on a cultural pluralism 
that is related to our social history, the present norms by which our society lives 
by and through identification with artificially constructed social symbols or 
artefacts.  There is evidentially an internal aspect to identity, perhaps this is 
what we could call ‘individual identity’: the identification with the self on an 
ethnic, sexual and gendered level; as well as an external aspect, our ‘collective 
identity’.  This external aspect could perhaps be described as the identification 
of the self with our immediate society or social norms, politics and common 
cultural symbols, as opposed to those of others in alternative societies.238  I 
would argue that our internal, individual identity is a constant aspect that, 
whilst influenced by external stimuli (especially when talking about gender 
identity and sexual identity), is more solidly fixed than what we would consider 
to be our collective identity.  What’s more, it is entirely possible that language 
is the link between the ‘internal self’ and the ‘external self’ when it comes to 
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countries’, p. 3. 
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identity.  Our linguistic sphere, having been present with us since birth, almost 
forms a part of our internal self, as well as being a limiting force on how we 
experience the external world and how the external self interacts in society. 
Charles Taylor’s model of identity suggests that identity is constructed 
dialogically, through a process of mutual recognition where participants 
recognise each other as both equal in their human dignity and separate in their 
individual uniqueness or cultural distinctiveness.239 Whereas Anthony D. Smith 
suggests that ‘for the individual, identity is usually “situational”, if not always 
optional. That is to say, individuals identify themselves and are identified by 
others in different ways according to the situations in which they find 
themselves. […]Collective identities, however, tend to be pervasive and 
persistent. They are less subject to rapid changes and tend to be more intense 
and durable’.240  Whilst I would agree that identity is situational in that our 
surroundings undeniably impact our sense of self as we grow and form a ‘self’, 
I do not agree that the core internal sense of identity is situational.  Being 
identified in a certain way or identifying with a certain group in a certain 
situation does not change our individual identity. Identity is made up of a series 
of identifications both on an individual and collective level and so choosing one 
or another to identify with in a certain situation does not change the whole core 
of our pluralistic identity.  ‘Individuals identify with different groups and, while 
they therefore have different identifications, they have only one identity which 
may change to a certain extent over time but which is considered to be basically 
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stable.’ 241  However Smith’s assertion about collective identities is of more 
interest for the purposes of this chapter.  He proposes that collective identities 
are more pervasive and persistent and less subject to change, an idea that must 
be considered in two ways.  Firstly, our collective identity is formed through a 
complex yet artificial series of identifications within a certain social group, the 
members of which are subject to identification with the same set of artificial 
symbols as we are. Due to the complex and historical nature of collective 
identity formation I would have to agree that collective identities are not 
subject to rapid changes. However secondly, in being based on artificially 
constructed archetypes it is certainly plausible to reckon that these artificial 
constructs could, over time, be reconstructed to form new and different 
symbols and archetypes with which the collective comes to identify with and 
subsequently form their collective identity.  After all, our collective identity is 
determined by artificial external forces rather than internal forces. 
 
SECTION 2.b : COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 
The sum of what constitutes collective identity as a general concept (and as 
separate to individual identity) must be considered before a discussion on what 
European identity is as it stands and what it could potentially become can be 
entered into.  The eventual aim in pursuing this line of investigation will be 
firstly to understand the current identity situation within the EU and better 
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understand the relationship between identification and identity formation 
within the European Union.242 
Although definitive differences are present between individual and collective 
identity (as described above), collective identity is made up of several 
individuals, all of whom identify with the same group, and therefore it could be 
described as both an individual and a group phenomenon. Three undeniably 
significant features of collective identity are those of: 1) a shared history, 2) 
common myths and identification with artificial symbols, and 3) the collective 
identification with the nation and national identification.243 
 
2.b.i. A Shared History 
An undisputed aspect of collective identity is that it is partially formed by a 
shared sense of cultural continuity and cultural history: 
shared memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the 
history of the unit - the collective belief in a common destiny of that unit 
and its culture - there can be no collective cultural identity without 
shared memories or a sense of continuity on the part of those who feel 
they belong to that collectivity.244 
Powerful shared histories are often amalgamations of historical events and the 
narratives that have come out of these events and changed over time.  
Momentous events such as war often have the greatest effect on solidifying the 
feeling of a common belief and common destiny within the members of a 
                                                          
242 Section 3 of this chapter. 
243 See R. Poole, Nation and Identity, Routledge, 1999. Particularly Chapter. 1, Section. 1 ‘the nation: 
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collective.  Once these events have passed then the story-making begins.  Take 
for example the instances of WW1 and WW2 and how remembrance of these 
events has changed throughout the years. Focusing on the heroic actions of 
certain individuals, propaganda and perpetuating the idea of having “survived” 
a potential threat to our way of living breeds narratives that change the actual 
event into a story that we, as a collective, share, perpetuate and eventually 
change. It is not the event itself which we are remembering as a collective, but 
rather the stories that this history has formed and changed over generations, 
all of which creates a strong sense of nationalism and reinforces the strength 
of the collective identity. Ross Poole discusses the value of such sentiments in 
the aftermath of war in relation to national identity, stating: ‘The various 
commemorations of war – cenotaphs, tombs of the unknown soldier, and the 
like – play a central role in the iconography of the nation just because they 
symbolise the sacrifices that men and women have been willing to make on its 
behalf’.245 And as Kymlicka points out, the fact is that, ‘void as these tombs are 
of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls, they are nonetheless 
saturated with ghostly national imaginings’.246 Whilst not advocating that the 
member states of the European Union should go to war as a united force, war 
is most definitely a way that emotive shared histories reinforce the sense of a 
group which influences the formation of a collective identity.  There has been 
no emotive incident that the members of the European Union have tackled as 
an entity that could potentially form stories that become shared histories.   
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There is also the issue that these shared histories need to be communicated in 
order to act with any significant force, which brings us back to the problem of 
language.  Should an emotive shared history happen, the subsequent shared 
stories would evolve in differing ways depending on the linguistic possibilities 
of the language it was shared in, potentially creating vastly diverging accounts 
from what began as the same shared history. 
Collective identities refer to a space of communication, the boundaries 
of which vary with what is communicated. This is an implication of the 
theoretical assumption that collective identities are constructed 
through stories. Stories that link people vary with the communicative 
network which they constitute. Thus, the reference object of collective 
identities is a network of communication with boundaries which are 
identified and controlled by an identity. Networks of communication 
generate identities as a project of control of their boundaries.247 
These artificial stories that are fundamental for collective identity construction 
are communicated through a common language, something that for the 
reasons explained in the previous chapter, the EU does not nor should have.  
That being said, it could be that this is precisely the reason why it is so hard for 
‘European stories’ or ‘constructs’ to take hold with the same level of force. 
The national collective identity is built on the shared histories of that nation.  
These shared national histories reinforce the symbols as well as reinforcing the 
exclusivity of the group. In addition to the point raised above about histories 
not being able to be shared because of the limits of each different linguistic 
sphere, at the European level there cannot be a shared national story as there 
are too many competing stories which refer to other EU member states as being 
the “other” due to the numerous historical wars between European countries. 
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‘The problem is the co-existence of many hegemonic stories. This creates not 
only a practical problem but also a theoretical problem: How to conceive the 
narrative network underlying a political community in a situation where we 
have many narratives floating around and referring to it? The case in point is 
Europe.’248  The EU clearly is lacking any kind of formed collective identity, an 
incontrovertibly necessary element if integration on a social and cultural level 
is to happen to the same extent as current economic integration.  This sense of 
collective identity is needed if the EU is going to be successful as a 
democratically legitimate project. But it is a two-way stream. ‘For a person, an 
identity allows them to be recognized as something particular vis-à-vis 
others.’249  Having an identity at the collective level creates a sense of belonging 
to a certain and defined “something” as opposed to something else.  This 
sentiment of belonging results in positive consequences such as an 
understanding of what your rights as an individual are within that specific 
collective as well as a feeling of recognition from within and without of the 
collective.  Officially having European citizenship therefore means nothing if the 
European identity has not come beforehand.   
 
2.b.ii. Common Myths and Constructed Artificial Symbols 
It is clear that collective identities are social constructions which begin as a 
shared history and then develop into stories that give the individuals of a group 
a sense of belonging both as an individual and as a collective. ‘Collective identity 
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is first and foremost an artificial phenomenon because it is a social 
construction. […] This kind of construction is based on strategies of inclusion 
and exclusion, demarcation and the definition of commonality and 
dissimilarity.250  We, as a group, create symbols that demonstrate our “we-
ness”.  Artificially constructed symbols such as an anthem or flag give us a sense 
of belonging.  We can recognise these symbols as being “ours” as opposed to 
“theirs”.  Such symbols highlight the artificial and socially constructed nature of 
collective identity.  Rather than evolving naturally, this aspect of identity 
formation is consciously and artificially forged in a manner that leads us to 
subconsciously feel a sense of belonging when surrounded by these artificial 
constructs.  According to Viktoria Kaina and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski there 
are two main theories that explain collective identity formation: essentialism 
and constructivism. Essentialists believe that political collective identities result 
from the given cultural ‘raw material’ within a society, whereas constructivists 
stress the active role of intellectuals and political entrepreneurs, for instance 
by manipulating cultural symbols and mobilizing ethnic or cultural cleavages.251  
In essence, essentialists believe that the “we-ness” of belonging are qualities 
emerging from physiological traits, psychological predispositions, regional 
features, or the properties of structural locations.252  The similarities of these 
common qualities are internalised by the individuals in a group in order to 
subconsciously form the idea of a common, unified society that is experienced 
in the same way by all of the members within it.  
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The problem for the European Union when it comes to these shared stories is 
this: 
Through rituals and ceremonies, political myths and symbols, the arts 
and history textbooks through these the links with a community of 
origin, continually reshaped as popular 'ethno-history', are reforged and 
disseminated. In this respect, national identifications possess distinct 
advantages over the idea of a unified European identity. They are vivid, 
accessible, well established, long popularized, and still widely believed, 
in broad outline at least. In each of these respects, 'Europe ' is deficient 
both as idea and as process. Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past-a 
'prehistory ' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and 
historical depth.253 
Lacking such well-established myths or truly emotive prehistory, one might ask 
why it is that the EU seems to have attempted to forge a collective European 
identity following this blueprint. 
 
2.b.iii. The Collective and the Nation 254 
The most effectively constructed and clear archetypes and symbols of a 
collective are those created at the national level. Flags and anthems are the 
most obvious examples of symbols that allow simple identification between the 
citizen and the national collective.  National identity is by far the strongest 
example of a defined collective identity: 
National identities do what collective identities do in general: they are 
stories that combine a series of events in texts, songs and images which 
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some people recognize as being part of their particular we, i.e. as a 
collective identity. In addition, national identity constructions have 
succeeded in imposing themselves as a hegemonic identity in a 
territorially bounded political community. This exclusiveness is built into 
a story which links people defined as citizens of a political community. 
This story is transmitted to and learned by new generations, practised 
in national rituals and objectified in songs (anthems) and images 
(flags).255 
National identity formation is a relatively new phenomenon that gives the 
collective geographical borders within which to solidify their collective 
sentiment at this level. As is discussed at various points throughout this chapter 
and the next, in its attempt to form an identity the EU has cookie cut aspects of 
national identity formation. Therefore what the collective attachment is and its 
strength at the national level must be understood if we are to comprehend the 
format so far followed by the EU. Only then will it be possible to conceive of 
how we can move forward in creating a European identity that is able to resolve 
the democratic legitimacy questions caused by its multilingual situation. 
Looking further into Anthony D. Smith’s work on national identity and nation 
building, he reveals that national identity, as a secular ideology, appeared 
following the American and French Revolutions.256  National identity, as we 
understand and construct it today thus came out of a period of struggle; where 
the rights of the people within the nation and the relationship between the 
nation and the citizen became more defined and widely understood than ever 
before. He explains that: 
The first, or 'Western', model of the nation arose out of the Western 
absolutist states whose rulers inadvertently helped to create the 
conditions for a peculiarly territorial concept of the nation. The Western 
model of the nation tended to emphasize the centrality of a national 
territory or homeland, a common system of laws and institutions, the 
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legal equality of citizens in a political community, and the importance of 
a mass, civic culture binding the citizens together.257 
The nation emerged therefore as a territorial concept within which apparent 
commonalities between the peoples of that territory could be observed, and 
under which citizens were afforded legal equality under a system of laws. The 
rise of the nation state and thus national identity is hence strongly linked to the 
emergence of democratic civic society in the West, yet again affirming the 
relationship between a defined people and democratic participation. 
Democracy emerged out of the revolutions in emerging nations as the people 
could identify a defined structure within which they could enforce their rights.   
The three aforementioned features of collective identity in fact derive from the 
assumptions and beliefs nationalists generally accept build the concept of 
national identity. In explaining the complex and multidimensional nature of 
national identity construction Smith outlines the following features: 
* the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own 
'homelands';  
* the shared nature of myths of origin and historical memories of the 
community;  
* the common bond of a mass, standardized culture;  
* a common territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and 
ownership of resources by all members in the homeland;  
* the possession by all members of a unified system of common legal rights and 
duties under common laws and institutions.258  
Which he summarises as ‘a named human population sharing a historical 
territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public 
culture, a common economy and territorial mobility, and common legal rights 
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and duties for all members of the collectivity.'259 In critiquing Smith’s work on 
national identity, John Erik Fossum adds the vital factor of ‘national identity [as] 
based on the conception of a collective national consciousness, whose sources 
are culturally based but need not be predetermined or given and can be 
constructed’ 260 , an element which will prove fundamental when later 
discussing how the EU can move forward with identity construction.  Nationalist 
scholars also insist that a common language is vital to the fostering of a national 
identity.  Karen A. Cerulo discusses Benedict Anderson’s ideas on imagined 
community and identity, stating that he approaches the idea of national 
identity as a socio-cognitive construct: 
[It is] both spatially and temporally inclusive, both enabled and shaped 
by broader social forces. [Anderson] documents key moments of 
identity construction, times during which cultural (language) and social 
factors (capitalism, print technology) convene in a particular historical 
moment, effectively remaking collective images of the national self.261 
If language plays such an important role in the construction of the national self 
then it follows that it must play an important part of the process of nation 
creation also. Does this then mean that the European Union cannot define 
itself, and does not “exist” until the identity of its people has been constructed?  
If so, demos creation through European identity formation is of vital 
importance for the democratic legitimacy of the Union in that democratic 
participation is impossible if there are, technically speaking, no people. There 
cannot be a nation without a people, and if the cultural assimilation of the 
people is largely influenced by their common collective identity which is by in 
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large forged by their common language then the ‘nation’ cannot be conceived 
of without there first being a national identity (not geographically speaking, of 
course).   
Nikiforova highlights that national identity formation also includes ’the 
formation of national states, connection of citizenship with ethno-cultural 
community, changes in economic system, the formation and distribution of 
mass education in a national language [and] the process of cultural 
homogenization’. She suggests that national identity is formed as a symbiosis 
of national statehood and the ethno-cultural ground and that the dominating 
differences of national identities are the linguistic and religious specificity of 
belonging to a certain group.262 It is without a doubt these two central elements 
of culture: language and religion, which create the most obvious distinctions 
between societies.  Where the EU is concerned, historically the continent of 
Europe has been largely dominated by Christians (although this also is changing 
with modern migration trends), meaning that a common language has been 
and could currently be said to be the major unifying aspect that is absent from 
the EU. 
Anthony D. Smith however suggests a middle-ground attitude towards identity. 
‘He links social constructionism to more essentialist views. He defines national 
identity as a product of both “natural” continuity and conscious manipulation. 
Natural continuity emerges from pre-existing ethnic identity and community; 
conscious manipulation is achieved via commemoration, ideology, and 
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symbolism.’ 263   Whether taking an essentialist or constructivist approach 
however, what is clear about the collective identity is that we, as humans, need 
defined categories that we can identify with in order to form and understand 
our collective identity.  On a collective level, identification with defined 
systems, symbols, ideologies and archetypes, all of which are artificial 
constructions, leads to collective identity formation.    
 
CHAPTER 4. SECTION 3 
WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY? 264 
“We are not bringing together states, we are uniting people.” (Jean Monet, 1952) 
‘The old dream of the EU founding fathers was to see citizens identify more and 
more with Europe and eventually cease to identify with their own nations — a 
transfer of attachment which was expected to ward off the nationalist conflicts 
and wars which have cast a shadow over the continent for several centuries.’265 
As we know, nearly 60 years after the birth of the European Community, this 
has not happened.  Along with the inherent problems caused by not having the 
unifying feature of a common language, the EU has created its identity around 
the same archetypes and symbols traditionally used by the nation state in its 
artificial construction of collective identity.  This has had the resulting 
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consequence of placing the EU in conflict with national identities rather than 
succeeding in its aim of superseding national identities or existing alongside 
them. 
So what has the EU done thus far? And why is it failing to achieve a defined 
collective European demos?  This section considers the current markers of 
European identity as it stands so that we have a comprehensive understanding 
of its make-up.  Beginning with discussion on The European Declaration on 
Identity 1973 this section discusses the numerous shortcomings of this 
declaration as well as its seemingly complete lack of understanding of identity 
as a concept.  However, hope springs from The Charter on European Identity 
which demonstratively reveals a much better understanding of the complexities 
of identity.  This leads to a discussion on the difference between a defined 
economic space and a defined cultural space, and the differing resulting 
consequences from the two.  The economic identity of the European Union has 
been relatively clearly defined since its naissance, with political and legal 
identities following not long after.  It is the cultural identity of the Union that is 
causing most problems, and it is the cultural identity that is hindering any true 
sense of citizenry and collective amongst the European people, and thus 
hindering democratic participation and legitimacy.   
The identity of the European Union, both that of its collective people and that 
of itself as an institution is still in process.  The attempt of the EU to define itself 
along the same lines of national identity formation is quite possibly its biggest 
downfall.  In doing so it has created a heightened sense of nationalistic 
sentiments and has placed itself in direct conflict with the already strongly 
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formed national identities of its Member States, rather than placing itself 
alongside them.  This weak sense of identity at the European level is invariably 
discussed in relation to the inherent power of a common language in identity 
formation (and lack of it within the EU), as well as the uncertainty caused by 
continually expanding geographical borders. It is quite possible that linguistic 
issues are the main reason behind the lack of identity – both in terms of a high 
level of multilingualism and in terms of the lack of linguistic equality at 
institutional level within the EU. In recognising this as the problem, we need to 
look further into identity and what it is in order to find a potential solution. 
One significant consideration of this section is that of The Other and the role it 
plays in collective identity formation.  The EU may not be able to define itself or 
create a collective identity for its people without first defining what it is not.  
Can we only truly understand ourselves once we know what we are not? 
 
SECTION 3.a : WHAT IS IDENTITY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AT PRESENT? 266 
3.a.i. The Declaration on European Identity 1973 267 
The Declaration on European Identity 1973 presents European identity as the 
foundation of EU citizenship. The declaration, in its naivety, seems to assert 
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that merely declaring something to be part of the European Identity thus makes 
it so.  The document, whilst acknowledging the need for unity and assimilation 
in identity formation, is completely ignorant in its understanding of the 
complexity of identity and its formation as a concept integral to the human 
subconscious. The document would seem to imply that the 9 member states of 
the time naively believed the common market, customs union and institutions 
could form essential elements of the European identity – collective identity 
formation theory, as discussed in the previous section, tells us this is 
impossible. 
2. The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a 
united Europe. On the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome setting up 
the European Communities and of subsequent decisions, they have 
created a common market, based on a customs union, and have 
established institutions, common policies and machinery for co-
operation. All these are an essential part of the European Identity.268 
It could be argued that by declaring these mechanisms to be an integral part of 
the European identity, the EU was attempting to form its collective identity on 
things other than the archetypes that our national identities are formed on.  
However, the error in this comes from not understanding the distinction 
between legal and political collective identity in contrast to social or cultural 
collective identity. The European identity is embodied firstly by practical 
components which belong to social welfare and democratic rules and less by 
symbolic and emotional elements which are underlying the national identity 
(such as language, ethnicity, religion, common history, myths, symbols, 
geographic boundaries).269 These practical mechanisms that serve as legal and 
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economic identifiers are not emotively strong enough to create a European 
citizenry, collective identity or demos.  That is not to say that the citizens of 
Europe are not concerned by or passionate about their legal rights and 
economic situation; what it means is that this type of collective identity is in no 
way linked to our subconscious.  They are models that we are consciously 
concerned about rather than things which we feel to be inherent to our being 
both as an individual and a collective. Making an attempt to forge the collective 
identity of a people based around such models is futile and, whilst the 
economies and policies can prove successful, it will prove difficult to encourage 
the people to back economic and political decisions within the area without 
there first being a defined social and cultural collective. 
Continuing our look at the declaration, it states further elements that are key 
to the European identity, noting the principles of representative democracy, 
the Rule of Law, social justice and human rights.  
1. The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, 
political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety 
of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, 
based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the 
needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of 
representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which 
is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human 
rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European 
Identity.270 
These are fundamentally more plausible as means of evoking a sense of 
collective at the subconscious level.  The individual element of collective 
identity formation is recognised by acknowledging the individual in relation to 
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democracy, the Rule of Law and social justice. Whether it is possible to use a 
common understanding of democracy, social justice and human rights as bases 
for collective identity formation within the EU will be discussed at length in the 
next chapter with regards to the possibility of a rights-based union. However it 
is worth mentioning here the glaring problem as raised in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis: that of a lack of concrete definition when it comes to the Rule of Law as 
well as the inequality at an institutional level in the area of linguistic human 
rights.  If the EU were to use these mechanisms as bases for collective identity 
formation, which is entirely possible if the correct definitional steps are taken 
(see Chapter 5), then the first task at hand would be to sort out the current 
level of linguistic inequality and decide upon a concrete definition of the Rule 
of Law. 
Ivic and Lakicevic highlight a further issue in defining European identity through 
common values: 
Although the diversity of cultures is recognized within this document, it 
is limited to the framework of common values and principles. The 
Declaration on European Identity emphasizes the need for ‘‘the 
increasing convergence of attitudes to life’’, ‘‘common European 
civilization’’ and ‘‘the attachment to common values and principles’’. 
Thus it tends to homogenize and essentialize European identity. It 
perceives ‘‘Europe’’, ‘‘identity’’ and ‘‘values’’ as static categories.271 
As we know, neither “Europe” nor “identity” are static values.  As a physical, 
geographical entity the borders of the EU are continually expanding and 
identity at a collective level is artificial and therefore capable of reconstruction 
(though this is not at all an easy process).  Identity is not a stable, unified 
category; it is constantly transformed and reconfigured. Hence the idea of 
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European identity embodied in the Declaration on European Identity should be 
rewritten.272 
The Declaration also makes an attempt at defining the then European 
Community against an ‘Other’. There are a number of paragraphs detailing the 
‘friendly’ and ‘cordial’ relationships between the then 9 Member States and 
other countries (such as America, Canada, Japan, China, the countries of Latin 
America), and yet Russia is glaringly absent from this.  Section 22 of The 
Declaration, as referenced below, conclusively demonstrates the Nine’s 
recognition that in order to have a unified identity, they need to define their 
unity in relation to other countries or groups of countries: 
22. The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic 
construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine 
propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in 
relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in 
so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the 
framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced 
that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and 
realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus 
making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of 
their relations into a European Union. (my bold) 273 
In the following chapter it is argued that the EU does need a defined Other to 
contrast itself against in order to begin the process of collective identity and 
demos formation.  I would therefore argue that recognition of this idea in the 
wording of The Declaration is a positive step by the EU in the path towards 
collective identity formation.  That being said, relying on politics of The Other 
can be dangerous in itself as it runs the risk of fostering tensions between the 
“self-group” and the “other-group” and can result in new types of nationalism. 
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3.a.ii. The Charter of European Identity 
Although the Declaration on European Identity is the most valuable document 
considering what the EU is striving towards in terms of identity, there is also 
The Charter of European Identity, a document initiated by Václav Havel in 1994, 
the then President of the Czech Republic.  This Charter - which discusses Europe 
under the headings of its destiny, values, living standards, economic and social 
policies, and responsibilities - aims to stimulate a wide-ranging debate of these 
issues in order that we may achieve a Union which is closer to its citizens, 
committed to common policies "based on solidarity, credible, and capable of 
making its citizens proud to be Europeans".274   
The first striking difference between The Charter and The Declaration comes 
from comparing their opening sections.  Section 1 of The Declaration begins 
with a statement about the then Community’s unity, basing it on “the cherished 
values of their legal, political and moral order” and declaring that the common 
market, customs union and common policies are all an essential part of the 
European identity.  As discussed in the above section, all of these are concepts 
that are not emotively strong enough to create a European citizenry or 
collective identity. In contrast, The Charter opens by defining Europe as a 
Community of Values: 
The aim of European unification is to realize, test, develop and 
safeguard these values. They are rooted in common legal principles 
acknowledging the freedom of the individual and social responsibility. 
Fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity and 
fraternity. Building on its historical roots in classical antiquity and 
Christianity, Europe further developed these values during the course 
of the Renaissance, the Humanist movement, and the Enlightenment, 
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which led in turn to the development of democracy, the recognition of 
fundamental and human rights, and the rule of law.  
By prioritising the unifying values of tolerance, humanity, democracy and 
human rights, the Charter takes a significantly more humanist approach to 
European identity.  This approach is more understanding of the nature of 
identity and offers potential bases for collective identity formation at a 
European level.  Unfortunately the EU identity in practice has not taken hold in 
this manner, perhaps partly due to Member State scepticism around EU 
membership caused in part by the oft cited democratic deficit, and in part by 
national political parties using EU membership as a political popularity tool.  
Whatever the reason, as it stands the EU seems to have quite a strong sense of 
legal and economic identity, but this has not transferred in forming a collective 
people.  Therefore the following chapter, whilst considering other possibilities, 
will explore the potentiality of these humanist concepts and their feasibility as 
subconscious and emotively strong bases for collective identity formation at 
the European level.  This chapter however will continue by examining the EU as 
a collective economic space as opposed to a collective cultural space. 
 
SECTION 3.b : ECONOMIC SPACE vs. CULTURAL SPACE 
Economically speaking the European Union has a strongly defined identity. This 
likely stems from the fact that it started out as an exclusively economic 
community (EEC) before moving on to become an economic, legal and political 
community (EC), and then furthering their aim into the realm of social and 
cultural cohesion (EU).  The change in terminology from European Economic 
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Community to European Community to European Union reflects the evolving 
aims of the EU.  By removing the term ‘economic’ from its name it was 
demonstrating its progression from a purely economic community into 
something that unified politically and legally also.  Then changing the term 
‘community’ to ‘union’ demonstrated its aim to also unify the people of the EU 
socially.  The possibility of social and cultural cohesion did not come into the 
European consciousness until much later, and unfortunately the strength held 
by its economic identity has not translated over into a collective culture or true 
sense of citizenship. 
The Maastricht Treaty was probably the most important single change. 
It was a major step in the process of polity making in Europe and 
reminded policy-makers and publics alike that the EU was now an entity 
that required a measure of direct legitimacy. It had developed such 
strong supranational features that it could no longer rely only on an 
indirect notion of legitimacy. By then, the EU had established a 
supranational legal system, it was a rights-granting entity, and it had 
taken on a wide range of additional tasks that are highly relevant to 
identity-formation and which affect the question of recognition.275 
Essentially, the EU had begun to act like a state in many ways but not only was 
its legitimacy to do so an issue (as still is to this day) but it was copying features 
of a nation state without having a national people.  Obviously there is a 
European people, being a citizen of a Member State automatically gives an 
individual European citizenship legally speaking; but the individuals that make 
up this citizenry do not have a fully formed identity as a collective.  Thus 
meaning that any advancements by the EU towards further competences is 
going to be viewed as a threat to the national identity, rather than an 
enhancement of the European identity, as this does not yet fully exist. 
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The Maastricht Treaty allowed the EU, which is historically geared towards the 
economy and trade, to take action in the field of culture in order to safeguard, 
disseminate and develop culture in Europe. Yet in its cultural initiative the EU 
is committed to its ‘unity in diversity’ motto, respecting the national and 
regional diversity of Member States and aiming to highlight the shared cultural 
heritage. As stated on the EUR-Lex website: 
Article 167 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
defines the role of the European Union (EU) in the area of culture: it 
supports, coordinates or supplements the actions of member countries 
and seeks to bring Europe's common cultural heritage to the fore. The 
EU supports actions to preserve cultural heritage, and promote 
cooperation and transnational exchanges between cultural institutions 
in member countries. A new funding programme ‘Creative Europe’ will 
run between 2014 and 2020. Other initiatives include Heritage Days 
(locally-based initiatives that allow access to sites not normally open to 
the public) and Capitals of Culture, both launched in 1985.276 
As with the terminology used in its initiatives to promote the equality of 
languages as discussed in Chapter 2, the order of the day seems to be 
promotion and support.  The Union is stuck between a rock and a hard place: it 
understands the emotive response that culture provokes in members of a 
particular group and so does not wish to be seen to be creating homogenising 
cultural initiatives by regulating or standardising the various cultures of the 
Member States into one cultural melting pot; however it clearly does not 
understand that in order to make the citizens of the EU more emotively 
attached to the Union creating a cultural identity of its own is a must.  The 
cultural initiatives that the EU has put in place (European Capitals of Culture for 
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example) have come too late in the game and thus have not been successful in 
forging a separate European identity for its citizens.277   
 
SECTION 3.c : EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN PROCESS 
There is no doubt that the construction of a European identity is still in process.  
John Erik Fossum argues that the development of a post-national European 
identity is given added impetus by international legal developments and the 
manner in which the development of the Union draws on and fuses legal orders 
at different levels.278  Cristina Matiuta also remarks upon the “in-process” state 
of the European identity, additionally noting the similarities between European 
identity construction and national identity construction: ‘The process has an 
objective dimension (territory, sets of common legal rights and duties) and a 
subjective one (symbols as flag, anthem, a Europe day, a motto, 
cultural/educational exchange meant to create a sense of solidarity to the EU 
project, to expose younger generation to patterns of cooperation and to 
emphasize the unity-in diversity-rather than difference)’.279   
The EU has made several attempts to foster an image of a united Europe in the 
hope of creating a sense of we-ness within the collective.  Things such as the 
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European flag, the anthem, and the European passport were created to support 
the aim of forming a common collective European identity.  However, much like 
with the cultural initiatives mentioned above all of these things were created 
and introduced into the European consciousness much later than declarations 
and regulations on economic, legal and political unification. It took almost thirty 
years for the flag to become officially recognized by the European Union. 
Likewise, it took seven years before the Community adopted Beethoven's Ode 
to Joy as the European anthem.280 The EU has tried to use these symbols as a 
means of giving its citizens means of identification with the aim of creating a 
feeling of belonging and forging a true sense of citizenship. Many issues arise 
from these attempts: firstly, identity is more than just identification; and 
secondly, these are yet again all traditional archetypes that have been utilised 
by the nation state in solidifying the collective identity of a nation.281   
What these attempts at symbolism show is that the EU understands what is 
needed to forge a people: powerful artificially created symbols that impose 
themselves onto the collective subconscious and consequently create a sense 
of belonging.  The EU’s error has been to copy the symbols used by the nation 
state. In my opinion, the only explanation for why these attempts have not 
proved successful is that in using the same symbols as the nation, the EU has in 
fact placed itself in conflict with the national identity rather than alongside it.  
If we as a collective are to understand and appreciate how Europe is imagined, 
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it is important both to take EU symbolic initiatives seriously, and to try and 
grasp the specificity of these symbols and the peculiar conditions of their use.  
What is evident is that legal and economic integration alone will not create a 
united Europe.282  Without an identity the EU will continually find it difficult to 
validate its existence, and legitimate democratic participation will not be 
possible.283 As Chryssochoou and Warleigh separately point out, ‘The absence 
of a European demos, that is, a ‘community of citizens linked to each other by 
strong democratic bonds and pressing to acquire a measure of effective control 
through formal or informal means over government’ is the principle problem 
faced by architects of democratisation in the EU’.284 Christopher Lord is even 
more emphatic in his assertion that, ‘institutional innovations can only go so far 
in removing perceptions of a democratic deficit in EU politics: without ‘a shared 
identity, a common deliberative forum, and an open system of 
communications’, citizens are unlikely to be aware of whatever institutional 
change is effectuated’.285 This directly refers back to the issue of legitimacy 
discussed earlier in this thesis. Yes, it is true that there are the issues of practical 
democratic legitimacy raised through the multilingual nature of the EU. 
However, it is evidently through understanding legitimacy at the social level, 
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(i.e. demos formation) that any and all legitimacy issues have any hope of being 
resolved.286 
 
SECTION 3.d : THE EUROEPAN UNION’S LACK OF DEFINED IDENTITY AS AN 
ENTITY 
There is one certainty that has come from this discussion so far, that is that the 
European identity as it stands is incomplete and lacks any original (unique to 
the EU) emotive symbolism that its citizens can identify with on a subconscious 
level.  This should not, however, be surprising; how could the EU possibly form 
any coherently defined and adequately emotive identity for its citizens when 
its own definition as an entity is in question.  The very nature of the EU is a 
highly contested subject, and one that provokes further debate on the 
democratic deficit and general legitimacy of the EU as a whole. Failure to admit 
to an end aim in political integration is hindering the possibility of a collective 
identity – if the EU cannot be defined as an institution because of a lack of 
understanding as to what it is, or what it could become, then its people will 
never have a strong sense of collective without a clear idea of what they are 
attaching themselves to. Throughout this thesis I have tended to stick to using 
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the terms “supra-national entity” or “post-national entity” as though these are 
somehow adequate as definition of what the EU is, which they are not.  Whilst 
it may take on many features of the nation, it is not a nation; it equally is not a 
federation, a confederation or anything else within our realm of 
comprehension of entities with as much legal, political and economic structure 
and power as the EU has over its members.  It is new, it is novel, and it is 
ambiguous.   
It has been argued that the ambiguity of what exactly the EU is does not 
necessarily mean confusion, but rather is to be viewed as a response to the 
European cultural diversity. 287   ‘Although the Monnet method has been 
successful in pushing forwards European unification, it had one unexpected 
consequence: the political aim of the project has never been clarified. And what 
is most interesting for the anthropologist: it must not be clarified.’288 I find it 
difficult to agree with the last sentence of this statement. Whilst the inherent 
diversity of the EU has hindered the development of a collective European 
identity for its citizens, it should not affect the definition of the EU as a political 
and legal system.  Even if the EU did come up with new identifiable symbols 
and archetypes that allowed the collective to form an identity, they would not 
hold with any force if their attachment was to an entity that itself did not have 
a defined identity.  Whilst discussion in the previous section remarked upon the 
instability of identity as a concept, in that it is based on artificial constructs that 
could be reconstructed (though not easily), that should not also be the case for 
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the European Union as an entity.  Fitting into a previously defined “box” forms 
a set of parameters within which we are able to comprehend something’s 
existence.  The EU does not fit into any previously defined parameters making 
its identity ambiguous at best, but it has also failed to define its own parameters 
or even give its box a name.  
As an emerging un-identified political object, Europe deeply affects a 
very old and perhaps obsolete perception of identity rooted in 
territorial grounds. Even if there is no word in the political vocabulary 
to qualify Europe (is it postnational, supranational, poststate, 
multigovernmental?), it appears that Europe as an emerging form will 
significantly change Europeans’ conception of politics and of identity.289 
And so it should. The European Union should firstly be focussing on defining 
itself as a political power in the international forum, then and only then will it 
be able to figure out what forms of symbolism will work to allow its citizens to 
integrate and democratically participate through a series of new and novel 
constructed and manipulated identifications which could lead to a collective 
identity that can exist alongside, and not in competition with the various 
national identities within its borders.  What it needs is a set of values that 
embody an identity that is particular and unique to the EU. And, the further 
away from similarities with national identity the EU can get, the better. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to the second aspect of postmodern identity construction mentioned 
earlier, that of fluidity and changeability, we may find some hope. If identity 
truly is fluid and in a constant state of flux and reconstruction, then surely this 
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offers hope for the eventual construction of a European identity that is just as 
strong as our other identities, and yet does not need to be based on same 
archetypes (most notably that of language) as our national collective identities. 
If this is possible, we could potentially form a collective supra-national 
European identity that can coexist alongside the older more established 
identities that the citizens of the European Union already carry with them; their 
national identities, religious identities, cultural identities, etc. 
It appears that the EU has perhaps attempted to forge a European identity for 
its citizens by cookie-cutting the components of collective national identity: 
creating a flag, having an anthem, creating a single currency, giving European 
citizenship to those born within its borders etc.  The problem with this lies in 
the fact that the EU is not a nation: 
National citizenship is the result of a long process of historical concept 
formation in which national identity emerged, integrating social and 
cultural differences under a new concept: citizenship (Somers, 1995). 
This same concept is now used to make a European identity. […]This 
story, since its beginning, has exclusively been tied to nationally defined 
networks of social actors. Thus there is an inherent difficulty with 
constructions of a collective identity based on the citizenship story.290 
We should not be constructing, defining or identifying with Europe under the 
same terms as we do with the nation state. If the EU cannot use stories or 
shared histories in the same way nations do, and cannot use the unifying power 
of language in the same way nations do, why would it try to use symbols in the 
same way nations do?  Surely it would make more sense for the EU to break 
down all of these artificial constructions that form national collective identities 
and either subvert them or come up with entirely new and different artefacts 
                                                          
290 Eder, ‘A Theory of Collective Identity: Making sense of the Debate on a ‘European Identity’’, p. 436. 
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and symbols in order artificially construct its own collective identity that the 
European people can identify with alongside and separate to their national 
identifications.  
It has been suggested that in order to gain support for further European 
integration and to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU a stronger 
collective attachment to Europe is needed.291 The formation of a European 
demos with a collective identity is one of the preconditions to improve the 
democratic legitimacy issues of the European Union. In the context of 
subsequent EU enlargement waves and increased cultural diversity, one might 
ask whether there is sufficient commonality in the Europeans’ perceptions 
regarding the EU project to substantiate a collective identity.292  The danger is 
though that the EU’s attempt so far has failed in forming any sense of genuine 
collective identity of similar strength to our national affiliations.  This failure 
may have in fact hindered any potential future attempts to subvert the 
traditional national collective identity archetypes in the EU.  That being said, all 
identity is social and also, in being an artificial construction, can be constructed 
and reconstructed at will.  That doesn’t necessarily mean it will take hold, but 
it must at least be attempted if the European project is to succeed 
democratically with a collective demos. ‘Changing social relations might 
produce forms of identity beyond the nation, an issue that is at the core of the 
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countries’, pp. 2-3. 
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debate of European identity and that makes this debate theoretically 
important.’293 
What is most striking about national collective identity as a concept is the ease 
with which we are tricked into believing, or at least not questioning the idea 
that none of what we feel as a collective is natural. In taking advantage of man’s 
need to feel like (s)he belongs, the nation has been able to manipulate us into 
believing that these archetypes are natural to our existence, when in fact they 
are entirely artificial constructions. What the European Union therefore needs 
to do is to construct its own simulated archetypes that have the same strength 
of power over our subconscious and consequently enforce the same strength 
of collective solidarity amongst its citizens. In doing so the EU could potentially 
resolve the democratic legitimacy problems caused by multilingualism, without 
having to change the practical, linguistically hierarchical day-to-day workings of 
its institutions.  
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CHAPTER 5. 
SOLUTIONS TO THE EU’S DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY CRISIS: MOVING PAST 
THE PRE-CONDITION OF A COMMON LANGUAGE IN DEMOS FORMATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The reasons behind the inexistence of a European demos have been clearly 
outlined as well as the full force and impact that the lack of a common language 
has on this inexistence. The previous chapter made clear that it is my opinion 
that we should not be constructing, defining or identifying with Europe under 
the same terms as we do with the nation state. That being said, given the 
direction the EU has taken in its attempt to form a European identity, and in 
reluctant recognition of that fact that the EU can’t just “start again”, this 
chapter will firstly consider whether there are any other features and 
archetypes of national identity that the EU could adopt to possibly forge a 
strong sense of European identity by continuing along its chosen path of 
national-identity emulation, and thus consider whether these archetypes 
would hold enough strength to support a greater level of democratic 
participation by making European citizens feel like a European people. 
One specific aspect of national identity formation that will be looked at during 
this chapter in relation to the EU’s identity construction is that of The Other.  
This line of thinking within identity formation theory argues that in order to 
answer the question “Who are we?” we must first be able to answer the 
question “Who aren’t we?” This question is important because if there is no 
certainty about who the people are then this has direct consequences for the 
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legitimacy of the institution as a whole and its democratic value. What is lacking 
is a defined geographical “We” border due to continued enlargements 
throughout the EU’s lifespan.  Linguistically, geographically and conceptually 
we do not know for certain who We, the people of Europe, are in terms of 
having a collective identity. 
In contrast however the suggestion that follows, impractical and idealistic as it 
may be, is a deconstruction of all theory that has come before. The current 
dominant position in academic literature takes the position of: no common 
language = no demos = no democracy. ‘According to Peter Graf Kielmansegg, 
the most determined representative of this school of thought, there is no 
European demos sharing a collective identity because the European level lacks 
a community of communication, collective experiences and common 
memories.’294  But what if we deconstructed our current understanding of what 
identity formation entails? In other words, what if we took the common 
language necessity out of demos creation? Would it then be possible to 
hypothesise about how a European identity could be forged and thus create a 
European demos that feels able to actively democratically participate without 
having a common European language?  It is my opinion that the feeling of being 
a people i.e. having a strongly felt and strongly defined collective European 
identity is all that is needed for this to happen.295 This is supported by my earlier 
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explanation of legitimacy being made of two components: a formal one and a 
social one (see footnote. 7 of this thesis). If we can forge a European demos, 
and thus increase social legitimacy, then this could mitigate the problems 
caused by formal (procedural) legitimacy such as those created by the 
multilingual nature of the EU.   
Benedict Anderson states that the nation is “an imagined political community 
– and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign”. If so, then surely we can 
imagine something else. 
 
CHAPTER 5: SECTION 1 
START AS WE MEAN TO GO ON 
In his writings on nation formation Benedict Anderson suggests that ‘a nation 
[is] a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive 
themselves as part of that group. It has an objective dimension (territory, mass 
education, common legal rights and duties) and a subjective one (common 
culture, symbols, myths)’.296 Based on what previous discussion has shown, the 
EU has so far emulated some of these objective and subjective features, but 
not all. On the objective side it has implemented common legal rights and 
duties to all citizens of all member states, but not the mass education or 
territorial aspects. On the subjective side the EU has copied the form but not 
the content of the symbols and myths used by nation states in order to create 
a common culture, but has not been successful in doing so.  Whilst it is not 
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being suggested that the EU is trying to forge a nation it cannot be denied that 
the EU works as a collective on many of the social and economic factors that 
are inherent in national identity formation as outlined in the previous chapter: 
anthem and flag symbolism, single currency creation, citizenship, free 
movement of people, free movement of goods etc. According to Ulrich Beck 
and Edgar Grande, ‘in public debates, Europe is still mostly conceived as an 
“incomplete nation,” an “incomplete federal state,” and in consequence it is 
treated as if it should (and could) become both nation and state’.297 Yet what is 
missing from the list? What features of the nation-state or national identity has 
the EU thus far not adopted? We know which traits of national identity 
formation the European Union has emulated, but which ones hasn’t it 
emulated? The starkest absences are undoubtedly the lack of: a common 
education system, a common welfare system and a joint defence 
system/strategy. 
Discussing the economics of a common welfare system goes beyond my 
comprehension. But suffice to say that where economics are concerned on a 
European level (that is to say the Euro), there has been much hostility due to 
the fluctuation in and strength or weaknesses of different economies across 
European Union member states. Implementing a EU-wide welfare system will 
more likely than not increase such tensions and lead to intense resistance from 
the more wealthy EU members states such as Germany, the UK and France. And 
what of the possibility of a common defence/joint military strategy? Such a 
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consideration as an identity creating or strengthening tool forms part of the 
discussion on the EU and “The Unknown Other” below (in Section 1.b). 
 
SECTION 1.a : A COMMON EDUCATION SYSTEM 298 
A common education system would certainly have its benefits in terms of 
European identity formation. In creating a bond between the youth of the 
member state nations this would permit a gradual solidarity that would carry 
into the workplace and support the free movement of people in the sense of a 
workforce. Arguments about quality standards when employing people from 
other EU countries could be quashed if all member state nations had been 
subject to the same rigorous education system and assessment procedures 
across the board: 
One of the committees established to analyze aspects of further 
European integration examined the concept of European identity under 
the leadership of Pietro Adonnino. ‘‘A People’s Europe’’ (Adonnino, 
1985), known as the Adonnino Report, was significant for the 
development of European citizenship. It included the right of residence, 
freedom of movement, right of establishement and right of citizens’ 
participation. Within this report the concept of European identity was 
closely tied to European citizenship. The Adonnino Report focused on 
culture and education, ‘‘which is essential to European identity and the 
Community’s image in the minds of its people’’ (Adonnino 1985, p. 
21).299 
Clearly the European Union itself understands the great potential of education 
in the battle to forge a true European identity and consequently valued and 
loyal European citizenship. Education could arguably play a greater role in 
solidifying a European identity than such the freedom of movement or right of 
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residence as European ideals would be instilled in the European population 
from a younger, more impressionable age. 
The furthest the EU has so far ventured in terms of education is through their 
present Erasmus (Erasmus Plus) programme and the former Socrates and 
Socrates II programmes. These programmes are generally well received and 
highly viewed for their generosity in funding opportunities for those who wish 
to study abroad for a short period of time.  The Erasmus Plus programme 
(initiated in 2014) has even extended this possibility so that it is not only those 
in tertiary education who can take advantage of this system, but also those who 
are in secondary education. The success of these programmes is likely largely 
due to their lack of interference with member states’ national education 
systems, being a supplementary option rather than enforced educational 
requirement. Although, it is highly probable that any attempt to introduce a 
standardised, EU-wide education system would be met with hostility, there is 
of course an argument for it in terms of supporting the creation of a European 
identity. Certain academics argue that mass education systems are an effective 
tool for state control and manipulation: 
The possibility that governments may actively intervene [in the 
education curriculum] to try to change popular perceptions of their 
identity. One could cite here not only the recent efforts of the British 
government to change the content of the history curriculum to accord 
with its perceived 'national interests', but also the efforts of France and 
Germany to change earlier perceptions of each other, through the use 
of symbols, through massive youth exchange programmes, and by 
subsidizing academic studies of common history, all of which have after 
25 years had a significant effect.300 
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Such a tool could arguably be used on a European level to “manipulate” the 
population from a young age into identifying with the symbols of their choice 
as a means of forging a European identity. As Patricia Nanz explains, such inter-
societal learning as a citizenship practice ‘could produce a European political 
community which is not based on a demos or a common cultural heritage, but 
on the shared pursuit of the most just and efficient solutions to social 
problems’. 301  A common education system, distributed in the numerous 
languages of European member states might allow for a collective vision and 
understanding of what it means to be European, whilst also leaving space for 
the different world-views each language naturally holds.  
On the other side of the argument however, a common education system at 
national level is largely linked to the utilisation and promotion of a single 
common language; something that the EU is lacking. Meaning that there is no 
guarantee that a common education system on a European scale would have 
the same effect that national education systems have historically had, due to 
the missing elements of a single (dominant) language of that education. Mass, 
standardised education systems came into the public realm in European nation 
states as a post-Enlightenment means of uniting the then recently defined 
geographical nations. Rolling out a common national education system was 
used as a means of standardising language homogeneity across the nation and 
marginalising regional, minority languages in favour of the dominant language 
spoken by the elites in public political discourse: 
Mass education systems, while on the face of it uniting a given national 
population into a single civic culture, also creates divisions along pre-
existing ethnic lines. By forcing all its different peoples to employ a 
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single civic language and by preaching allegiance to national symbols 
and historical myths, the state's elites may actually stir up resentment 
and bitterness at the neglect of minority cultures and the suppression 
of minority peoples' histories.302 
Of course there are examples of countries where education is delivered in 
several languages; as in Switzerland for example. However as has been stated 
previously in this thesis 303 , comparisons between the multilingualism of 
Switzerland, Belgium and Finland for example and that of the EU are over-
simplified and fail to understand that these countries had a fully formed 
national identity well before constitutionalisation and before fully-fledged 
national education systems were imposed, whereas the EU does not.304  As 
Habermas argues, ‘democratic collective identity rests on ‘a prior cultural 
integration of what is initially a number of people thrown together’. This 
integration is needed to create a solidarity that will enable citizens to feel 
responsible for one another’.305  
Whilst national education systems may well be a greatly useful tool in symbol 
identification and potential population manipulation, the success of this at a 
European level (when distribution would be in several different language) is 
questionable. To introduce a common education system in similar fashion to 
the nation-state model could therefore go one of 2-ways. It would succeed in 
playing a large role in the eventual solidification of a European identity through 
symbol manipulation and identification of the young European population. Or, 
it would in fact stir up even further nationalist sentiment as it might be seen to 
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marginalise the histories of certain minority groups within Europe whose 
stories there may not be space for in a Europe-wide curriculum. 
 
SECTION 1.b : EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE OTHER 306 
Looking back to the previous chapter, The Declaration on European Identity 
1973 made a distinct attempt at defining the then European Community 
against an Other with paragraph 22 stating that ‘the Nine propose progressively 
to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or 
groups of countries’. 307  The Other in terms of identity formation is the 
established, yet contested idea that collective identity can only be formed 
against the background of a different collective identity that it recognises as 
being Other to the collective.  Perhaps the most pertinent and succinct 
explanation of The Other in identity formation comes from Basia Nikiforova in 
her article ‘Language Policy and Language of Cultural Pluralism’.  In it she writes: 
Identity is formed and supported through “external” identification, 
distinguishing ourselves from Others. The Other is represented as 
something ontologically external and hostile. Therefore, he has to be 
assimilated or banished. Concern about the Other allows forgetting 
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personal problems and communal conflicts; [The] Other doesn’t exist 
outside me. He is the only unique way of my self-identification.308 
On a collective level therefore must we firstly have a perceived and defined 
Other in order to have a comprehensive We? Historically this is how nations 
have increased nationalistic sentiment, by contrasting their values and cultural 
symbols against those of neighbouring nations in order to demonstrate 
difference and distinction.  The suggestion that the Other poses a threat is 
perhaps the strongest way of affirming fidelity to the home nation.  ‘The in-
group/out-group antagonism is a latent phenomenon which can be activated 
under certain circumstances such as the insiders’ perception that outsiders 
pose a threat to the in-group.’309  This in turn forces the insiders of the ‘we-
group’ to react with discrimination against outsiders in order to protect the 
collective self from perceived or real, substantial or symbolic ‘attacks’ of the 
obvious others.310   
A clear marker of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in national terms has been 
linguistic distinction between nations.  The idea of “I belong to the nation of 
England because I speak English”; “I belong to the nation of France because I 
speak French” etc.  An idea that, as mentioned before, was reinforced through 
the introduction of national education systems being standardised in one single 
dominant national language following the Enlightenment.  Although linguistic 
borders do not realistically work like this, the dominant language of a nation is 
still one of the strongest symbols of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
Throughout history when such nations as England, France, The Netherlands etc. 
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were colonising African nations, one way of asserting their power and 
establishing their colonised territories was by enforcing the use of the 
home/colonising nation’s language within these territories.  However, 
assimilation as the process of evening out “otherness”, adjusting oneself to a 
dominant cultural-linguistic environment is usually accompanied by the 
weakening of national identity, and this is exactly what many Europeans fear.311  
Given the linguistic inequality inherent within the institutions of the European 
Union (see Chapters 1 and 2), the very real fear is that further political and 
cultural unity within the Union will eventually lead to a cultural assimilation led 
by the culture of the most dominant practical language(s) used within the 
institutions.  And with this, many fear that their national identity will be 
replaced by a European identity, rather than coexisting alongside it. This can 
only be overcome forming an equally strong European identity without the pre-
condition of a common language. Something that I hope to demonstrate is 
possible throughout this chapter. 
‘We are witnessing a revival of nationalism even as the globalizing trends of 
post-industrial society become clearer. Established cultures are essentially 
antithetical to the development of a cosmopolitan culture.’312  I would suggest 
there are 2 reasons for this revival of nationalism amongst European nations.  
Firstly, the European Union has vastly underestimated the power of language, 
both as a practical tool for communication and as a dominant feature of identity 
formation; and secondly, it has relied on the same archetypes and symbols as 
nations when forming its identity (common currency, flag, anthem etc.) which 
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has in fact placed it in competition with the national identities of European 
Member States rather than aligning itself alongside them.313  Some academics 
suggest that the EU can only have a fully formed identity if it defines itself 
exclusively against other world actors. 314   If this is the case, then what 
characteristics could we say distinguish Europe as a collective from “not 
Europe”?  This would involve recognising or discovering unique identifiers that 
were exclusive to Europe but nowhere else. This all suggests that having a 
defined Other is a feature of national identity formation that cannot be escaped 
in any identity formation, even that which exist beyond the nation, such as the 
European Union.  But does this distinction between the self and other 
necessarily have to come along with discrimination and conflict? The question 
we need to answer from a European perspective is: what mind-set produces 
stronger feelings of attachment to the group? Do we need the negative 
associations that come with distinction from an Other in order to fully form an 
Us? Or can this difference between Us and Them be outlined in a more positive 
manner that does not breed discrimination against the Other? Highlighting 
difference and distinction between the in-group and the out-group generally 
evokes highly negative sentiments towards the perceived other, however some 
scholars argue that collective identities do not necessarily rest on adverseness 
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to others because strangers do not have to be enemies.315  Yes, strangers do 
not have to be enemies, but whether this is true for identity formation is 
another question.  
 
1.b.i Europe against Russia, the US and afar 316 
The values of collective identity are formed in opposition to the values 
cherished in other cultures. Constructing or perceiving an “enemy” of the 
collective gives those within it the idea that this “Other” poses a possible threat 
to the collective’s way of life, culture, economy, security or whatever else it 
defines its distinguished self with. ‘These Others are, however, shifting objects: 
the non-European world is projected on some particular Others, sometimes on 
the ‘East’, sometimes on the ‘Orient’, sometimes on ‘America’. Distinguishing a 
European culture from such Others is a strategy for the foundation of a story 
about a European Self, i.e. a collective identity.’317  
In his article ‘From Cultural Defence to Political Culture’, Philip Schlesinger 
argues that the ending of the Cold War has had a profound impact on how we 
categorise European culture.  He suggests that having the defined other of 
Russia allowed us to see ourselves in polar opposition to another entity: 
democracy vs. totalitarianism, capitalism vs. socialism, freedom vs. repression.  
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Given the changing political atmosphere since the Cold War, along with the 
expansion of the EU eastwards to former Soviet states, the ability to define 
ourselves against Russia, the Other, no longer exists with the same clarity.  It is 
blurry, indistinct and unclear, to the point where Europe is unsure against 
whom to measure or contrast itself.  The recent tensions with Russia with 
regards to the situation in the Ukraine could be a situation upon which the EU 
could once again define itself as an Us against the Other, being Russia once 
more.  Should the Member States of the European Union decide upon joint 
military action against Russia if the situation worsens, this is exactly the type of 
situation that leads to stronger nationalistic, or in this case supra-nationalistic 
sentiments.318 Should this situation arise, it would perhaps be an example of 
negative experiences being stronger in identity formation than positive ones.  
Anthony D. Smith suggests that the effect of such frontiers on creating an out-
group depends on the degree of unity of perceptions and sentiments among 
the Europeans themselves, and on the degree of common political action, of 
which the field of defence and foreign policy is especially significant. 319 
Collective military action, although negative in consequence, would form a 
collective memory that would be emotively significant enough to move towards 
a sense of collective at the European level. 
In many ways The United States could be the “Other” against which Europe 
distinguishes itself. The US has a level of international political power 
comparable, if not greater, than that of the combined EU states, and is 
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undoubtedly an ally to the EU in many situations of global concern; yet there 
are certain aspects of its legal and political system which stand in such stark 
contrast to the (some would say) more liberal and progressive stances taken by 
the EU member states that its opposition in the form of the “Other” could be 
defined: 
[T]he EU stresses its progressive stance, for instance in rejecting death 
sentence or in promoting and implementing environmental policies. By 
so doing it asserts its leading role and depicts, for instance, the US as a 
laggard. In other words, the EU promotes its positive image as the 
forerunner in the fight against climate change, thus claiming its moral 
supremacy. Consequently, the EU uses the vanguard-laggard dichotomy 
in order to describe its own identity in contrast to other countries, in 
particular the US. The United States are especially useful for the EU’s 
identity constructing processes, since being a global power with their 
own normative appeal, they can serve as a ‘significant other’. In this 
case, the EU uses techniques associated with the construction of the 
inferiority of the other with the aim of establishing and perpetuating its 
own positive image.320 
Promoting its progressive human rights and environmental stance aside the 
danger here would lie in the fact that the US, like the EU, is a democratic, 
Christian, capitalist group of states, meaning that its otherness might become 
confused given its level of sameness. As such it would quite probably be seen 
as a rather ambiguous “Other” to imagine. Even Habermas notes that the 
differences between Europe and the US ‘are overdrawn and constantly risk 
“orientalising” an egoistic, religious, unilateral, consumerist American other 
and reifying a democratic, secular, solidaristic Europe’.321 
The pitfalls of these two suggestions aside, the fact remains that if the EU insists 
on forming its collective identity based on the recipe provided by national 
identity construction, then it must decide upon which Other it is going to pit 
                                                          
320 Kaina and Karolewski, ‘EU Governance and European Identity’, p. 23. 
321 Parker, ‘Why EU, Which EU? Habermas and the Ethics of Postnational Politics in Europe’, p. 399. 
176 
 
itself against. There are other options of course: Political opposition with China 
given its communism; Economic opposition with India and its expanding 
economy; or religious opposition with the Middle East and Islam as the 
dominant religion. The dangers of defining this Other in such a multicultural age 
however, are very real and present a very real level of difficulty. The nature of 
modern identity is very different to that even of 30-40 years ago prior to high 
levels of economic migration. Our modern idea of Us almost always includes 
what would once have been perceived as Them. Individual nations, particularly 
European nations, are much more religiously and culturally diverse than they 
were say 50 years ago and this diversity has become part of modern multi-
cultural identity.  This only increases at the collective European level not only 
with the continually expanding geographical borders, but also given the 
inclusion of third country nationals who gain European citizenship.  A big 
problem for envisaging an Other for Europe is that the various nations of the 
EU are made up of multicultural citizens who are Others in a sense.  The Other 
can be simply described as being something which is outside ourselves, outside 
what we perceive to be common amongst ourselves in our chosen collective. 
However, multiculturalism makes this definition of what we are NOT much 
harder when what we are not may also be what we ARE.  
It might be an inescapable necessity for the EU to define itself against an Other 
in order to begin creating a fully formed European identity which would allow 
its citizens to feel like a collective.  But just because it may be a necessity, that 
does not make it a necessary evil.  By following the national identity formation 
concept of Otherness it does not mean that they have to do it in the same way.  
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In acknowledging the multiculturalism and the narratives of sameness and 
difference that already exist within the European culture the EU should not turn 
to marginalisation in order to form an Us.  ‘European identity should not lead 
to new forms of nationalism. That is why it should be flexible and dynamic. It is 
necessary that the European Union ‘‘set out to define a new identity for its 
supranational agenda as more and more Eastern European countries started 
knocking on the Union’s doors’’.’322  The EU needs to find a means of giving a 
solid definition which also allows room for the changeability of collective 
identity and the multicultural nature of it citizens, something that could 
possibly be done through simple geographical certainty and definition. Defining 
the collective inevitably comes along with some potential problems for 
consideration however: 
Definition and self-definition are always relational and contextual; 
cultures are not homogenous wholes but relationally constructed; and 
nations do not consist of essences or given national characters. Rather, 
nations provide the boundaries through which difference is most easily 
constructed and recognized.323  
Abéles’ statement therefore supports the earlier assertion that modern identity 
is not a homogenous concept, so perhaps producing identifiers unique to the 
nations of Europe would in fact cause confusion due to the pluralistic nature of 
modern identity. What Abéles does reveal however is the necessary element of 
boundaries provided by the nation to form a space within which these modern, 
pluralistic concepts of collective can be formed. Is this then the way forward for 
the EU in terms of identity formation? Distinguished, certain geographical 
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borders which physically outline who we are? It could at least be a starting 
point. 
 
1.b.ii Defining the European Union’s Geographical Borders 324 
Geographical borders not only physically define the boundaries of a collectives 
Us and externally Them, but also create a sense of exclusivity within each 
particular collective.  To be able to physically see the borders of a collective 
identity highlights the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ narrative that is also necessary for 
collective identity formation. It could perhaps be suggested that this is a further 
reason why the EU and its citizens have no sense of a strong European identity.  
The EU’s borders are continually moving, with regular expansions over its 
lifetime.  If the European citizens can’t identify what they are not, as what they 
currently are not may be part of what they are in the future, then they do not 
know the defined extent of their collective on a physical level.  There cannot be 
a Them if we do not know where expansion will end and who We are.  Without 
major institutional structural reform the problems outlined throughout this 
thesis caused by the multilingual nature of European Union law will never be 
resolved.  The only way to configure these potential institutional reforms is to 
find or create a complete definition for the EU as an entity, a process which can 
only begin with the solidification of geographical borders. Given that the EU 
cannot distinguish itself linguistically due to its multilingual nature, and given 
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that its definition as an entity is contested and vague, geographical borders are 
perhaps the only certainty that the EU could reasonably commit itself to. 
 
The European Union itself needs to be defined in a way that its citizens 
understand its nature, and physical, geographical definition might just be the 
starting point. The competences of the Union have been continually advancing 
since its naissance; growing from a simple economic union, to a political, legal 
and social union over its lifetime.  As an entity, it is not like anything which has 
existed before; it is neither a federation nor a confederation; not a nation nor 
simply an international organisation, all of which casts confusion over its 
political nature. We tend to describe it as a supranational entity, a definition 
which goes no way in helping the citizen understand the relationship between 
the citizen and the EU.  It makes sense to begin with a defined physical certainty 
to begin the process of identity formation as it offers a real and physical Other 
against which the European self can be projected upon. This would allow for 
the process of demos formation to begin and thus creating the space of 
democratic legitimacy that the EU is currently lacking and which linguistic 
diversity has somewhat limited.  As Habermas says: ‘Any political community 
that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at least distinguish 
between members and non-members.325  
Others have questioned whether we should really be aggregating the EU on 
these terms.   ‘Is a European identity merely the sum total of its various national 
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identities and communities? If so, is there not something quite arbitrary about 
aggregating such identities simply because certain otherwise unrelated 
communities happen to reside in a geographical area which is conventionally 
designated as the continent of Europe?’326  Not necessarily in my opinion. Even 
if geographical aggregation seems arbitrary to some, it is no more arbitrary than 
many of the other artificial tools nations use to strengthen attachment at 
collective level. What’s more, doing so would potentially allow for a defined 
space in which to assert a rights based Union. What this geographical definition 
would also allow for is a certain space within which the European Union could 
solidly define what the Rule of Law means in relation to the laws of the Union, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  If the European Union is able to define 
the geographical limits of its membership, then it can begin working on a Rule 
of Law definition that encompasses the understanding of the Rule of Law within 
all of its member states. Physical boundaries, once in place, open up the doors 
from numerous other certainties and definitional possibilities to begin, upon 
which a solidly defined European identity can begin to be formed. 
Whilst my argument maintains that the traditional, post-Enlightenment 
structure of nation-state building and thus national identity formation is not 
the path that the EU should be following, it would be remiss of me to not accept 
that there is a place in European identity formation for Otherness. The external 
validation of a Them seems to be a necessary component for Us, the in-group, 
to feel attachment to each other as well as to the European Union itself. It is 
the internal archetypes that I am sceptical and dismissive of, not the external 
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validation. According to Derrida, the European Union reflects the 
Enlightenment ideals based on homogeneous values that produce binary 
distinctions such as: European/non-European, self/other, essential/contingent, 
universal/particular, and so on. He argues that European identity should be 
more open to differences. Hence it should be re-defined.327  Perhaps then what 
is needed is another Enlightenment. If the EU lacks the preconditions of 
nationhood (as I have demonstrated is the case) meaning it is therefore 
deficient both as an idea and as a process, I suggest we should not be forming 
its identity on the post late 18th century Western ideas of nation but on a 
different set of preconditions that we equally artificially constructed. With 
defined geographical European borders within which European identity 
formation can take place, another Enlightenment would mean that we can 
reform our idea of what identity formation should entail at the European level. 
 
CHAPTER 5. SECTION 2 
STARTING AFRESH 
As John Erik Fossum writes: ‘It is not clear that the EU needs to equip itself with 
similar means to foster a post-national identity. Another and related question 
is whether these socialising mechanisms mean the same today as they did 
when the nation states were forged. The challenge is to understand how 
identity formation takes place in the contemporary world’.328 And this is where 
the challenge lies. As the EU does not fit into any of our traditional 
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understandings of nation or state formation, it must find a contemporary 
manner of conducting identity formation that fits into its contemporary 
condition. Discovering a way to form its identity (both the collective identity of 
its people and that of itself as an institution) is the starting point for the EU to 
become more united politically, socially, economically and culturally, and to 
become a democratically legitimate entity. As we know from the above 
discussion, the EU has adopted several concepts that would normally, or 
historically be associated with the nation state: creating a single currency, the 
common market, the supremacy of EU law etc. Yet the most traditional 
mechanisms for socialising a people are still held at national level: a common 
language, a common heritage, a national education system.  The problem isn’t 
that the EU has only been able to emulate some of these characteristics, it is 
rather than it attempted to emulate any of them at all. Rather than forming a 
supra-national identity that exists with the same strength and alongside 
national identities, it has instead made something weak yet opposing which has 
led to low levels of identification and a defensive attitude towards the EU.  In 
order to stop this attitude from perpetuating the European Union needs to 
decide upon new archetypes that aren’t the same as those that national 
identity is based upon.  Perhaps this would also stop negative sentiment 
towards the EU in that the people would take on this additional identity without 
feeling as though they were sacrificing their national identity. It is through 
finding its identity and forging a collective identity for its peoples that the 
questioned democratic legitimacy of the European Union can begin to be 
overcome. By forging such an identity without the archetype of a common 
language in particular, the democratic viability of the EU as a whole would no 
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longer be dependent on communication possibilities in the same way as those 
of the nation state.  
This thesis thus far, although separated into titled subject chapters in an 
attempt to force structured coherence from what is often untamed thought, 
has led to a point which hopefully makes clear the inter-relatedness of such 
concepts as language, thought and identity with notions that we (wrongly) 
perceive to be stable, timeless entities such as the nation state. All that which 
has come before leads to this point: given what we now understand about the 
problems caused by multilingualism and having a weak sense of identity on a 
European level, how can we make the situation better than it currently is?  
Before leading into discussion on the idea of a re-Enlightenment I consider the 
Habermasian idea of Constitutional Patriotism, Charles Taylor’s Deep Diversity 
and the oft-cited possibility of a rights-based Union as means of demos 
formation within the EU. Certain aspects of these alternatives most certainly 
could feature in a re-Enlightened European identity. However others are 
dispelled for their lack of understanding of the strength of attachment needed 
for identity formation to take place.329  
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SECTION 2.a : CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM, DEEP DIVERSITY AND A RIGHTS-
BASED UNION 
2.a.i Constitutional Patriotism 330 
Turning first towards the concept of constitutional patriotism, more specifically 
Jurgen Habermas’ development of the concept. The term ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ is a concept borne out of post-war Germany by political philosopher 
Dolf Sternberger, the idea of which was later taken up and developed by Jurgen 
Habermas. To say that Habermas developed what we understand as 
constitutional patriotism is true, yet it could not be said that it has been truly 
defined as a self-supported political theory. Some scholars even question its 
status as a free-standing political value: ‘there has been significant 
disagreement as to whether constitutional patriotism is a political value in itself 
or a means to ensure other values, such as political stability’.331 Nevertheless, 
from what is generally understood from Habermas’ writings on constitutional 
patriotism, he argues that cultural and ethnic identity should be detached from 
the state or political culture as it were, and thus suggests that loyalty should be 
based on abstract procedures and principles.332 Many consider constitutional 
patriotism an attractive option to engender political allegiance in an ever more 
multicultural world, particularly in multicultural societies such as that of the 
European Union. This is because it hypothetically allows for political recognition 
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and inclusiveness when a broad range of cultures and nationalities are 
politically aligned. ‘[Constitutional patriotism] attempt[s] to bind the state 
around its constitution and the abstract principles and procedures of liberal 
democracy, moving it away from a basis in an ethnic or cultural identity.’333 As 
Mason explains: 
In principle at least, the citizens of a state could identify with their major 
institutions and practices, and feel at home in them, without believing 
that there was any deep reason why they should associate together, of 
the sort which might be provided by the belief that they shared a 
history, religion, ethnicity, mother tongue, culture or conception of the 
good.334 
What this means is that while the various identities of the peoples of Europe 
could exist and co-exist within the European Union, they would not actively be 
echoed within its institutions. Habermas is hence suggesting that the citizens of 
the European Union should hold their collective identities yet not look to the 
state (the institutions of the EU in this sense) to validate these or to create the 
symbols that the collective can form their identity around. Habermas believes 
that ‘the European Union can be based on a ‘thin’ collective identity stemming 
from a set of abstract universalistic principles such as human rights, but evolves 
and thickens from this Kantian cosmopolitan conception into the European 
constitutional patriotism which is expected to replace the ethnic bonds of 
European nations’.335   
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Constitutional patriotism therefore seems to be a type of identity separation 
rather than identity formation. It separates the already existing European 
national identities from the larger institution of the EU by distinguishing 
national identity from political identity. By doing this constitutional patriotism 
dismisses the idea of finding a possible way to form a valid and strong supra-
national European identity. One of the many problems with this idea is that by 
separating identity from the state (or the political allegiance) it is unclear where 
peoples’ loyalty to the European Union will stem from.  The political state is 
enmeshed with the notions that form our national collective identities, and so 
if we separate our political allegiance and our collective allegiance, who’s to say 
that the strength of belonging and loyalty will remain with solely the political? 
What is more, having the collective’s identity and therefore loyalty be “thin” 
would inevitably lead to the bonds between that collective being weak.  As has 
been written about in the previous chapter, collective identity or national 
identity uses symbols to form a sense of solidarity which in turn fosters loyalty 
to the nation. ‘It is doubtful that the idea of good government is enough to 
motivate people to make such sacrifices in new democracies since the 
government is too young to be proven to be good. Rather, for many people to 
make sacrifices they need to think they are making sacrifices for an entity that 
is both part of and greater than themselves.’336 The problem with constitutional 
patriotism is that it doesn’t grasp the whole sense of importance of collective 
identity in relation to the (political) state, that is to say the importance of 
collective identity for democratic communication and hence the democratic 
viability of the larger entity as a whole. With its separation of collective identity 
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from the state, and its thin identity suggestion, no comprehensive 
understanding of where the loyalty and strength normally provided by a strong 
sense of collective identity will come from instead. Citizenship (as in the 
political recognition of and legal right belong to a collective and be subject to 
the rights and laws of that collective) alone is not strong enough to forge or 
sustain a common identity.  Assuming the ineffectiveness of constitutional 
patriotism at the European level can be supported by the fact that the EU has 
funded and promoted numerous citizenship initiatives with the aim of forging 
loyalty between its peoples, none of which have formed anything close to the 
bonds formed by collective identity.  
 
2.a.ii Deep Diversity 
In contrast, Charles Taylor’s concept of Deep Diversity most certainly grasps the 
complexity of collective identity and the strength of loyalty that such an identity 
fosters amongst members of the group. John Erik Fossum succinctly and rather 
impressively explains the content of Charles Taylor’s deep diversity: 
[Deep Diversity] was developed as a means of understanding identity 
and citizenship in complex, multinational and polyethnic states. It refers 
to a situation in which a ‘plurality of ways of belonging . . . [are] . . . 
acknowledged and accepted’ within the same state. Deep diversity is 
more than mere ethnic and cultural diversity. Forms of diversity are 
politically and legally – and perhaps also constitutionally – 
acknowledged and accepted in three fundamental ways. First, society is 
marked by the absence of an overarching agreement on what the 
country is for. This entails different conceptions of the cultural, national, 
linguistic or ethnic make-up of the society and where these conceptions 
constitute different collective goals for what the society ought to be and 
ought to look like. This is generally the case with states that are both 
multinational and polyethnic. Second, society acknowledges the 
existence of different collective goals and tries to accommodate these 
through accepting differentiated citizenship and through allowing 
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collectives to maintain their sense of difference. Third, those groups or 
collectives that feel different or distinct actively take measures to 
maintain their sense of difference or distinctiveness over time. Deep 
diversity thus denotes a sense of attachment in which a group’s or 
collective’s belonging to the overarching entity ‘passes through’ its 
belonging to another and more tightly integrated community. 337 
Breaking this description down, let us first look at the idea of ‘a plurality of ways 
of belonging being acknowledged and accepted within the same state’. Looking 
back at the discussions on language equality and minority rights explored in 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, it can be said that the European Union already 
officially acknowledges the plurality of cultures that exist within its borders 
(although as we know, official recognition does not necessarily lead to practised 
equality).  And as Deep Diversity would suggest is necessary, these forms of 
ethnic and cultural diversity are politically and legally acknowledged within the 
treaties of the European Union. Looking further along in Fossum’s explanation 
of Deep Diversity, it seems to fit very well with the first criteria that is the lack 
of an overarching agreement on what the “country” is for. The various member 
states of the EU most certainly have different visions and aims about what 
European society at large should look like and the direction the EU as a larger 
supra-national entity should be heading towards. The EU can also be said to be 
adhering to the second and third criteria of Deep Diversity in that; 1) the 
different collective goals of the various member states are acknowledged and 
accommodated, 2) difference and diversity is celebrated rather than stamped 
out, and 3) cultural and ethnic difference is actively promoted by the 
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institutions of the EU with a large amount of funds being set aside purely for 
this purpose. 
It is clear that Taylor’s social concept of Deep Diversity understands the 
complexity of issues surrounding the relations between the larger 
political/legal state and the cultural collectives which inhabit the spaces 
demarcated politically and geographically. It also clearly acknowledges that 
bonds and unity between peoples comes from a cultural or ethnic collective, it 
is only citizenship that comes from political and/or legal recognition of such 
collectives. ‘Taylor argues that “a sovereign people, in order to have the unity 
needed for collective agency, had already to have an antecedent unity or 
culture, history or (more often in Europe) language”. Behind the political nation 
there ‘had to stand a pre-existing cultural (and sometimes ethnic) nation”.’338 
What Deep Diversity offers us is a well-rounded understanding of the necessary 
preconditions for the political entity to exist, as well as a social theory into 
which the EU seems to fit quite nicely. It understands the current situation as 
being one of plurality, diversity and difference, within which different cultural 
collectives in the form of member states have various goals and conceptions, 
all of which are considered equally (legally speaking at least). 
Whilst effectively explaining the identity model of the EU as the grouping of a 
plurality of collectives whose loyalty lies in the smaller national collective and 
passes through that of the larger political unit of the European Union, Deep 
Diversity does not in any way offer a solution to the problem of lack of existence 
of a European identity in itself or the lack of a defined European demos.  Deep 
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Diversity simply acknowledges this lack of a European demos and rather than 
offering up suggestions on how to forge one, and seems to rely on the 
possibility of loyalty at the national level being enough to have loyalty at the 
European level given that the nations have politically affiliated themselves with 
the EU. What’s more, whilst it may be true that (as Deep Diversity suggests) the 
EU politically and legally acknowledges the cultural and linguistic plurality of 
the various collectives that exist within the member state nations, as was 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, there are serious practical failings 
and shortcomings of such acknowledgement, especially given the previously 
highlighted problems caused by the plurality of languages within those borders. 
Therefore, what is the point in the legal and political recognition of such 
diversity if its practical implementation is not equally felt by the citizens of each 
diverse cultural collective within the borders of that legal system?  
It would seem that the Deep Diversity approach would work for the European 
Union if it were to decide that its collective goal was to move towards a federal 
system of government given that ‘Deep Diversity entails a commitment to live 
together within an overarching political entity but where different modes of life 
and collective projects are accepted’. 339  As it stands however, the EU has 
neither a solid definition of what it presently is nor a confirmed idea about what 
it will be in the future. What is more, who’s to say that the same stumbling 
blocks caused by the lack of a collective identity and common language would 
not appear along the federal route also? Yet again, unlike other Western 
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federations (the US and Germany for example), the EU is blighted by the lack of 
a common, unifying language.  
 
2.a.iii Rights-based Union 
Both Habermas’ Constitutional Patriotism and Taylor’s Deep Diversity have 
rights as being central to their theories in that the formal, legal recognition of 
the rights of different collectives forms a necessary feature of both. That being 
said, ‘deep diversity is reflective of the communitarian position that rights are 
inadequate to foster a sense of community and belonging’.340 There are those 
however who hold the opinion that given the distinct and diverse nature of the 
European Union, forming a collective sense of being based on collective rights 
is the way forward: 
A rights-based politics of equal dignity, which not only places limits on 
and constrains national identities but also fosters novel, post-national 
ones. This scenario depicts the EU as a rights based federal-type entity, 
which propounds a post-national type of allegiance akin to what has 
come to be known as 'constitutional patriotism'. […] This political 
culture is supportive of cultural difference but cultural difference 
cannot be permitted to undermine the common allegiance. Such an 
entity is premised on an EU-wide citizenship, based on a bundle of civil 
and political rights that ensure citizens' autonomy and permits them to 
consider themselves as the ultimate authors of the laws. […] This 
scenario is premised both on the development of such allegiance-
forming institutions at the EU level as well as on a significantly reduced 
ability of the nation states to maintain their national identities.341 
The idea of a rights-based union therefore centres around the possibility of 
forming a sense of belonging based on collective group rights of the citizens of 
the EU. Yes, each cultural collective is supported and promoted, but this is 
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secondary to the union which is formed between these distinct groups, 
founded in the equal enforcement of common rights. In making rights the 
central focal point, cultural distinction becomes secondary in terms of 
importance to the structure of the union. As the rights are the bond, or the 
bridge, which unify the different peoples of each different collective, their 
precedence is paramount to the union succeeding.  
Taking the idea of a rights-based union in its most simple form we can 
understand why it seems like such a good idea to many. Collective rights mean 
collective recognition, and recognition by the “state” is a key factor of collective 
identity formation. What’s more, blanket rights that are applicable to all 
citizens within the union, no matter which national, ethnic or cultural collective 
they associate themselves with promotes equality and could be the starting 
point for a sense of belonging based on shared recognition and equal rights. 
According to the standard Eurobarometer 69: ‘Peace (45%), human rights (42%) 
and respect for human life (41%) are the three most important values in the 
eyes of Europeans. These three values are on the podium far ahead of 
democracy (27%), the Rule of Law and individual freedom (21% in both cases), 
equality (19%) and tolerance (16%)’342.343 Clearly European citizens themselves 
feel the importance of human rights and thus building a union based on what 
the citizens themselves see as integral to their being could be a positive step 
forward. That being said: 
The sheer diversity of the EU also means that it is still far from clear 
precisely which institutional level this thrust, if successful, will support. 
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In principle, it can occur (a) through a strengthened harmonisation of 
national systems of rights; (b) through the establishment of full-fledged 
European citizenship; (c) through the 'Europeanisation' of international 
rights, in particular those embedded in the ECHR; or (d) through some 
kind of co-evolution of rights at national, EU and 
European/international levels.344 
Furthermore, as with Constitutional Patriotism and Deep Diversity, a Right-
based Union does not in any way attempt to forge a European collective in its 
own right, instead relying on the (potential) unification of already existing 
collectives around a system of rights. Given my earlier discussion in Chapter 2 
on the impact of multilingualism on minority rights implementation, the same 
problems would likely arise but on a wider scale if the EU based its entire sense 
of being around this concept. Making rights the EU’s primary identity marker 
still does not solve any of the identity issues currently present within the Union 
that have been outlined throughout this thesis. Those rights would still be 
subject to potential unequal enforcement due to the EU’s multilingual nature 
unless an alternative, equally compelling identity marker was found to replace 
that of a common language. And unfortunately, as others have also suggested, 
rights just aren’t emotively compelling enough to replace such a strong, sub-
consciously formed identity feature as a common language. There is also the 
issue that the above three ideas attempt to provide a political solution to a 
demos problem.  If we want to increase the democratic legitimacy of the 
European Union, we need to start by looking at the demos at the European 
level, not by segmenting it into a collective of several demos (as with Deep 
Diversity), and not by attempting to get those distinct collectives to co-exist in 
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the name of political patriotism (as with Constitutional Patriotism). Without a 
defined European demos, how can the EU be democratically legitimate?  
As Sophie Duchesne has pointed out, ‘identity change is a complex issue and 
current concepts of European identity do not seem convincing, because they 
are overly analytical, insufficiently refer to the process of political community 
building and are too ambitious’345.  Furthermore, history has shown us that 
attempting European demos formation through political processes is likely to 
be met with hostility. Rather than being seen as an additional identity to 
become attached to, it pits the already strongly defined national collective 
identities against the European attempt. The failure of the TCE (European 
Constitution) is an example of the failure of overt, forced political and legal 
merging of the states and people of Europe.  Morally dubious as it may sound 
in description, what must instead be done is an artificial construction of 
archetypes that are not the same as the archetypes our national identities are 
based upon.  We must forge and construct archetypes that subconsciously 
create a sense of unity rather than attempt an overt reconstruction of the 
Union through constitutionalism or other political processes.  I am not 
suggesting that the people should be tricked into feeling a loyalty for the EU so 
that they would then want a European Constitution; rather I am saying that 
forming a defined European demos is necessary for both the democratic 
legitimacy of the Union and if a move towards a more socially integrated 
European Union is desired.  No political entity can hope to generate loyalty to 
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the institution without a defined people who feel that they have an emotional, 
subconscious attachment to the body at large. 
To reiterate the conclusion of the previous chapter, the formation of a 
European demos with a collective identity is one of the preconditions to 
improve the democratic legitimacy issues of the European Union.  Given what 
was discussed in the previous chapter with regards to national identity 
formation and identity being an artificial social construction, we must start to 
look at ways of beginning to artificially construct a European identity beyond 
that of national identities.  As previously stated, copying the archetypes of 
national identity construction (as the EU has thus far tried to do) is not a good 
idea given the identity conflict it brings between national identity and post-
national identity. But just because copying the symbolic content of national 
identity is not a good idea, that does not mean there is any problem with 
copying its format. Identity construction at the national level has proved to be 
a remarkably strong concept. The collective identity formed around the nation-
state has been able to create within the citizens of that nation a feeling of 
belonging based on archetypes which, although artificially constructed, we feel 
are natural to our existence. What the European Union therefore needs to do 
is to follow the nation-state format but construct its own simulated archetypes 
that have the same strength of power over our subconscious and consequently 
enforce the same strength of collective solidarity amongst citizens at the 
European level. 
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CHAPTER 5. SECTION 3 
STARTING FROM SCRATCH: A RE-ENLIGHTENED IDENTITY 
As discussed in the previous chapter and earlier in this, our present concept of 
nation-state and hence national collective identity arose following the 18th 
Century Enlightenment period in Europe. Perhaps then, if demos formation at 
the EU level is the solution to the democratic legitimacy issues created by its 
multilingual nature (as I am suggesting it may well be), and following the 
format, not the content of national identity formation is the way to proceed, 
then we need to start with a re-Enlightenment.   
You can’t just make an Enlightenment happen.  Enlightenment is more the 
resulting period of a gradual collective change in social views about both the 
personal and the political.  It is the collective’s response to archaic ways of 
thinking that dominate society by demonstrating social progression through 
art, protest and social movements. It is using reason over tradition and using 
that reason to move society forward.  And this is what the European Union must 
do.  Progress in human thought has brought us the birth of democracy, 
women’s suffrage, racial equality and human rights.  There was a time when 
these things were inconceivable to the collective conscious, but now we could 
not imagine a (Western) world without the existence of these things, imperfect 
though their application may be.  What is being suggested is that the EU needs 
to think outside the box; to see its own existence beyond the confines of what 
is already defined and what can already be conceived of. Only then will it be 
able to overcome the democratic legitimacy issues caused by its multilingual 
nature and form an identity both for itself and for its citizens as a collective that 
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does not conflict with their pre-existing national identities. As Rosamond notes, 
‘this tendency to “familiarize” the EU might seriously downgrade its novelty, its 
distinctiveness and its potentially transcendent qualities’.346 
An ethical vision of a European future is one which aims at moving 
beyond a methodological nationalism and goes further towards 
embracing – rather than overcoming – the plural reality of Europe. This 
may involve new imaginative ways of thinking about the world and 
Europe – both in social scientific and normative theoretical domains – 
which adopts what Ulrich Beck calls a methodological cosmopolitanism 
in place of a methodological nationalism. Adopting such an approach, 
Beck and Grande advocate a “both-and” cosmopolitanism for Europe. 
In other words, the aim should be a cosmopolitan Europe – rather than 
an oxymoronic European cosmopolitanism – where both loyalty to 
nation and loyalty to Europe (and, indeed, globally) is possible.347 
The general idea of creating a European collective identity in addition to 
national ones is not new in itself. There are two predominant views about 
national and European identity; ‘one claiming that national and European 
identities are competing, therefore, to develop a European identity, national 
identity needs to be at least eroded; and another one claiming that the bases 
of identification with the European community are different from those with 
the national community, so national and European identities are compatible 
and they can coexist peacefully’348.  Whilst my view falls within the realm of the 
latter of these two, my suggestion of using the format but not the content of 
national identity is where the novelty of solution comes from. In order to form 
a European identity and thus demos we do not need to erode national 
identities. Conflict between the two has only arisen in my view because the 
content of European identity has so far copied and thus conflicted with the 
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content of national identities. ‘Any further integration of Europe must be 
guided not by the traditional ideas of uniformity in a European federal state, 
but must take the unalterable diversity of Europe as its starting point’.349 If 
created in the right way, with a full understanding of the gravity and weight 
held by the symbols and archetypes that form its content, European identity 
could be constructed to function alongside national identity, by using its format 
but not its content.  
 
SECTION 3.a : STAGE 1. RE-ENLIGHTENED IDENTITY: CONSCIOUS 
CONSTRUCTION AND SUBCONSCIOUS ATTACHMENT 
Looking back at the 2 markers of identity in the postmodern theory discussed 
in the previous chapter: 1) its reliance on discourse as a key constructing factor, 
and 2) its fluidity and changeability, the European Union must make use of the 
second marker to overcome the first. In other words, use the fluid and 
changeable nature of identity to surpass the reliance on discourse in the 
traditional sense.  It should re-work our idea of collective identity in order to 
hypothesise about how a post-national European identity could be forged and 
thus create a European demos that feels able to actively democratically 
participate without having a common European language.  
When it comes to European identity formation, ‘some scholars believe that the 
European Union has marked the start of a new kind of political system which is 
free from any kind of exclusive commitment on the part of its citizens — be it 
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because of the development of a basic global solidarity or because of the 
transformation of political decision systems from governments to multi-level 
governance’.350 Because of this, many feel that identification with the European 
Union ‘would be a unique process, based on different kinds of feelings of 
belonging than existing identification with a nation’.351 Others have argued that 
‘there can only be a European identity if it is civic – based on a ‘social contract’ 
– and not cultural – based on a shared tradition’.352 All of these arguments have 
valid points, and different though their approach might be in substance, one 
thing that they all agree on is that European identity needs to be something 
different. Whilst I agree that exclusive commitment to the EU is not necessary 
for European identity formation to take place, commitment beyond political 
allegiance most certainly is. Not only that but, as many scholars also suggest, 
this process must be unique and comprise of different kinds of feelings than 
those bound up in national identity commitment.  
Perhaps the most physically prominent feature of national identity formation is 
the demarcation of geographical borders discussed earlier. For the EU, each 
enlargement brings along with it an increase in nationalistic sentiments, with 
the citizens of present member states often displaying hostility towards the 
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idea of further enlargement, and what they perceive as the further stretching 
of resources and funds. A logical starting point would be to define the 
geographical borders of the EU, by stating that no further enlargements will 
take place. Historically, national borders have been put into place through wars, 
battles and tensions with neighbouring states; ‘nation building has been 
marked by struggle, by people actively seeking recognition for their particular 
culture, history, language, and identity’.353 Evidently, this is not the path that 
the EU would or should take given that the essence of its being was borne from 
a desire to stop wars between European countries ever happening again. 
However that does not mean that the EU cannot follow the format of 
geographical nation-state boundary definition, without following the hostile 
manner in which it took place. Border definition through political debate and 
general consensus of the citizens already within those borders would be a 
democratic, peaceful start to defining the boundaries of the EU, at least 
geographically speaking. Following the idea of politics of “The Other”, having 
defined geographical borders is the starting point for the creation of a collective 
demos. Once the people within those borders can identify those that do not fall 
within their borders, i.e. identify the Them collective, they can begin to form 
their Us collective. Continuing with the idea that we should be following the 
format but not the substance of national-identity formation, one significant 
factor for the European Union is making sure that their Us and Them dynamic 
is neither ethno-central nor religion-centric as is the case with national identity 
Other distinction. Given the multicultural, diverse nature of the European 
Union, it is vitally important that in forging a European identity we are careful 
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to avoid the xenophobic characteristics that featured in post-Enlightenment 
national identity formation. ‘A 'post- modernist' global culture is more likely to 
resemble is the eclectic patchwork we are witnessing in America and Western 
Europe today-a mixture of ethnic elements, streamlined and united by a veneer 
of modernism’.354 According to Inglehart: 
Identification with Europe will take place in a more abstract way than it did 
with formerly with nations. This would constitute a further level in the 
development of cosmopolitan attitudes, in such a way that post-materialist 
concerns – freedom, quality of life, human values, as opposed to materialist 
concerns like consumer goods and physical security – would become more 
important for Europeans than they were for members of national states.355 
What Inglehart is suggesting not only points to the need for a cosmopolitan and 
diverse appropriation of the Us and Them dynamic for a European identity, but 
his idea also evokes rights promotion as a feature of that identity. Although the 
early discussion on a right-based union was critical of this approach to 
European identity formation, perhaps the problem with it in its current state 
lies not with the concept of a rights-based Union itself, but instead with creating 
an identity based on such with the EU in its current ill-defined state. Whilst still 
holding the opinion that rights alone are not enough to form a strong sense of 
collective identity, they would most certainly feature as one of the hallmarks of 
European identity if the correct conditions of definition and other archetypal 
feature formations were met.   
Once geographical certainty is in place, self-determination of the EU as an 
entity could begin. In order to then solidly define what the EU is within those 
geographical borders, the extent of its competences would need to be more 
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clearly outlined and defined by ending the pattern of gradual competence 
extension that it has thus far taken.  If the EU were to fulfil these definitive 
features (geographical definition without further enlargements and 
competence definition) as a stage-1 of identity formation the possibility of a 
union in which rights featured as one of the unifying collective characteristics 
is more likely. Geographical definition and limitation could therefore open the 
door for many other aspects of identity formation to be put in place, and a 
certainty defined space in which a rights based union would be viable. Certainly 
work would have to be done on the definition of these rights in order to 
encompass the necessary element of diversity and ensure a system of morality 
beyond religious and cultural distinction. But it would most definitely be a more 
likely possibility to include rights in the definition of what it is to be European 
means if there is a certain geographical space in which those rights can be 
defined.356   
Earlier in this chapter when discussing the idea of a rights-based union, I stated 
that “rights would still be subject to potential unequal enforcement due to the 
EU’s multilingual nature unless an alternative, equally compelling identity 
marker was found to replace that of a common language”. But perhaps this 
equally compelling marker can come from several sources rather than just one, 
through a process of European identity formation rather than a product 
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creation. Beginning with geographical definition is most certainly a start, and 
defined rights for the people and competences of the Union within that space 
becomes a viable possibility. ‘The question then becomes: can this commitment 
be generated, or must we wait for it to 'grow', in harmony with the underlying 
conditions for the formation of any large group identity and community?’357 Or 
perhaps there is room for both. This initial stage could be described as being 
the “conscious stage” of European identity construction. The clear and overt 
carving of a physical space and the duties and powers of the EU within that 
space. Identity is a process which is formed through the artificial construction 
of symbols and archetypes, which then over time subconsciously form part of 
the collective self. Some may argue that geographical definition of the peoples 
of Europe is an arbitrary attempt to unite peoples who happen to be situated 
within a certain geographical region. True as this may be what geographical 
definition allows for is much more than that; it is the beginning of a process 
which can be consciously generated in the first instance, but has the aim of 
forming a subconscious sentiment of loyalty and attachment within those its 
construction is formed around; something that takes process rather than 
production.  
Much like identity itself, the European Union is often referred to as a process 
and not a product. European identity formation goes hand-in-hand with the 
European Union defining its own identity. Starting from scratch and beginning 
with the conscious stage of identity construction would be the EU carving its 
position as a state-like entity. Defining a physical space for rights, duties and 
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competences and outlining what those are. ‘Common legal rights and duties for 
all members is not what one should expect from a cultural community, such as 
the nation. Rather, this is a function of the state, the political institution that 
regulates the lives of people within its territory’.358 The sub-conscious stage of 
identity formation would then follow this conscious demarcation to allow for 
the more sentimental attachment that we would usually associate with the 
nation. But how would this take place? 
If we were to look at the European Union as if it were a tree, the conscious 
construction of physical space and comprehensive powers is the seed, and the 
EU needs to choose the correct species of seed and get the conditions of growth 
right or the tree will either grow into something unexpected or won’t grow at 
all. What the EU wants to grow is a unique collective attachment that is equally 
as strong as national identity but does not conflict. Looking at the strength of 
national-identity bonds, Montserrat Guibernau writes: 
Sharing a national identity generates an emotional bond among fellow 
nationals, which, as Connor puts it, is fundamentally psychological and 
non-rational. It is not irrational, only ‘beyond reason’ (Connor 1994b). 
This is so because, basically, a nation is a group of people who feel that 
they are ancestrally related. In Connor’s view, the nation ‘is the largest 
group that can command a person’s loyalty because of felt kinship ties; 
it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family’. However, ‘the 
sense of unique descent, need not, and in nearly all cases will not, 
accord with factual history’ (Connor 1994b: 202) since nearly all nations 
originate from the mixing of peoples from various ethnic origins. For this 
reason, what matters is not chronological or factual history but sentient 
or felt history.359 
The hope would be that once the consciously constructed aspects of European 
identity formation are in place, the subconscious aspects that create the 
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emotional bond and forge loyalty to the institution could take hold. As 
Guibernau notes, when it comes to national identity these emotional bonds are 
irrational, not built on historical fact and are beyond reason. ‘The strength of 
emotions overrides reason, because it is through a sentimental identification 
with the nation that individuals transcend their finite and, at least for some, 
meaningless lives’.360 This can only be a positive thing for the European Union 
as what it needs to emulate (yet subvert) in form is an artificial feeling. Meaning 
that it could create the basis of the sentiment, rather than having to overcome 
and form something that is very real.  
 
SECTION 3.b : STAGE 2. RE-ENLIGHTENED IDENTITY: THE BATTLE BETWEEN 
PAST AND FUTURE 361 
The next stage for the European Union, the “subconscious stage” shall we call 
it, is to make the collective feel something that isn’t necessarily real in a tangible 
or even intangible sense. Guibernau’s quote above, as well as discussion in the 
previous chapter about the nature of national identity, reveals the important 
aspect of a shared history and an imagined idea of ancestral relatedness. This 
past, this historical belonging of togetherness could be said to be the link 
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between all of the other symbols and archetypes of national identity. The 
shared myths and stories are a way of remembering (or creating) the past that 
creates the sense of being united, these stories are shared in the common 
language, a language which is shaped by and shapes the past experiences of 
that collective. Europe, in contrast ‘is deficient both as idea and as process. 
Above all, it lacks a pre-modern past-a 'prehistory ' which can provide it with 
emotional sustenance and historical depth’.362 Perhaps then, in continuing with 
the idea of following the format of national-identity formation but not the 
content, and in attempting to discover something which could overcome the 
strength of unity forged by a common language, we should instead look to the 
future rather than the past. We should not be looking to make the EU collective 
feel ancestrally related as this would again create the conflict scenario that is 
posing problems today. What the EU should instead focus on is an ideological 
relatedness in a future sense, a vision of ideals that we are working towards as 
a collective rather than looking backwards as national identity does. Instead of 
relying on sentiment for a past connection, we could create a yearning for a 
future one. In this way the identity is being consciously constructed but also 
allows for natural growth to strengthen bonds between the various peoples of 
the EU. This would also fit well with the idea of European identity being a 
process. The xenophobic past of the nation-state (national identity) could be 
contrasted with the diverse, cosmopolitan, racially and religiously inclusive 
future of the EU. 
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Contrasting the past-focused myths of national identity with future-focused 
ideals of European identity may well be the step needed to stop one conflicting 
with the other. As Anthony D. Smith writes, ‘The revival of ethnic myths, 
memories and traditions, both within and outside a globalizing but eclectic 
culture, reminds us of the fundamentally memoryless nature of any 
cosmopolitan culture created today’.363 He also points out the ‘time-bound’ 
nature of existing cultures, highlighting the fact that they are ‘tied to specific 
peoples, places and periods’ and are ‘bound up with definite historical 
identities’. 364   All of these features of national identity conflict with the 
cosmopolitan nature not only of the European Union, but also modern 
existence at the national level. My issue with Smith’s evaluation of 
cosmopolitan demos creation is that he fails to see beyond the past. He writes: 
Here lies the new Europe's true dilemma: a choice between 
unacceptable historical myths and memories on the one hand, and on 
the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific 'culture' held together 
solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often 
subject to change. In between, there lies the hope of discovering that 
'family of cultures' briefly outlined above, through which over several 
generations some loose, over-arching political identity and community 
might gradually be forged.365 
Smith does not consider the artificial nature of historical myths, symbols and 
ancestry and in doing so is unable to see the potential for artificial cosmopolitan 
demos creation at the European level. I agree with Smith that we must work 
with materials destined for the very projects which [the European Union] seeks 
to supersede’366, yet I do not see this as a problem. As has been stated many 
times in this chapter and the last, working with these materials should not 
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involve copying them as this creates identity conflict. European demos 
formation ‘should not be built on the Enlightenment’s universalist assumptions 
nor on the metaphysical understanding of a cultural and historical heritage’367 
as ‘stories telling a shared past constitute boundaries with high emotional 
value’368.  Instead, having a sense of collective based on an artificial past and 
artificial myths can be contrasted with having a future sense of self based on 
artificially created future ideals such as rights and genuine cosmopolitanism 
that can be worked towards. In other words, the European Union should create 
a concept or a vision of what our people will be if we work and unify together, 
and rights could play a large part in this. ‘The proposal is to look not at political 
or cultural symbols but at stories that emerge in the making of a network of 
social relations among those living in Europe. […] A story based on a successful 
process of unification, […] the story of the making of a rich, yet socially 
responsible continent, the story of an economic yet social Europe.’369 This is 
exactly the way in which the European Union should be thinking when it comes 
to demos creation at the European level. Prospective stories of future ideals to 
work towards which incorporate the element of process that is necessary in 
solidifying collective identity at such a level.  Just as the stories of the past are 
artificial yet believed in a very real sense at the collective level, the future 
stories of Us can be a dream that we can work towards – a future sense of 
togetherness which, in attempting to achieve, unites and solidifies the 
European collective. 
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SECTION 3.c : STAGE 3. RE-ENLIGHTENED IDENTITY: LABEL MANIPULATION 
Stages 1 and 2 of my Re-Enlightened European demos formation focused on 
the identity of the collective itself and how the process of collective identity 
formation should begin to take place. However, there is one final aspect that is 
of vital importance for demos creation at this level which, rather than being at 
the collective level, must be defined at the institutional level. As mentioned 
both earlier in this chapter and in the previous chapter, the EU has an identity 
crisis of its own.  Not only in regards to the competence creep but also in the 
sense of terminological definition. We continuously switch between referring 
to it as either a ‘post-national’ or ‘supra-national’ state or entity. There are 2 
main problems with this: firstly, given the EU’s unique nature there is no 
definite, comprehensive term which describes its state of being; and secondly, 
both terms currently used make reference to the nation in their name. If we 
look back at the idea of the European Union when it was first conceived, 
‘Monnet's vision was of a federation of member states, with a substantial 
component of supranationality modeled on the nation state, the United States 
of Europe’, whereas Jacques Delors referred to it as an "objet politique non 
identifié".370 Such terminology as “federalism” or “federation” has always been 
shied away from when it comes to the writing of the treaties as ‘the word 
"federation" seems to repel most of the member states. […] It is interesting to 
observe that all European political leaders try never to name or define the 
European political system as it is constructed’.371 Neither the terminology used 
by Monnet nor that of Delors is helpful. The former increases hostile nationalist 
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sentiment and is seen as a threat to sovereignty, whereas the second wilfully 
ignores the need for a defined certainty in a democratic entity. What is more, 
Delors’ choice to term it in such a vague, ambiguous manner in fact harms the 
EU as such a lack of certain self-determination by the EU impedes identity 
formation, identification processes and even integration at the level of the 
citizen. How could any of these processes begin without certainty about the 
larger institution that they are identifying with? The following quote from Marc 
Abeles sums up the EU’s position on self-definition: 
The absence of identification of what could appear as "political Europe" 
(a new sort of nation state? a federation? a postnational?) can be 
interpreted in two different ways: for many politicians and political 
scholars this situation reflects only situational difficulties that can be 
overcome. Anthropologists have to take into account the difficulty not 
only of finding an adequate word to designate the future shape of 
Europe, but also denial concerning the opportunity to adopt a clear 
position on this point. In all speeches, reports, and literature produced 
by the political actors, this indeterminacy has become a 
commonplace.372 
Just because the European Union is unique in every sense of its being, that does 
not mean that it should have remained ill-defined for all of this time. By thus 
far only ill-defining its nature and its name in terms of the nation (by referring 
to itself as a post or supra nation) the EU has once again pitted itself against the 
strength of attachment felt towards the nation. Much as with the arguments 
used throughout the second half of this chapter, the EU has yet again made the 
error of defining itself in terms of the nation. By consciously constructing its 
name in a way that did not refer to the nation, there is the possibility of 
manipulating or altering people’s perceptions about what the EU is and what it 
is trying to become. If this were the world of advertising it would be a case of 
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renaming and rebranding a product after bad publicity in order to trick the 
consumer into believing the content of the product itself was also different. 
How, then, would we define the European Union? Beginning with the 
post/supra options, etymologically speaking ‘supra’ has connotations of 
superiority, which some might find adverse to the pursuit of European identity 
existing alongside national ones, not instead of. ‘Post’ on the other hand does 
not generate the same potentially negative connotations. Rather, given that it 
evokes the idea of coming ‘after’ something else, we could quite literally 
chronologically justify ‘post’ being used in the EU’s definition since the EU did 
indeed come after other types of united entities that collectives had been 
attached to.  Next, we must find something which encompasses the discussed 
notions of European demos creation and definition beginning from a re-
Enlightened position as well as the future-centred identity process that was 
proposed. Given the nature of the argument that our sense of being as a 
collective could come from a constructed future yearning for something better 
that we can work towards rather than an artificial shared past, the word 
“ideology” springs to mind. The Oxford Dictionary offers the following 
definitions for the word: 
1. A system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of 
economic or political theory and policy; 
2. The set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual; 
3. Visionary speculation, especially of an unrealistic or idealistic 
nature.373 
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The definitions combined cover the sense that is intended; the aim of moving 
towards united political, economic, and social beliefs, theory and policy 
through an idealistic shared collective vision.  
With all of these elements in mind, I would suggest that terming the European 
Union as a post-ideologue juris civitas encompasses the European Union as an 
establishment but also as a community of citizens, that those citizens can then 
go on to identify with. The given name defines the EU as a political and 
economic Union but also offers a means of the citizen identifying with it by 
evoking ideologies of a rights-based community; all without referencing the 
nation and thus avoiding conflict in definition. What is more, each word of the 
given name etymologically is derived from either Latin or Greek, meaning that 
the numerous linguistic families that exist within the European Union would be 
able to identify with the words themselves given the etymology of the language 
families within Europe that existing European identities are formed around. 
Beyond the idealistic vision it is also important to include a more solid idea of 
what this ideology would contain when defining the EU. As was stated earlier, 
although I disagree with the suggestion of a rights-based union in the current 
state of the EU, I most certainly agree that rights could and should form a 
significant part of the EU’s identity once the stages suggested above were 
implemented. Naming the European Union in a manner which evokes the 
legally enshrined nature of collective rights would also conjure ideas of social 
justice which could solidify the peoples’ sense of collective communication 
possibility with the establishment. By defining the EU in terms of rights a belief 
in communication possibilities would be aroused. This is because the people of 
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Europe do not necessarily need to practically use or speak the same language 
in order to feel able to democratically participate. By creating a true, solidly 
defined European identity that took hold of the peoples’ subconscious 
sentiment so that they felt like a collective, democratic participation would be 
believed in. If people feel like they belong, then they feel able to participate 
and like their voice is heard. Thus, in forging a demos the problems of unequal 
democratic participation caused by multilingualism (and thus questions around 
democratic legitimacy) can be overcome. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By exploring existing theories about European demos formation, as well as 
considering the path thus far taken by the European Union (that of emulating 
national identity formation), I have been able to outline a new idea of how 
European demos formation should take place. By taking the format but not the 
content of national identity formation, I have been able to suggest a way of 
forging a collective which, in theory, should take hold with the same strength 
as national identity attachment has done so.  None of the above has overtly 
solved the language problem when it comes to multilingualism putting a block 
on democratic legitimacy. What I have instead offered is a way for the EU to 
mitigate the fact that its multilingual nature hinders the true and complete 
application of the Rule of Law within its borders by constructing a European 
identity through a redefinition of its status as a post-nation state. 
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I have also presented and justified a viable hypothesis that identity formation 
at the European level would be able to surpass the problems caused by 
multilingualism simply by making the peoples of the EU feel as though they are 
a collective, which will hence automatically lead to those peoples feeling a 
sense of the possibility of democratic participation. Democratic participation 
therefore becomes a reality through the collective’s subconscious attachment 
to the entity of the European Union through demos formation. Doing so allows 
for the cultural diversity of the EU to remain a celebrated attribute and does 
not require any sacrifice or change on the part of existing national or regional 
identities.   
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis opened with an examination of the multilingual language situation 
of the European Union, more specifically the legislation that is in place to 
protect the linguistic equality of the official languages of the Member States 
and the Union prescribed distinctions between treaty languages, official 
languages, working languages and languages of the case. Examination 
revealed a lack of procedural equality of languages throughout the institutions 
of the EU, and more importantly, that the unequal treatment of languages 
resulted in a lack of certainty and predictability in the law.  Through the 
consideration of ECJ case law, Chapter One revealed that the Union’s current 
situation presents numerous shortcomings such as the relative rather than 
absolute equality of languages, and translation errors that lead to non-uniform 
law due to the impossibility of perfect translation. This further revealed the 
wider issue of the impact such linguistic uncertainty has on the existence of the 
legal certainty aspect of the Rule of Law. 
The case examples discussed in Chapter One demonstrated how complications 
arising from multilingualism can diminish legal certainty, the equal 
enforcement of the law and the equality of all language versions, and thus how 
this directly affects rights enshrined in international human rights laws. Chapter 
Two moved on to further examine what our linguistic human rights actually are 
by looking at the key international instruments on human rights in order to 
better understand the extent of linguistic human rights within the international 
community so that discussion which followed could debate whether or not the 
EU is legally or morally in breach of linguistic human rights. This discussion 
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revealed that language rights are ill-defined across all international instruments 
and that the minimal protection they are in fact granted is not done so through 
specific language rights, but through general human rights that have an implied 
linguistic dimension. The inadequacy of such linguistic rights exposed the larger 
issue that is the effect such inadequate linguistic rights within a multilingual 
entity such as the EU has on the standing of the Rule of Law in the political 
structure of the EU as a whole. It was shown that there is a lack of adherence 
to the certain formal, procedural features of the Rule of Law such as 
foreseeability of the law, accessibility of the law and a lack of legal certainty; all 
resulting from either the multilingual nature of the EU or the lack of well-
defined language rights.  
Chapter Two concluded by stating that there are two steps that the EU must 
take. Firstly, it must define the exact nature and extent of language rights, and 
also what it means by the Rule of Law in order to offer a greater level of legal 
certainty, greater recourse to have these rights upheld at EU level, and of 
course, increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU by creating a greater level 
of predictability and accessibility to the law through definition. The second step 
it was concluded that the EU must take is not so easily resolved. I concluded 
this chapter by highlighting the fact that even if the EU actively takes steps to 
define language rights in their own right, and even if it clearly lays out a 
definition for the Rule of Law at EU level which encompasses the necessity for 
legal certainty, accessibility and predictability of the law, the aforementioned 
problems caused by the multilingual nature of the EU would still be present due 
to the inexact nature of language as an entity, and the impossibility of perfect 
translation. This is why Chapter Three of this thesis subsequently turned to 
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grasping a stronger understanding of language as a concept in order to 
comprehend the nature of the problem conceptually, and thus move towards 
creating a conceptual, theoretical solution where no practical one could be 
found. By exposing such inadequacies, Chapters One and Two gave a deeper 
understanding of the democratic implications of multilingualism with regards 
to rights not being upheld and formal elements of the Rule of Law not being 
fully adhered to. Thus, the content discussed in these chapters showed that the 
problems caused by multilingualism have roots in deeper issues, which alighted 
the idea that it was possible to discover a theoretically conceptual solution to 
the practical problems caused by multilingualism. 
Chapter Three explored language as a concept by looking at it through various 
ideas formed in Western linguistic theories; those of Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. Understanding 
the theories espoused by these linguists explained why the problems caused by 
multilingualism that were discussed in Chapters One and Two present an 
insurmountable practical obstacle for a unified EU. The content of these 
theories offered an insight into the influence that language holds over our 
reality and thought process, and as such revealed the more serious issue of laws 
being discussed and created in one language and thus one world-view being 
dominant in the creation of laws that affect numerous linguistic diversities and 
thus numerous world-views.  However, discussion of these theories not only 
explained why such problems present themselves, but also opened up a 
starting point for a potential solution by revealing language’s position in 
collective identity formation.  The chapter commenced by quoting Dieter 
Grimm, evoking the idea that the absence of a European communication 
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system, due chiefly to language diversity, has the consequence that for the 
foreseeable future there will neither be a European public nor a European 
political discourse. 374  Through a conceptual, theoretical understanding of 
language, this chapter presented the idea that language has a great power in 
its role as a significant feature of collective identity, and thus plays a major role 
in demos formation.  
 
What the consideration of linguistic theories in Chapter Three uncovered was 
that in order to navigate around the language issues of the European Union, we 
must look beyond the language regime towards a solution that does not 
necessarily rely on language being a solution to the language problem.  It 
exposed an opening towards the possibility that, if language holds such great 
power over our democratic participatory capacity because of its primary role in 
identity formation, could we not look beyond language into identity formation 
at the European level that does not have language as one of its defining features. 
The chapter therefore progressed the line of thought into the direction of 
whether it would be possible to create a community of communication and 
participation which is not reliant on a common language, and within which 
language does not feature as one of the markers of the collective identity.  
Although not the main area of originality within the thesis, Chapter Three was 
novel in the approach that was taken to explain and resolve the language issues 
of the European Union. Prior legal academic consideration of the field lacked in 
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depth exploration into the reasons why the linguistic issues within the European 
Union are a continuously prevailing concern.  It also lacked thorough application 
of and explanation through linguistic theory, as well as an absence of 
deliberation on how such linguistic barriers could be minimised in order to 
facilitate a more democratically legitimate Union.   
Chapter Four begins from the premise that the root of the EU’s language 
problems comes from language’s role in identity formation, and thus the 
chapter commences with the suggestion that: if we solve the EU’s demos 
problem through finding a way to forge a European identity that does not 
contain the requirement of a common language, we could also overcome the 
issues surrounding democratic participation and democratic legitimacy within 
the EU. 
Chapter Four covers discussion on: 1) the impact of language on our collective 
identity formation; 2) what it means to have an identity; 3) what identity is for 
the European Union at present; and 4) why the EU is failing in its attempts to 
create a collective identity for its citizens. Exploration of these first two topics 
reveals that collective identity is an artificial construction which uses symbols 
and artefacts to manipulate peoples’ loyalty to an artificial construct; most 
frequently, the nation state. And exploration of the second two topics exposes 
the weak nature of European identity at present, and that its failure is due to 
the fact that its artificial construction has thus far followed the criteria used to 
form national identity (flag, anthem, single currency, border-defined 
citizenship). This has had the consequence of putting this weak European 
identity in competition with national identities rather than existing alongside or 
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above them. The EU should not have been following the path of national 
identity formation as it is not a nation. National citizenship is the result of a long 
process of historical concept formation in which national identity emerged, 
integrating social and cultural differences under a new concept: citizenship. This 
is something that the EU does not have and therefore inevitably invalidated any 
European identity that was being forged using the same criteria. The EU is 
unable to use stories or shared histories in the same way nations do and also is 
unable to use the unifying power of language in the same way nations do. Thus, 
it should not be attempting to use symbols in the same way nations do.   
Coming to this understanding lead me to the idea that the EU needs to break 
down all of these artificial constructions that form national collective identities 
and either subvert them or come up with entirely new and different artefacts 
and symbols in order artificially construct its own collective identity. Given that 
earlier discussion in Chapter Four had revealed the artificial nature of national 
identity construction, and had also looked at the post-modernist view of 
identity which declares identity to be fluid and changeable, I felt confident that 
it should therefore be possible to create a novel and unprecedented European 
identity which was not formed around the same symbols and artefacts of 
national identity, but which instead fit into the post-national existence of the 
Union. And that if we did so, it would add great integrity, legitimacy and stability 
to contemporary identity formation at the European level. 
Chapter Four concludes that the European Union needs to lead the way in 
creating new and different artefacts upon which contemporary identity can 
thrive on rather than relying on the traditional archetypes used by national 
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identity formation if it is to produce the same strength of collective solidarity 
amongst its citizens as the nation state, and if it is to create a Union where true 
democratic participation is possible. If so, the EU could potentially resolve the 
democratic legitimacy problems caused by multilingualism, without having to 
change the practical, linguistically hierarchical day-to-day workings of its 
institutions.  
Although Chapter Four was most certainly novel in its resulting decision on how 
a European identity should be formed and how this goes some way in resolving 
democratic participation potential, it is in Chapter Five where the true novelty 
of this thesis comes to the fore. The chapter outlines two separate paths for 
European demos/collective identity formation: firstly, a path which reluctantly 
acknowledges the fact that in reality the EU cannot just “start afresh”; and 
secondly a path which is idealistic, impractical, but resoundingly novel and 
insightful in its approach and content.  
As such, the first pathway that is discussed considered whether there are any 
other features and archetypes of national identity that the EU could adopt (that 
it thus far has not) to possibly forge a strong sense of European identity by 
continuing along its chosen path of national-identity emulation. Discussion 
focussed on the aspect of “The Other” within national identity formation; a line 
of thinking within identity formation theory which argues that in order to 
answer the question “Who are we?” we must first be able to answer the 
question “Who aren’t we?” By considering this question it was highlighted that 
the EU is lacking a defined geographical “We” border due to continued 
enlargements throughout its lifespan.  Linguistically, geographically and 
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conceptually citizens of the EU do not know for certain who We, the people of 
Europe, are in terms of having a collective identity, given that there is not 
definite, defined They. 
Conversely, the second pathway deconstructs the current dominant position in 
academic literature that: no common language = no demos = no democracy. 
This path of investigation deconstructed our current understanding of what 
identity formation entails by taking the common language necessity out of 
demos creation and by following the format, but not the content, of national 
identity formation. By doing so, I offered a possible route which, if followed, 
could forge a collective and should theoretically take hold with the same 
strength as national identity attachment has done so.  This also involved 
creating a definition which described the existence of the European Union: 
post-ideologue juris civitas, with the aim of facilitating citizen identification with 
the Union. 
The novel approach and theory outlined in Chapter Five did not overtly solve 
the EU’s language/multilingualism problems with regards to democratic 
legitimacy. Instead, it offered a way for the EU to mitigate the fact that its 
multilingual nature hinders the true and complete application of the legal 
certainty aspect of the Rule of Law within its borders by constructing a 
European identity through a redefinition of its status as a post-nation state. This 
theory is largely based around the belief that democratic participation is made 
possible through the act of making a people feel as though they are a collective, 
whether there are practical, linguistic barriers in place or not. The democratic 
participation of the people becomes a reality through the collective’s 
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subconscious attachment to the entity of the European Union through demos 
formation.  
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